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Satchu's Rich Wrap-Up
Monday 27th of February 2017

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If you are tracking the NSE Do it via RICHLIVE and use Mozilla Firefox
as your Browser.
0930-1500 KENYA TIME
Normal Board - The Whole shebang
Prompt Board Next day settlement
Expert Board All you need re an Individual stock.

The Latest Daily PodCast can be found here on the Front Page of the site

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An Interview with @Charles_Hecker of @Control_Risks Video

I thank Siddharth Chatterjee for a wonderful and inspiring #Mindspeak

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Choose a car and a song @MohaBiG

“Nothing behind me, everything ahead of me, as is ever so on the
road.”  ― Jack Kerouac, On the Road

“What is that feeling when you're driving away from people and they
recede on the plain till you see their specks dispersing? - it's the
too-huge world vaulting us, and it's good-bye. But we lean forward to
the next crazy venture beneath the skies.” ― Jack Kerouac, On the Road

“Our battered suitcases were piled on the sidewalk again; we had
longer ways to go. But no matter, the road is life”  ― Jack Kerouac,
On the Road

“Sal, we gotta go and never stop going 'till we get there.'
'Where we going, man?'
'I don't know but we gotta go.”
― Jack Kerouac, On the Road

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My Favourite Robert Frank Photograph remains

Jack Kerouac described this Photograph as follows

In his introduction to The Americans, Kerouac describes this
photograph as "a long shot of night road arrowing forlorn into
immensities and flat of impossible-to-believe America in New Mexico
under the prisoner's moon."

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ANNALS OF DIPLOMACY TRUMP, PUTIN, AND THE NEW COLD WAR By Evan Osnos, David Remnick, and Joshua Yaffa
Law & Politics

What lay behind Russia’s interference in the 2016 election—and what lies ahead?


On April 12, 1982, Yuri Andropov, the chairman of the K.G.B., ordered
foreign-intelligence operatives to carry out “active
measures”—aktivniye meropriyatiya—against the reëlection campaign of
President Ronald Reagan. Unlike classic espionage, which involves the
collection of foreign secrets, active measures aim at influencing
events—at undermining a rival power with forgeries, front groups, and
countless other techniques honed during the Cold War. The Soviet
leadership considered Reagan an implacable militarist. According to
extensive notes made by Vasili Mitrokhin, a high-ranking K.G.B.
officer and archivist who later defected to Great Britain, Soviet
intelligence tried to infiltrate the headquarters of the Republican
and Democratic National Committees, popularize the slogan “Reagan
Means War!,” and discredit the President as a corrupt servant of the
military-industrial complex. The effort had no evident effect. Reagan
won forty-nine of fifty states.

Vladimir Putin, who is quick to accuse the West of hypocrisy,
frequently points to this history. He sees a straight line from the
West’s support of the anti-Moscow “color revolutions,” in Georgia,
Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine, which deposed corrupt, Soviet-era leaders, to
its endorsement of the uprisings of the Arab Spring. Five years ago,
he blamed Secretary of State Hillary Clinton for the anti-Kremlin
protests in Moscow’s Bolotnaya Square. “She set the tone for some of
our actors in the country and gave the signal,” Putin said. “They
heard this and, with the support of the U.S. State Department, began
active work.” (No evidence was provided for the accusation.) He
considers nongovernmental agencies and civil-society groups like the
National Endowment for Democracy, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty
International, and the election-monitoring group Golos to be barely
disguised instruments of regime change.

Benjamin Rhodes, a deputy national-security adviser under President
Obama, is among those who reject Putin’s logic, but he said, “Putin is
not entirely wrong,” adding that, in the past, “we engaged in regime
change around the world. There is just enough rope for him to hang

The 2016 Presidential campaign in the United States was of keen
interest to Putin. He loathed Obama, who had applied economic
sanctions against Putin’s cronies after the annexation of Crimea and
the invasion of eastern Ukraine. (Russian state television derided
Obama as “weak,” “uncivilized,” and a “eunuch.”) Clinton, in Putin’s
view, was worse—the embodiment of the liberal interventionist strain
of U.S. foreign policy, more hawkish than Obama, and an obstacle to
ending sanctions and reëstablishing Russian geopolitical influence. At
the same time, Putin deftly flattered Trump, who was uncommonly
positive in his statements about Putin’s strength and effectiveness as
a leader. As early as 2007, Trump declared that Putin was “doing a
great job in rebuilding the image of Russia and also rebuilding Russia
period.” In 2013, before visiting Moscow for the Miss Universe
pageant, Trump wondered, in a tweet, if he would meet Putin, and, “if
so, will he become my new best friend?” During the Presidential
campaign, Trump delighted in saying that Putin was a superior leader
who had turned the Obama Administration into a “laughingstock.”

For those interested in active measures, the digital age presented
opportunities far more alluring than anything available in the era of
Andropov. The Democratic and Republican National Committees offered
what cybersecurity experts call a large “attack surface.” Tied into
politics at the highest level, they were nonetheless unprotected by
the defenses afforded to sensitive government institutions. John
Podesta, the chairman of Hillary Clinton’s campaign and a former chief
of staff of Bill Clinton’s, had every reason to be aware of the
fragile nature of modern communications. As a senior counsellor in the
Obama White House, he was involved in digital policy. Yet even he had
not bothered to use the most elementary sort of defense, two-step
verification, for his e-mail account.

2. COLD WAR 2.0

Remarkably, the Obama Administration learned of the hacking operation
only in early summer—nine months after the F.B.I. first contacted the
D.N.C. about the intrusion—and then was reluctant to act too strongly,
for fear of being seen as partisan. Leaders of the Pentagon, the State
Department, and the intelligence agencies met during the summer, but
their focus was on how to safeguard state election commissions and
electoral systems against a hack on Election Day.

That caution has embittered Clinton’s inner circle. “We understand the
bind they were in,” one of Clinton’s senior advisers said. “But what
if Barack Obama had gone to the Oval Office, or the East Room of the
White House, and said, ‘I’m speaking to you tonight to inform you that
the United States is under attack. The Russian government at the
highest levels is trying to influence our most precious asset, our
democracy, and I’m not going to let it happen.’ A large majority of
Americans would have sat up and taken notice. My attitude is that we
don’t have the right to lay blame for the results of this election at
anybody’s feet, but, to me, it is bewildering—it is baffling—it is
hard to make sense of why this was not a five-alarm fire in the White

The Obama circle, which criticizes Clinton’s team for failing to lock
down seemingly solid states like Wisconsin, Michigan, and
Pennsylvania, insists that the White House acted appropriately. “What
could we have done?” Benjamin Rhodes said. “We said they were doing
it, so everybody had the basis to know that all the WikiLeaks material
and the fake news were tied to Russia. There was no action we could
have taken to stop the e-mails or the fake news from being propagated.
. . . All we could do was expose it.”

Last September, at a G-20 summit, in China, Obama confronted Putin
about the hacking, telling him to “cut it out,” and, above all, to
keep away from the balloting in November, or there would be “serious
consequences.” Putin neither denied nor confirmed the hacking efforts,
but replied that the United States has long funded media outlets and
civil-society groups that meddle in Russian affairs.

The White House watched for signs that Russian intelligence was
crossing what a senior national-security official called “the line
between covert influence and adversely affecting the vote count”—and
found no evidence that it had done so. At the time, Clinton was
leading in the race, which, the official said, reinforced Obama’s
decision not to respond more aggressively. “If we have a very forceful
response, it actually helps delegitimize the election.”

Robert Gates, who was Secretary of Defense under both George W. Bush
and Barack Obama, describes relations between Obama and Putin as
having been “poisonous” and casts at least some of the blame on Obama;
referring to Russia as a “regional power,” as Obama did, was “the
equivalent of referring to isis as a J.V. team,” in his view. “I think
the new Administration has a big challenge in front of it in terms of
stopping the downward spiral in the U.S.-Russia relationship while
pushing back against Putin’s aggression and general thuggery,” Gates
said. “Every time nato makes a move or Russia makes a move near its
border, there is a response. Where does that all stop? So there is a
need to stop that downward spiral. The dilemma is how do you do that
without handing Putin a victory of huge proportions?”

Some in Moscow are alarmed, too. Dmitry Trenin, a well-connected
political and military analyst for the Carnegie Moscow Center, said
that in early fall, before Trump’s victory, “we were on a course for a
‘kinetic’ collision in Syria.” He said that the Kremlin expected that,
if Clinton won, she would take military action in Syria, perhaps
establishing no-fly zones, provoking the rebels to shoot down Russian
aircraft, “and getting the Russians to feel it was Afghanistan
revisited.” He added, “Then my imagination just left me.”

Not in a generation has the enmity run this deep, according to Sergey
Rogov, the academic director of the Institute for U.S. and Canadian
Studies, in Moscow. “I spent many years in the trenches of the first
Cold War, and I don’t want to die in the trenches of the second,”
Rogov said. “We are back to 1983, and I don’t enjoy being thirty-four
years younger in this way. It’s frightening.”


Putin’s resentment of the West, and his corresponding ambition to
establish an anti-Western conservatism, is rooted in his experience of
decline and fall—not of Communist ideology, which was never a central
concern of his generation, but, rather, of Russian power and pride.
Putin, who was born in 1952, grew up in Leningrad, where, during the
Second World War, Nazi troops imposed a nine-hundred-day siege that
starved the city. His father was badly wounded in the war. Putin
joined the K.G.B. in 1975, when he was twenty-three, and was
eventually sent to East Germany.

Posted in one of the grayest of the Soviet satellites, Putin entirely
missed the sense of awakening and opportunity that accompanied
perestroika, and experienced only the state’s growing fecklessness. At
the very moment the Berlin Wall was breached, in November, 1989, he
was in the basement of a Soviet diplomatic compound in Dresden feeding
top-secret documents into a furnace. As crowds of Germans threatened
to break into the building, officers called Moscow for assistance,
but, in Putin’s words, “Moscow was silent.”

Putin returned to Russia, where the sense of post-imperial decline
persisted. The West no longer feared Soviet power; Eastern and Central
Europe were beyond Moscow’s control; and the fifteen republics of the
Soviet Union were all going their own way. An empire shaped by
Catherine the Great and Joseph Stalin was dissolving.

In speeches and interviews, Putin rarely mentions any sense of
liberation after the fall of Communism and the Soviet Union; he
recalls the nineteen-nineties as a period of unremitting chaos, in
which Western partners tried to force their advantages, demanding that
Russia swallow everything from the eastward expansion of nato to the
invasion of its Slavic allies in the former Yugoslavia. This is a
common narrative, but it ignores some stubborn facts. The West
welcomed Russia into the G-8 economic alliance. The violence in the
Balkans was the worst in Europe since the end of the Second World War
and without intervention would likely have dragged on. And Russian
security concerns were hardly the only issue at stake with respect to
the expansion of nato; Poland, Czechoslovakia, and other countries in
the region were now sovereign and wanted protection.

When the 1996 election season began, Yeltsin was polling in the single
digits. Much of the country held him responsible for economic measures
that seemed to help only those close to Kremlin power. For millions,
reform—including the “shock therapy” pushed by Western advisers and
politicians—meant a collapse in basic services, hyperinflation,
corruption, kleptocratic privatization, and an economic downturn as
severe as the Great Depression. Most Russians blamed not the corrosion
of the old system but, rather, the corruptions of the new. Demokratiya
(democracy) was popularly referred to as dermokratiya (shit-ocracy).
Yeltsin, benefitting from the support of both the oligarchs and the
International Monetary Fund, managed to eke out a victory against his
Communist opponent, but he continued to drink heavily, despite a
history of heart attacks, and, in his final years in power, was often
a sorry, inebriated spectacle.

On New Year’s Eve, 1999, Yeltsin appeared on national television
sitting in front of a Christmas tree. Looking blocky and moribund, he
said that he was resigning. “I am sorry that many of our dreams failed
to come true,” he said. “I am sorry that I did not live up to the
hopes of people who believed that we could, with a single effort, a
single strong push, jump out of the gray, stagnant, totalitarian past
and into a bright, wealthy, civilized future. I used to believe that

A man who had resisted a coup eight years earlier no longer had the
endurance for office or the political imagination to advance the
cause. “I have done all I could,” he said. “A new generation is
coming.” With that, he appointed as his successor Vladimir Putin, a
relatively obscure intelligence agent who had been accelerated through
the ranks because he had proved himself disciplined, shrewd, and,
above all, loyal to his bosses.

One of Putin’s first decrees was to protect Yeltsin from future
prosecution. Then he set out to stabilize the country and put it on a
course of traditional Russian autocracy. “As Yeltsin started to
withdraw, the old system reconsolidated, and Putin finalized this
regression,” Andrei Kozyrev, the foreign minister between 1990 and
1996, said. “The fundamental problem was an inability to complete the
economic and political reforms, and so we slipped back into
confrontation with the West and nato.”

Putin revealed his distrust for an open system almost immediately. He
saw a state that had become barely functional, and he set about
restoring its authority the only way he knew how: manually, and from
the top. He replaced the freewheeling anarchy of Yeltsin’s rule with
something more systematized, casting aside or coöpting the oligarchs
of the nineteen-nineties and elevating a cast of corrupt satraps loyal
to him—an arrangement that became known as Kremlin, Inc. Every aspect
of the country’s political life, including the media, was brought
under the “vertical of power” that he constructed. When Yeltsin held
office, privately owned television stations, such as NTV, reported on
the horrific war in Chechnya and even satirized Yeltsin and other
Kremlin leaders on a puppet show called “Kukly.” NTV, which was owned
by an oligarch named Vladimir Gusinsky, seemed to test Putin in the
beginning, airing discussions about corruption and human-rights
abuses; “Kukly” added a puppet depicting the new President. Putin was
not amused. Within five months of taking power, he dispatched armed
Interior Ministry troops to raid Gusinsky’s headquarters; by 2001,
Gusinsky had been forced to give up NTV to more obedient owners and
had fled the country. Ever since, television has been under strict
federal control.

America’s invasion of Iraq, which Putin opposed, marked a change in
his thinking. Bush had made some progress with him on bilateral issues
such as nuclear-arms proliferation, but by 2007 Putin had grown deeply
disenchanted and came to feel that the West was treating Russia as a
“vassal.” Robert Gates recalls a security conference, in Munich, in
2007, at which Putin angrily charged that the United States had
“overstepped its national borders in every area” and that the
expansion of nato was directed against Russian interests. “People were
inclined to pass it off as a one-off,” Gates said. “But it was a

Putin was hardly surprised by the liberal umbrage voiced by the Obama
Administration and other Western governments. That confrontation was
the point, a means of cementing his authority at home by playing up
the notion of an encircled, perpetually menaced Russian state.
Although Putin grew up under Soviet atheism, he nonetheless decried
secular Americans and Europeans for “rejecting their roots, including
the Christian values that constitute the basis of Western
civilization.” His conservatism, he insisted, “prevents movement
backward and downward, into chaotic darkness and a return to a
primitive state.”

He was alarmed by the Obama Administration’s embrace of the uprisings
in Tunisia and Egypt. And he was infuriated by the U.S.-led assault on
Muammar Qaddafi’s regime. In early 2011, as Libyans challenged
Qaddafi, Putin was ostensibly offstage, serving as Prime Minister; his
protégé Dmitry Medvedev was President, and made a crucial decision not
to veto an American-backed U.N. Security Council resolution in favor
of military action in Libya. In a rare public split, Putin condemned
the decision, comparing the resolution to a “medieval call to the
crusades.” In October, 2011, a crowd of Libyans found Qaddafi hiding
in a culvert with a gold-plated 9-mm. pistol, dragged him out, and
killed him—a gruesome event that was broadcast worldwide. From Putin’s
perspective, this was a case study in Western intervention: stir up
protests, give them rhetorical support and diplomatic cover, and, if
that doesn’t work, send in the fighter jets. The epilogue comes in the
form of uncontrollable violence and an inglorious end for the
country’s leader. According to Mikhail Zygar, the former
editor-in-chief of the independent Internet station TV Rain and the
author of “All the Kremlin’s Men,” Putin absorbed the death of Qaddafi
as an object lesson: weakness and compromise were impermissible. “When
he was a pariah, no one touched him,” Zygar wrote. “But as soon as he
opened up he was not only overthrown but killed in the street like a
mangy old cur.”

In October, 2012, on the occasion of Putin’s sixtieth birthday, Dmitry
Kiselyov, the host of “News of the Week,” a favorite TV show of
Putin’s, delivered a long encomium to the President: “In terms of the
scope of his activities, Putin can be compared to only one of his
predecessors in the twentieth century—Stalin.” NTV aired a
documentary, “Visiting Putin,” that sent a broadcaster to his office
and his house on the outskirts of Moscow. Although well-informed
critics have said that Putin is worth tens of billions of dollars and
has twenty residences at his disposal, the program portrayed him as a
near-ascetic, who wakes at eight-thirty, lifts weights, swims long
distances, eats a modest breakfast (beet juice, porridge, raw quail
eggs), and works deep into the night.

In February, 2014, hours after President Victor Yanukovych of Ukraine,
weakened by months of protests, fled Kiev, Putin made the decision to
invade Crimea. He feared that Ukraine would turn its back on Russia
and gravitate toward Europe. It was a way for Putin to signal, loudly
and rudely, that he was finished going along with the Western-led
order. It was personal as well. Michael Morell, a former deputy
director of the C.I.A., said that the fall of Yanukovych led Putin to
worry about his own power and well-being. “It happened in the heart of
the Slavic world, and he could not allow it to become a precedent for
a similar movement in Russia against him,” Morell said. “He had to
crush it.”

Putin and members of his circle also saw the Syrian civil war as an
opportunity to halt a trend that had started with the invasion of Iraq
and continued through the downfall of dictators in Egypt and Libya. A
former senior U.S. official who has interacted with Russians said,
“There was this period of time when the United States, in Putin’s
view, was able to use international institutions to take on regimes
that we found offensive, right through Libya, and Putin was determined
to put a stake in the ground in Syria, to have Russia be at the table,
and be able to resist the international community’s efforts to
continue this pattern of conduct.” As Russia’s Defense Minister,
Sergey Shoigu, remarked last month, Russia’s intervention in Syria
“helped solve the geopolitical task of breaking the chain of ‘color
revolutions.’ ” Russian television, of course, covered the siege of
Aleppo as an enlightened act of liberation, free of any brutality or


Putin rarely uses a computer, but he has moved his country into the
digital age. Russia was once a technological laggard: the Soviets did
not connect to the global Internet until 1990, and the state security
services were so befuddled by the technology that, according to “The
Red Web,” by Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, agents demanded that
Relcom, Russia’s first commercial Internet Service Provider, print out
every communication that crossed its network. (Engineers rebelled, and
the order was abandoned.) By 1996, however, a new generation of
hackers in Russia had achieved the first state-directed penetration of
America’s military network, pilfering tens of thousands of files,
including military-hardware designs, maps of military installations,
and troop configurations. In 2008, according to “Dark Territory,” a
history of cyberwar by Fred Kaplan, Russian hackers accomplished a
feat that Pentagon officials considered almost impossible: breaching a
classified network that wasn’t even connected to the public Internet.
Apparently, Russian spies had supplied cheap thumb drives, stocked
with viruses, to retail kiosks near nato headquarters in Kabul,
betting, correctly, that a U.S. serviceman or woman would buy one and
insert it into a secure computer. In the past decade, cyber tactics
have become an essential component of Russia’s efforts to exert
influence over its neighbors.

Such events were “typical of warfare in the twenty-first century,” he
wrote. “The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and
strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the
power of force of weapons in their effectiveness.”

Even with the rise of new technologies, the underlying truth about
such operations hasn’t changed. They are less a way to conjure up
something out of nothing than to stir a pot that is already bubbling.
In the U.S., a strategy like the alleged hacking of the Democrats was
merely an effort to deepen an existing state of disarray and distrust.
“For something to happen, many factors have to come together at once,”
said Alexander Sharavin, the head of a military research institute and
a member of the Academy of Military Sciences, in Moscow, where
Gerasimov often speaks. “If you go to Great Britain, for example, and
tell them the Queen is bad, nothing will happen, there will be no
revolution, because the necessary conditions are absent—there is no
existing background for this operation.” But, Sharavin said, “in
America those preconditions existed.”

Obama’s adviser Benjamin Rhodes said that Russia’s aggressiveness had
accelerated since the first demonstrations on Maidan Square, in Kiev.
“When the history books are written, it will be said that a couple of
weeks on the Maidan is where this went from being a Cold War-style
competition to a much bigger deal,” he said. “Putin’s unwillingness to
abide by any norms began at that point. It went from provocative to
disrespectful of any international boundary.”

In the fall of 2014, a hacking group known as the Dukes entered an
unclassified computer system at the U.S. State Department and gained
enough control so that, as one official put it, they “owned” the
system. In security circles, the Dukes—also referred to as Cozy
Bear—were believed to be directed by the Russian government. Very
little is known about the size and composition of Russia’s team of
state cyberwarriors. In 2013, the Russian Defense Ministry announced
that it was forming “scientific” and “information operations”
battalions. A defense official later explained their purpose as
“disrupting the information networks of the probable enemy.” Oleg
Demidov, an expert on information security and cybercrime, and a
consultant at the PIR-Center, a research institute in Moscow, said,
“At the time, this idea was met with laughter. But this was something
real, these units were indeed formed, and staffed by graduates of the
country’s leading technical universities.” The next year, the Russian
military expanded its public recruitment of young programmers;
social-media ads for the “Research Squadron of the Russian Federation”
depicted a soldier putting down a rifle and turning to a keyboard,
accompanied by a heavy-metal soundtrack.

A retired K.G.B. colonel recently told the magazine Ogonyok that
Russia had about a thousand people working in military and security
operations online. According to a detailed report that appeared last
November in the well-regarded online publication Meduza, several
hundred technical specialists have left commercial firms to work for
state-run cyber teams. A Defense Ministry spokesperson refused to
confirm any details, telling a Meduza correspondent that the topic is
secret, “so no one can see how we might apply these methods,” and
warning against publication: “Don’t risk doing anything further—don’t
put yourself in the crosshairs.”

WikiLeaks put out a new batch of the e-mails nearly every day until
the election. Reporters covered the contents of the messages—gossipy
asides, excerpts from Hillary Clinton’s highly paid Wall Street
speeches, internal discussion about Clinton’s statements on Benghazi,
infighting at the Clinton Foundation over the political risks of
foreign donations—and Podesta believes that the impact of individual
stories was magnified by manipulation on social media. The Clinton
campaign tried to shift focus from the details in the e-mails to the
fact that they had been hacked. That argument was largely futile. “You
don’t see the full extent at the time,” he said. “But it’s corrosive
and it’s eating away underneath.”

Some Clinton aides suspect that Roger Stone, an on-again, off-again
adviser to Trump, counselled WikiLeaks on the optimal timing for its
disclosures. Six days before the leaks began, Stone tweeted,
“@HillaryClinton is done. #Wikileaks.” Stone said that he was
“flattered” by the suspicion but denied that he had given the group
advice. He said that he was merely alerted to the leaks by a “mutual
friend” of his and Assange’s: “And I was told that the information he
had would be devastating to Hillary. I was not told the subject
matter.” Stone was among those named in news reports about evidence
that Trump associates had had exchanges with Russian intelligence
officials. According to Stone, he has not been contacted by the
F.B.I., and such suspicions are unfounded. (“If they have evidence of
a crime, indict somebody,” he said. “I have not been in touch with
anybody in Russia. I’ve never been to Russia. I don’t know any


Russia’s political hierarchy and official press greeted Trump’s
Inauguration with unreserved glee. An old order had crumbled and, with
it, an impediment to Putin’s ambitions. “In 1917, armed supporters of
Lenin stormed the Winter Palace and arrested capitalist ministers and
overthrew the social political order,” the lead article in the daily
Moskovski Komsomolets read. “On January 20, 2017, nobody in Washington
planned to storm Congress or the White House and hang prominent
members of the old regime from lampposts, but the feeling of the
American political élite, especially the liberal part of it, is not
different from that of the Russian bourgeoisie one hundred years ago.”

On “News of the Week,” Dmitry Kiselyov, the host, dismissed charges
that Trump was a racist as “unfounded myth,” and the new President’s
sexist and predatory remarks as nothing more than a “minute’s worth of
impulsivity.” Trump, Kiselyov said, “is what we call in our country a
muzhik,” a real man. “On the first day of his Presidency, he removed
from the official White House Web site the section protecting the
rights of gays and lesbians. He never supported that. He was always
behind the values of the traditional family.”

Alexey Venediktov, the editor-in-chief of Echo of Moscow, and a figure
with deep contacts inside the Russian political élite, said, “Trump
was attractive to people in Russia’s political establishment as a
disturber of the peace for their counterparts in the American
political establishment.” Venediktov suggested that, for Putin and
those closest to him, any support that the Russian state provided to
Trump’s candidacy was a move in a long-standing rivalry with the West;
in Putin’s eyes, it is Russia’s most pressing strategic concern, one
that predates Trump and will outlast him. Putin’s Russia has to come
up with ways to make up for its economic and geopolitical weakness;
its traditional levers of influence are limited, and, were it not for
a formidable nuclear arsenal, it’s unclear how important a world power
it would be. “So, well then, we have to create turbulence inside
America itself,” Venediktov said. “A country that is beset by
turbulence closes up on itself—and Russia’s hands are freed.” ♦

read more

05-DEC-2016 :: "We have a deviate, Tomahawk."
Law & Politics

Putin has proven himself an information master, and his adversaries
are his information victims.
However, my starting point is the election of President Donald Trump
because hindsight will surely show that Russia ran a seriously
sophisticated programme of interference, mostly digital.
Don DeLillo, who is a prophetic 21st writer, writes as follows in one
of his short stories:
The specialist is monitoring data on his mission console when a voice
breaks in, “a voice that carried with it a strange and unspecifiable
He checks in with his flight-dynamics and conceptual- paradigm
officers at Colorado Command:
“We have a deviate, Tomahawk.”
“We copy.  There’s a voice.”
“We have gross oscillation here.”
“There’s some interference. I have gone redundant but I’m not sure
it’s helping.”
“We are clearing an outframe to locate source.”
“Thank you, Colorado.”
“It is probably just selective noise. You are negative red on the
step-function quad.”
“It was a voice,” I told them.
“We have just received an affirm on selective noise... We will
correct, Tomahawk. In the meantime, advise you to stay redundant.”
The voice, in contrast to Colorado’s metallic pidgin, is a melange of
repartee, laughter, and song, with a “quality of purest, sweetest
“Somehow we are picking up signals from radio programmes of 40, 50, 60
years ago.”
I have no doubt that Putin ran a seriously 21st predominantly digital
programme of interference which amplified the Trump candidacy. POTUS
Trump was an ideal candidate for this kind of support.
Trump is a linguistic warfare specialist. Look at the names he gave
his opponents: Crooked Hillary, Lyin’ Ted, Little Marco, ‘Low-energy’
Jeb — were devastating and terminal.  The first thing is plausible
deniability (and some folks here at home need to remember those
The second thing is non-linearity, you have to learn how to navigate a
linear system (the new 21st digital ecosystem) in a non-linear way

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The holding pattern is highlighted by yields being trapped between 2.30 percent and 2.50 percent
Law & Politics

The holding pattern is highlighted by yields being trapped between
2.30 percent and 2.50 percent. Any breakout to the upside could seek
the Dec. 15 high of 2.64 percent, while a drop through 2.30 percent
could lead to a deeper decline.

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Currency Markets at a Glance WSJ
World Currencies

Euro 1.0561
Dollar Index 101.12
Japan Yen 112.14
Swiss Franc 1.0076
Pound 1.2429
Aussie 0.7672
India Rupee 66.638
South Korea Won 1130.82
Brazil Real 3.1110
Egypt Pound 15.7930
South Africa Rand 12.8960

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Crude Oil Chart INO 54.42

Emerging Markets

Frontier Markets

Half of China’s oil imports sail through the Mandeb Strait, the choke
point off Djibouti that connects the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian

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Blowtorched, beaten and shot for 19 (Pound)

A survivor of South Africa’s rising tide of attacks on farms tells of
the ordeal that left his wife dead

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Zuma says S.Africa will allow expropriation of land without compensation

"We need to take bold steps that will transform our economy, including
land ownership, very fast," Zuma said in a speech outlining
agricultural policy.

"We are busy amending (laws) to enable faster land reform, including
land expropriation without compensation as provided for in the

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South Africa All Share Bloomberg +1.89% 2017

Dollar versus Rand 6 Month Chart INO 12.95172 [Risks are to the
downside now]


Egypt Pound versus The Dollar 3 Month Chart INO 15.802

Nigeria All Share Bloomberg -6.04% 2017

Ghana Stock Exchange Composite Index Bloomberg +9.95% 2017


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Mozambique's debt crisis: Trawling for answers

The lending package was signed in June 2013, but not disclosed to
investors who purchased the Ematum debt just months later. Credit
Suisse reportedly purchased insurance against the risk of Mozambique
defaulting at Lloyd’s of London

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Jubilee declares advertising blackout on local media
Kenyan Economy

The Jubilee government has frozen all advertisements to the country’s
four main national newspapers in a move likely to put it in a
collision course with the media industry.

A special Cabinet meeting early this month resolved to have the State
start its own publication referred to as MY.GOV, where all adverts
will be published. All State agencies too have been asked to direct
adverts to the publication.

Head of Civil Service and President Uhuru Kenyatta’s Chief of Staff
Joseph Kinyua has since communicated the directive to all ministries.
The move will deprive newspapers millions of shillings in revenue, and
could lead to massive job losses.

In a circular dated February 8, 2017 from Mr Kinyua to all ministries
and copied to Attorney General Githu Muigai, all directors of
administration (MDAs) have been warned that failure to comply will
lead to them being surcharged.

The circular from Kinyua states that in line with the Jubilee
government’s desire to cut cost in the provision of services, there
will be no need for MDAs to use resources allocated to them to
advertise their services and convey requests for service from the

The State, through the Government Advertisement Agency (GAA), has
already held meetings with media houses informing them of the decision
and requesting to distribute its publication as an insert in the
mainstream papers.

GAA had asked representatives from the commercial departments of
various media houses to give a quotation on how much they can charge
to distribute the paper.

Media executives have rejected the move and insisted that they can
only carry the insert on condition that they have a say in the
editorial content and adverts thereon are paid as per individual media
houses rates.

Media owners are interpreting the move as a slap on their faces coming
at a time the State, through GAA, owes them more than Sh1 billion in
unpaid adverts for the past 18 months.

The People Daily owned by President Kenyatta’s family has since
accepted the offer while The Standard and the Star newspapers
declined. It’s not clear if The Nation was given the offer.


bearish for media counters.

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Breaking M-Pesa from Safaricom toxic to global investors @Thestarkenya
Kenyan Economy

Safaricom chief executive Bob Collymore, who is typically reticent in
his public comments, said this: "It sends a really worrying message to
international investors in investing in the country ... It would imply
that this is no longer a safe place."

This comment was made in response to the leak of a report commissioned
by Kenya's telecoms regulator which allegedly recommends breaking
Safaricom up into separate telecoms and financial services businesses
because the firm is too dominant. Safaricom has 26 million
subscribers, and of course its innovative M-Pesa mobile money

"It's a malicious act to leak such a damaging report without first
consulting or at least sharing it with us," Collymore told Reuters.

The leaked report comes two days after Jakoyo Midiwo, the deputy
minority leader in Parliament, said he was proposing amendments to
banking and communications laws to force Safaricom to separate M-Pesa.
Further proposals are that Safaricom should place the 2G, 3G and 4G
domiciled on its network onto a shared and regulated tower to benefit
competitors. Collymore rejected the claim Safaricom is dominant and
said any moves to clip its wings using the study commissioned by the
regulator were designed to help rivals rather than consumers.

Collymore said the publication of the leaked draft had already
undermined foreign investors' confidence in the East African country
as an investment destination.

Let me compare this to Athletics. It's like going to David Rudisha and
saying you are running too fast, from now on I want you to carry your
closest competitor on your back. Why would anyone make such a
proposal? We are a tiny country, a minnow even in the scheme of
things. Safaricom has invested hundreds of millions of dollars, they
have consistently made the right calls. So now we punish them for
their success and reward failure. Just take a look at how rewarding
failure works. Do I need list the failures? Ask yourself how much the
rescues (because it is not a one time thing) of Uchumi, Pan Paper and
all the others have cost you the taxpayer? That's what rewarding
failure achieves – failing companies endlessly sucking out Kenya Inc's
resources. Look around and ask yourself: Has Google (Alphabet) been
considered too dominant? Of course not. Google succeeded. Yahoo did
not. That's capitalism.

Safaricom made an outsize bet on the information highway and on mobile
money. They made those investments (hundreds of millions of dollars)
in good faith. They would never have made those investments if Kenya
Inc had told them then. Look folks, if you do well we are going to
barge in and demand we take control of your infrastructure and open it
to your competitors. Which brings me back to the captioned headline:
"It sends a really worrying message to international investors in
investing in the country...It would imply that this is no longer a
safe place."

And we have reached a point when we have to call a spade a spade. This
is ''rogue'' policymaking; plain and simple, and inimical to the
national interest. These are heavy charges to lay but I am laying

The Nairobi stock market was the worst performing stock market in the
world, anywhere in the world in January. Ask yourself why? It's plain
as day. It's because of poor, sub-optimal policymaking. The banking
rate cap is a debacle, plain and simple. Ask yourself when will it be
reversed? By the time it's reversed the damage will be done, if it's
not already.

We need to decide right now whether we want to be a part of the
international capital markets (where we have sold a few billion
dollars of bonds) and attract foreign investors into our markets (more
than 50 per cent of our stock market is foreign-owned). And if we do
(because we don't have a choice) then we need to get with the
programme and get with it now.

Safaricom is a Kenyan champion. M-Pesa is a champion known around the
world. It has a huge value for Kenya Inc allowing us to re-invent
ourselves as capable of being part of the 21st century. We need more
Kenyan champions. It's as simple as that.

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Kenya Shilling versus The Dollar Live ForexPros
Kenyan Economy

Nairobi All Share Bloomberg -5.11% 2017


Nairobi ^NSE20 Bloomberg -5.12% 2017


3,023.07 +13.88 +0.46%

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by Aly Khan Satchu (www.rich.co.ke)
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February 2017

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