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Satchu's Rich Wrap-Up
Tuesday 22nd of January 2019

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Risks to global growth tilt to the downside. An escalation of trade tensions beyond those already incorporated in the forecast remains a key source of risk to the outlook. @IMFNews #WEO
International Trade

Financial conditions have already tightened since the fall. A range of
triggers beyond escalating trade tensions could spark a further
deterioration in risk sentiment with adverse growth implications,
especially given the high levels of public and private debt. These
potential triggers include a “no-deal” withdrawal of the United
Kingdom from the European Union and a greater-than-envisaged slowdown
in China.

Idiosyncratic factors (new fuel emission standards in Germany, natural
disasters in Japan) weighed on activity in large economies.

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International Trade

High-frequency data signal subdued momentum in the fourth quarter.
Outside the United States, industrial production has decelerated,
particularly of capital goods. Global trade growth has slowed to well
below 2017 averages. The true underlying impetus could be even weaker
than the data indicate, as the headline numbers may have been lifted
by import front-loading ahead of tariff hikes, as well as by an uptick
in tech exports with the launch of new products.

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Growth in the euro area is set to moderate from 1.8 percent in 2018 to 1.6 percent in 2019 (0.3 lower than projected last fall) and 1.7 percent in 2020. @IMFNews #WEO
International Trade

Growth rates have been marked down for many economies, notably Germany
(due to soft private consumption, weak industrial production following
the introduction of revised auto emission standards, and subdued
foreign demand); Italy (due to weak domestic demand and higher
borrowing costs as sovereign yields remain elevated); and France (due
to the negative impact of street protests and industrial action).

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Currency Markets at a Glance WSJ
World Currencies

Euro 1.1355
Dollar Index 96.427
Japan Yen 109.41
Swiss Franc 0.9976
Pound 1.2876
Aussie 0.7138
India Rupee 71.375
South Korea Won 1130.77
Brazil Real 3.755
Egypt Pound 17.9237
South Africa Rand 13.8836

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A second source of systemic financial stability risk is a deeper-than-envisaged slowdown in China @IMFNews #WEO
Emerging Markets

A second source of systemic financial stability risk is a
deeper-than-envisaged slowdown in China, with negative implications
for trading partners and global commodity prices. China’s economy
slowed in 2018 mainly due to financial regulatory tightening to rein
in shadow banking activity and off-budget local government investment,
and as a result of the widening trade dispute with the United States,
which intensified the slowdown toward the end of the year. Further
deceleration is projected for 2019. The authorities have responded to
the slowdown by limiting their financial regulatory tightening,
injecting liquidity through cuts in bank reserve requirements, and
applying fiscal stimulus, by resuming public investment. Nevertheless,
activity may fall short of expectations, especially if trade tensions
fail to ease. As seen in 2015–16, concerns about the health of China’s
economy can trigger abrupt, wide-reaching sell-offs in financial and
commodity markets that place its trading partners, commodity
exporters, and other emerging markets under pressure.

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Emerging Markets

Xiang Songzuo, a professor at Renmin University’s School of Finance,
is at the controversial end of the spectrum. He told a seminar last
month that President Xi Jinping’s government was playing a game of
smoke and mirrors.

“How bad are things? The number that China’s National Bureau of
Statistics gives is 6.5%, but a research group of an important
institution released an internal report. Can you take a guess on the
GDP growth rate that they came up with using the NBS data?” Xiang

“They used two measurements. Going by the first estimate, China’s GDP
growth this year [2018] was about 1.67%. And according to the other
calculation, the growth rate was negative,” Xiang, the former chief
economist of the Agricultural Bank of China, one of the big four state
lenders, added in a translated version of his speech on the
influential China Change website.

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In sub-Saharan Africa, growth is expected to pick up from 2.9 percent in 2018 to 3.5 percent in 2019, and 3.6 percent in 2020. @IMFNews #WEO

In sub-Saharan Africa, growth is expected to pick up from 2.9 percent
in 2018 to 3.5 percent in 2019, and 3.6 percent in 2020. For both
years the projection is 0.3 percentage point lower than last October’s
projection, as softening oil prices have caused downward revisions for
Angola and Nigeria. The headline numbers for the region mask
significant variation in performance, with over one-third of
sub-Saharan economies expected to grow above 5 percent in 2019–20.

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#Ethiopia: Major development as PM #AbiyAhmed speaks about #Italy's pledge to finance the first phase of study for a planned railway line which will link #Eritrea's port of #Massawa with #AddisAbeba @ddisstandard

#Ethiopia: Major development as PM #AbiyAhmed speaks about #Italy's
pledge to finance the first phase of study for a planned railway line
which will link #Eritrea's port of #Massawa with #AddisAbeba. He said
this during a joint press briefing with Italian PM Giuseppe Conte.

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Chinese Hard Power Supports Its Growing Strategic Interests in Africa @africacentre's @PNantulya

The debate on China-Africa relations has largely focused on Beijing’s
massive infrastructure projects around the continent. Less noticeable
but no less significant are its security activities, which have grown
in scale and scope alongside the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),
President Xi Jinping’s signature program to strengthen infrastructure,
trade, and investment links in Africa, South Asia, and Europe.
China’s growing military footprint in Africa is part of a policy that
has at its core the rejuvenation of China as a “Great Power” or shijie
qiang guo. In the past decade, it has pursued an increasingly
competitive and assertive foreign policy that made a decisive break
with Beijing’s decades-long approach of “hiding our capabilities,”
“biding our time,” and “keeping a low profile”—a policy known as
taoguang yanghui. According to Xi, “China now stands tall and firm in
the East” and should “take center stage” in the world. This theme is
echoed in the Diversified Employment of the Armed Forces, China’s
defense guidance, which says that a world-class military deployable in
a wide range of scenarios is indispensable in pursuing the “Great
Rejuvenation of China.”
In 2015, China passed a law that allows overseas deployments of the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and China’s other security forces,
including the People’s Armed Police. Two years later, Beijing opened
its first foreign naval base in Djibouti. In July 2018, the PLA
constructed additional pier facilities at the base, and in November,
it conducted live fire exercises there, employing armored fighting
vehicles and heavy artillery—the first time China had conducted
exercises on such a scale on foreign soil. That same month, PLA
helicopters conducted a major training exercise to evacuate war
casualties from a guided missile frigate off Djibouti’s coast,
demonstrating China’s sophisticated ground and aerial capabilities in
the region, in addition to its naval assets.
In 2018, the PLA conducted drills in Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, and
Nigeria, while its medical units worked with counterparts in Ethiopia,
Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Zambia to develop their combat casualty care
capabilities as part of decades-long relationships that involve arms
sales and intelligence cooperation. In May, Burkina Faso established
diplomatic relations with China and rescinded its recognition of
Taiwan. The PLA is now developing ties to the Burkina Faso military
that will likely feature training in counterterrorism and
infrastructure protection, two key elements of Chinese engagement in
the Sahel. In neighboring Mali, the PLA deployed its Sixth Battle
Group, consisting of regular and Special Forces, to the United
Nations-led Peacekeeping Operation in Mali (MINUSMA) to protect the
mission’s Chinese and foreign staff and secure critical
infrastructure. This deployment provided China with a security
presence in a country that remains central in its ongoing effort to
extend the BRI into the Sahel and the larger West African region.
Efforts to establish a comprehensive security assistance policy gained
pace at the inaugural China-Africa Defense and Security Forum held
June 26-July 10, 2018, ahead of the fourth Forum for China Africa
Cooperation (FOCAC) in September. Defense officials from around 50
African countries developed new priorities for Chinese security
engagement, including combating terrorism and piracy, and protecting
Chinese nationals and economic infrastructure. These constitute an
important part of the 2019-2021 China-Africa Action Plan, which
established the overarching framework for China’s security programs in
Strategic Shifts and Emerging Policy
Africa fits into China’s grand strategy in three main ways. First, the
continent represents an opportunity for Beijing to restore itself to
its perceived rightful place of global preeminence at a time when
Africa’s traditional partners such as the United States, United
Kingdom, and European Union are perceived to be scaling back their
African and global commitments. “With more than 5,000 years of
civilized history, the Chinese nation created a brilliant Chinese
civilization, made outstanding contributions to mankind, and became a
great nation of the world,” said Xi during the 19th Communist Party of
China Congress in October 2017. As part of this vision, Beijing is on
a quest to expand its global economic and military influence and
promote its models and norms. Its strengthened relationships with
Africa, which are rooted in party-to-party ties and ideological bonds
dating back to its support for anti-colonial and anti-apartheid
movements, are a major part of this quest because African support for
Chinese positions at the UN and other bodies is beneficial in
amplifying China’s voice on the global stage.
Africa represents an opportunity for Beijing to restore itself to its
perceived rightful place of global preeminence.
Second, Africa is a strategic node in the maritime portion of the BRI
known as the Maritime Silk Road that links China to East Africa,
Southeast Asia, the Persian Gulf, and Europe and was recently extended
to West and Southern Africa. The World Bank estimates that investment
links between China and the 65 countries that have signed on to the
BRI account for 30 percent of global GDP and 75 percent of known
energy reserves. China by 2020 aims to expand its GDP to $20 trillion
and become a Great Power by 2049. The view from Beijing is that this
target cannot be achieved without deepening its links with trade
corridors along the BRI. China’s expanding maritime cooperation with
Africa through port and infrastructure construction and counterpiracy
patrols is part of this larger geopolitical and economic strategy.
Chinese companies are constructing rail links to connect landlocked
Mali to ports in Dakar, Senegal, and Conakry, Guinea. Some of this
infrastructure passes through areas affected by violent extremist
groups in northern Mali, raising concerns about the safety of
thousands of Chinese railway workers. This was a major driver of
Beijing’s decision to participate in MINUSMA. Similar concerns
informed China’s decision to train a local security force to protect
the new $4 billion Mombasa-Nairobi high speed railway in Kenya, a
showpiece of the BRI in East Africa and Kenya’s most expensive project
to date. Because this type of training is normally assigned to elite
forces of the People’s Armed Police, it will likely give the force its
entrée to the African continent.
Third, the Chinese government has recognized the need to protect the
growing number of Chinese expatriates working on its BRI-related
projects dotted across Africa, numbering close to 300,000. African
partners generally share Beijing’s security concerns given their
vested interest in these projects. In Kenya, President Uhuru Kenyatta
threatened to use executive powers to approve capital punishment for
“economic saboteurs” after sections of the new railway had been
vandalized. In Uganda, President Yoweri Museveni ordered the military
to protect Chinese industrial parks and companies following a string
of attacks on Chinese nationals and property. Similar attacks have
occurred in Ghana, Lesotho, Madagascar, South Africa, South Sudan,
Sudan, and Zambia in recent years.
In line with the 2019-2021 China-Africa Action Plan, 50 new security
programs have been established to address growing risks to the BRI
through counterterrorism assistance, law enforcement, early warning
systems, and infrastructure protection, in addition to traditional
military assistance. These have in turn expanded the reach of China’s
security services. The PLA’s Office of International Military
Cooperation, an organ of the powerful Central Military Commission
chaired by Xi, has been expanded in part to accommodate China’s
growing programs in Africa. The PLA also upgraded its Peacekeeping
Military Training Center in Huairou to support an ambitious program to
train 2,000 international peacekeepers by 2020, many of whom will be
China’s defense guidance tasks the PLA with playing a more prominent
role in Beijing’s new military diplomacy and national security
strategy, a further shift away from “keeping a low profile.” The PLA
Navy’s participation in international counterpiracy patrols in the
Gulfs of Aden and Guinea, China’s first naval deployment outside Asia,
is one example of the PLA’s recalibrated engagement. A naval presence
in Africa will give China greater latitude to support its peacekeeping
troops, humanitarian interests, and hard security operations.
Together, these deployments form part of a repertoire of diversified
deployments that the PLA refers to as “new historic missions.”
China’s maritime capabilities were critical in evacuating over 35,000
Chinese nationals from spiraling violence in Libya in 2011 and over
200 in Yemen in 2015. In April 2019, China’s second aircraft
carrier—the first that was domestically built—is expected to come into
service, with two more expected by 2025. The rapid growth is aimed at
increasing the PLA Navy’s ability to operate in what it terms as the
“far seas” that extend from the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean.
Unpacking China’s Security Engagements
China’s 2015 Africa Policy Paper calls for deepened military
engagement, technological cooperation, and capacity building for
Africa’s security sectors. While assistance to the AU and its regional
security communities has increased significantly under this policy,
Beijing channels most of its support bilaterally, with arms sales
constituting an important element. According to the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute, China is now the top supplier
of weapons to sub-Saharan Africa, accounting for 27 percent of the
region’s imports between 2013 and 2017, a 55 percent increase over the
2008-2012 period. Algeria, Angola, Gabon, Mozambique, Nigeria, South
Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda are among the 22 African countries that have
imported weapons from China in recent years.
China has diversified its sales from small arms and light weapons to
tanks, armored personnel carriers, maritime patrol craft, aircraft,
missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and artillery. It is also
increasingly focusing on building institutional capability in Africa’s
security sector. In 2018, China’s State Administration for Science,
Technology, and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND) announced it
had concluded bilateral agreements with 45 African countries on the
sharing of defense technologies and building defense industries.
The network of Chinese-built ports and infrastructure along Africa’s
east, west, and southern coasts has positioned China to become a major
player in Africa’s maritime space.
The network of Chinese-built ports and infrastructure along Africa’s
east, west, and southern coasts has positioned China to become a major
player in Africa’s maritime space. Djibouti’s Doraleh Multipurpose
Port—built by the state-backed China Merchants Group to handle bulk
cargo, containers, and oil shipments—is a few minutes’ drive from the
PLA naval base. This unique arrangement allows China to mix commercial
and military interests in Djibouti and the wider region. A new
Chinese-funded electric railway for instance connects Djibouti to
Ethiopia. Doraleh Port, in turn, connects Ethiopia and other Horn of
Africa countries to Chinese-built port clusters in the Suez Canal, the
Strait of Hormuz, and Gwadar, Pakistan, on the Arabian Sea.
(Speculation is rife that China is planning to construct its second
overseas naval base in Gwadar.)
Namibia’s Walvis Bay (formerly a naval outpost for apartheid South
Africa) is another strategic hub along the Maritime Silk Road that has
hosted numerous PLA Navy port visits and naval drills in recent years.
The Namibian and Chinese navies share a special military relationship
dating back to China’s support for Namibia’s independence war against
South Africa. Some of Namibia’s most advanced naval assets are
Chinese-supplied, including two maritime patrol craft delivered in
October 2017. During a diplomatic function in February 2018, the
Chinese Ambassador to Namibia described Walvis Bay as “the most
brilliant pearl on the Atlantic coast of southwest Africa,” invoking
China’s “String of Pearls” doctrine that refers to military and
commercial nodes along China’s sea lines of communication from the
Chinese coast to Somalia and Port Sudan.
The Namibian press has speculated that China seeks to establish naval
facilities in Walvis Bay using the Djibouti model, pointing to
similarities with the approach China used to acquire its Djibouti
base, a process that started with the construction of a deep water
port. The Walvis Bay Expansion Project is one of China’s most highly
prized in Africa. Once complete, this port will connect southern
Africa to China Harbor Engineering Company ports and infrastructure in
São Tomé and Príncipe, Cameroon, Nigeria, Ghana, the Ivory Coast, and
Guinea, and planned facilities in Gambia and Senegal. These maritime
corridors—all critical nodes of the Maritime Silk Road—have important
security dimensions.
The PLA Navy’s 27th and 28th Anti-Piracy Task Forces, for instance,
visited ports in Cameroon, Ghana, and Nigeria after they joined the
BRI. All three countries signed military agreements with China on
training, weapons acquisition, information sharing, maritime
navigation, and maritime security. The 28th Task Force also visited
Gabon and South Africa. China’s 2017 Vision for Maritime Cooperation
under the Belt and Road Initiative further underscores the security
elements of the BRI. It commits Beijing to increasing counterpiracy
training and joint patrols, conducting maritime security and law
enforcement activities, and improving maritime domain awareness
through cooperative use of China’s Beidou satellite system. The PLA
Navy has been at pains to downplay the military significance of its
activities on Africa’s seas. In 2017, China’s hospital ship, Peace
Ark, visited seven coastal African countries where it conducted free
medical and humanitarian services to thousands of African citizens in
a major show of soft power.
Peacekeeping is the other area in which China’s influence in Africa’s
security sectors is growing. Beijing contributes more troops to UN
missions than the other permanent members of the Security Council and
is now the second largest financial contributor to UN missions. This
is a strategic move to bolster Beijing’s image in Africa because not
only do 78 percent of all UN peacekeepers serve in Africa, but nearly
half of them are African. China’s peacekeeping strategy prioritizes
support for the operationalization of the African Standby Force (ASF)
and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises. The
China-Africa Peace and Security Fund committed $100 million to that
end. In February 2018, this fund disbursed $25 million to the ASF’s
logistics base in Cameroon. That same month, Tanzania opened a $30
million Chinese-funded military training center. In May, China signed
an agreement with the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) to build its new headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria. In
September, China began constructing a logistics depot in Botswana for
the Southern African Development Community’s Standby Force.
Given that BRI infrastructure is mostly located in highly insecure
environments, the PLA has raised its own 8,000-strong Standby Force,
even as it continues to support the ASF. This new force has been
placed at the UN’s disposal for rapid deployment to conflict zones,
the bulk of which are in Africa. According to the UN, 800 of its
members will join the UN’s Vanguard Brigade, a new rapid-reaction
force that can be deployed in 60 days. China’s peacekeeping and
noncombat military deployments are concentrated in countries where its
greatest economic and military interests are at stake. Instability in
South Sudan, for instance, resulted in damage to Chinese oil
infrastructure and attacks on Chinese oil workers. These missions are
often supplemented by high-level Chinese mediation activities, a major
departure from China’s longstanding principle of noninterference.
China’s mediation initiatives in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
South Sudan, Sudan, and Zimbabwe and its offer to mediate the
Eritrea-Djibouti border conflict are cases in point. This mediation,
notably, is often aimed at maintaining authoritarian leaders with whom
Beijing has good relations and through which strategic investments in
natural resources and infrastructure can be secured.
China also intends to double its training of African military
professionals over the next three years. Several hundred officers
study in China each year in schools such as the China Military
Academy, the Dalian Naval Academy, the Air Force Aviation Academy, and
the PLA’s National Defense University. Exposure to the Chinese
approach to military management and control is central to this
training. In the Chinese model, the PLA is subordinate to the absolute
control of the ruling party, which itself supersedes the government
and parliament.
In contrast, the majority of African constitutions place the military
under civilian control and multi-party legislative oversight. Some
African observers have therefore voiced concern that the wholesale
application of the Chinese model could be harmful given the prevalence
of personality-driven governing styles and the tendency to bypass
constitutional checks.
What Lies Ahead
The centrality of the Belt and Road Initiative to China’s global
strategy suggests that China’s military and security footprint in
Africa will continue to expand. FOCAC has enabled China to fine-tune
its policies in ways that advance Beijing’s economic and security
goals. Ever mindful of messaging and image, China has gone to great
lengths to reinforce that mutual respect, not hegemonic designs, lie
at the core of its leadership ambitions. Furthermore, Chinese
political and military leaders insist that China’s expanding military
role in Africa and around the world is defensive and collaborative and
that China offers viable alternatives as other world powers appear to
be disengaging from the developing world.
China also makes clear that the BRI is compatible with the African
Union’s Agenda 2063 by prioritizing open trade, industrialization, and
infrastructure development—themes that resonate with African
governments, and form part of the strategic partnership between the AU
and China.
The centrality of the Belt and Road Initiative to China’s global
strategy suggests that China’s military and security footprint in
Africa will continue to expand.
The more controversial aspects of China’s security strategy, however,
will continue to shape the debate on China-Africa relations. The
growing indebtedness of BRI partner countries to Chinese state-owned
banks underwriting China’s megaprojects has raised alarms within both
Africa and the international community. At the same time, anti-Chinese
sentiment in many countries has grown, mostly stemming from hiring
practices that favor Chinese nationals over locals. Additionally,
there has been a proliferation of Chinese private security contractors
operating in poorly regulated environments in Africa as BRI projects
expand more quickly than oversight mechanisms can be adopted.
African citizens are increasingly pressuring their leaders to manage
their security relationships with China in ways that avoid reinforcing
these trends while promoting a broader concept of security beyond
regime survival. This tension between African citizens and governments
is likely to grow as China, in its drive to restore itself as a great
power, seeks to expand its influence in Africa’s security arena.

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06-AUG-2018 :: The Indian Ocean Economy and a Port Race

we are witnessing a Port race of sorts as everyone seeks to get a
piece of the Indian Ocean Port action. China [ e BRI initiative], the
Gulf Countries [who now appear to see the Horn of Africa as their
hinter- land], Japan and India [to a lesser degree] are all jostling
for optimal ‘’geo-economic’’ positioning.

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Its the End Game in Harare, in Khartoum and in Kinshasa.

I was reading the @AfDB_Group #2019AEO Economic release which is
rather a well put together report and in that report the AfDB
pronounced that  Africa’s average inflation fell from 12.6 percent in
2017 to 10.9 percent in 2018 and is projected to further decline to
8.1 percent in 2020.

''Inflation is highest in South Sudan, at 188 percent, due to the
lingering economic crisis. Inflation is lowest, at 2 percent or less,
in members of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community and
the West African Economic and Monetary Union and particularly in
members of the CFA zone because of its link to the euro''

There is a ubiquitious Meme that Africa is not a Country and that
Inflation continuum 2%-188% confirms as much. A further dive into the
Inflation data and you will note some serious, non-linear inflation
spikes. In Bashir's Sudan Inflation rose to 72.94% in December. In
Zimbabwe, Inflation clocked 42.1% in December [nothing close to The
peak month of hyperinflation which occurred in mid-November 2008 when
the rate was estimated at 79,600,000,000% per month]. DR Congo is
somewhere around 25% but data is difficult to gather as you would

i have been reading Yuval Noah Harari and in his best-seller he says
this about money;

"Money is accordingly a system of mutual trust, and not just any
system of mutual trust: money is the most universal and most efficient
system of mutual trust ever devised." -

“Cowry shells and dollars have value only in our common imagination.
Their worth is not inherent in the chemical structure of the shells
and paper, or their colour, or their shape. In other words, money
isn’t a material reality – it is a psychological construct. It works
by converting matter into mind.”

The Point I am seeking to make is that There is a correlation between
high Inflation and revolutionary conditions, Zimbabwe is a classic
example where there are $9.3 billion of Zollars in banks compared to
$200 million in reserves, official data showed. The Mind Game that
ZANU-PF played on its citizens has evaporated in a puff of smoke.
President Mnangagwa was cavorting around the World with his scarf [As
violence unfolded on the streets, Mnangagwa traveled to Russia. He’s
also scheduled to visit Kazakhstan, Belarus and Azerbaijan before
flying to the World Economic Forum in Davos] at the very moment that
his Citizens like Roberto Durán II in his fight with Sugar Ray Leonard
turned away from Leonard towards the referee and quit by apparently
saying, "No más" (Spanish for "No more"). The Petrol price hike was
the proximate cause and ''ignited the already dry tinder on the
ground'' [Piers Pigou International Crisis Group] Samm Farai Monro
told the Guardian  “The government can switch off the internet but not
the frustrations of millions of people.”

I said to Aljazeera "What we're watching across this continent -
whether it's Gabon, Sudan, or DR Congo [I should have added Zimbabwe
and Chad and Cameroon and others]  - is a kind of tipping point
moment," Ryszard Kapuxcinski characterised the revolutionary moment

''The choice of that moment is the greatest riddle of history’’ and
also said "If the crowd disperses, goes home, does not reassemble, we
say the revolution is over."

What is clear to me is that Zimbabwe is at a Tipping Point moment. At
the time of the Jasmine Revolution in Tunis the crowds chanted

"We are not afraid, we are not afraid, we are afraid only of God." In
Tunis, it was the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi (Arabic: محمد
البوعزيزي‎; 29 March 1984 – 4 January 2011) on 17 December 2010, which
became a catalyst for the Tunisian Revolution. I don't know where the
match is coming from but what I do know is that not even Dr. Benedict
Oromah's Afreximbank [who have taken an enormous punt on Zimbabwe] can
save the situation. There was a Trend Change on the street last week
and it strikes me that the long-suffering Citizen has thrown off their

In Sudan I saw this Tweet from @daloya

Singing an old Sudanese revolutionary song: “we sing in our prison as
you tremble in your castle” "نغني و نحن في اسرك و ترجف وأنت في قصرك"
#SudanUprising #مدن_السودان_تنفض

President Bashir whose Prop is not a scarf but a Jig is hanging on by
his fingertips. He has managed to claw his way back into position
before and is a political Harry Houdini otherwise he would not have
lasted more than three decades but its clear these are “the last days”
or “end times.”

In DR Congo, the Constitutional Court has declared Félix Antoine
Tshisekedi Tshilombo the President. It is widely accepted that he
received 20% or thereabouts of the Vote versus Martin Fayulu who
received about 60%. Martin Fayulu told the FT's @thomas_m_wilson

“I won’t let the victory of the Congolese people be stolen. If they
don’t get the truth now, no one will trust any election ever again.”

The announced result is the equivalent of overturning @anc_party's
@CyrilRamaphosa [who will surely win the election in 2019] and
investing @Our_DA's @MmusiMaimane as President. It was a clever ruse
by the outgoing President Kabila but it wont stand.

We are in the End Game now. It might be tomorrow, it might be months
away but make no mistake Its the End Game in Harare, in Khartoum and
in Kinshasa.

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"The internet was the tool used to coordinate the violence" presidential spokesman George Charamba state TV @YahooNews

 "There is no way you expect us to sacrifice a national good for the
sake of internet. If they want uninterrupted internet, let them abide
by the law."

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Kenya Shilling versus The Dollar Live ForexPros
Kenyan Economy

Nairobi All Share Bloomberg +3.71% 2019


Nairobi ^NSE20 Bloomberg +1.06% 2019


Every Listed Share can be interrogated here


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by Aly Khan Satchu (www.rich.co.ke)
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January 2019

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