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Satchu's Rich Wrap-Up
 
 
Friday 15th of March 2019
 
Morning
Africa

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Normal Board - The Whole shebang
Prompt Board Next day settlement
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The Latest Daily PodCast can be found here on the Front Page of the site

http://www.rich.co.ke

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My Interview with @CGTNOfficial's @Ramah_Nyang starts at 03:02 re: @EmmanuelMacron in East Africa @cgtnafrica
Africa


 주황빛 양귀비가 벌써 만개하였네요! 올겨울엔 유난히 많은 비가 내려서 남부 캘리포니아에 야생화가 많이 피는 #슈퍼블룸 이
일찍 찾아왔습니다. 인근에 계신 분들은 방문하셔서 아름다운 경관을 맘껏 즐기시길 바랍니다! @USEmbassySeoul

https://twitter.com/USEmbassySeoul/status/1106414389932879873

Macro Thoughts

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F_MU1 was an incredible elephant. For more than 60 years, she lived a peaceful life in a quiet corner of Tsavo in Kenya. @willbl
Africa


When I first saw her I was awestruck, for she had the most amazing
tusks I had ever seen. If I hadn’t looked upon her with my own eyes, I
might not have believed that such an elephant could exist in our
world. If there were a Queen of Elephants, it would surely have been
her.
These are amongst the last images captured of her. Shortly after they
were taken, she died of natural causes. She had survived through
periods of terrible poaching and it was a victory that her life was
not ended prematurely by a snare, bullet or poisoned arrow.
F_MU1 was an elephant that few people outside Tsavo knew about.
Photographing her, in partnership with Tsavo Trust and Kenya Wildlife
Service, was one of the greatest honours of my career. What follows is
the story of how I came to capture these images…
F_MU1 was skinny and old but she strode forward with stately grace.
Her tusks were so long that they scraped the ground in front of her.
She was like a relic from a bygone era.
There is a new nature documentary titled “The Elephant Queen”
featuring one of Tsavo’s beautiful cow tuskers (a different individual
I believe). It has not been released yet but keep an eye out for it as
I am sure it is going to be incredible.
I would like to thank Kenya Wildlife Service for the crucial support
they provided. Thanks also to Sony for a grant that helped fund this
project. Thank you to my friend Chris Gordon for first introducing me
to Richard Moller. Finally, thank you to Richard Moller, the Tembo 2
team – Kyalo, Katana and Christine – and everyone at Tsavo Trust,
without whom I never could have captured these images.

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29-APR-2013 :: The Brothers Tsarnaev and the Long Tail Put in a different way, there are surely many Brothers Tsarnaev in this new c21st of ours
Law & Politics


There are more than seven billion of us now in this c21st world of
ours. The long tail in a population of seven billion is not an
insignificant absolute number.

‘’In statistics, a long tail of some distributions of numbers is the
portion of the distribution having a large number of occurrences far
from the “head” or central part of the distribution.’’

Put in a different way, there are surely many Brothers Tsarnaev in
this new c21st of ours. And whilst I appreciate Osama Bin Laden is
being nibbled by the fishes somewhere in the ocean, he basically
inspired the likes of the Brothers Tsarnaev, i.e those disaffected
with the c21st. In truth, that disaffection might have any number of
reasons and I am reminded of my French O level where I studied Albert
Camus’ L’Etranger and Camus said;

“The byronic hero, incapable of love, or capable only of an impossible
love, suffers endlessly. He is solitary, languid, his condition
exhausts him. If he wants to feel alive, it must be in the terrible
exaltation of a brief and destructive action*.”

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18 SEP 17 :: "A screaming comes across the sky" North Korea. @TheStarKenya
Law & Politics


Gravity’s Rainbow is a 1973 novel by Thomas Pynchon which is about the
design, production and dispatch of V-2 rockets by the German military.
In particular, it features the quest undertaken by several characters
to uncover the secret of a mysterious device named the “Schwarzgerät”
(black device), slated to be installed in a rocket with the serial
number “00000”. As the world watches PyongYang, I cannot help
wondering if Kim Jong-Un has read Pynchon which speaks of “A screaming
comes across the sky” and North Korea.

“But it is a curve each of them feels, unmistakably. It is the
parabola.  They must have guessed, once or twice -guessed and refused
to believe -that everything, always, collectively, had been moving
toward that purified shape latent in the sky, that shape of no
surprise, no second chance, no return.’’

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American B-52 bombers fly over disputed South China Sea for second time in 10 days @SCMPNews
Law & Politics


Two US B-52 strategic bombers flew over the contested South China Sea
on Wednesday, according to the US Pacific Air Force, the second such
flight in 10 days despite China’s objections.
“Two B-52H Stratofortress bombers took off from Andersen Air Force
Base, Guam, and conducted routine training in the vicinity of the
South China Sea on March 13 [Hawaii Standard Time], before returning
to base,” a spokeswoman for the Pacific Air Force said in a statement
released on Thursday.
“US aircraft regularly operate in the South China Sea in support of
allies, partners, and a free and open Indo-Pacific,” the statement
said. “US Pacific Air Forces bombers have flown from Guam for more
than a decade as part of US Indo-Pacific Command’s continuous bomber
presence operations.”
Meanwhile, the USS Blue Ridge, flagship of the US 7th Fleet also
sailed through the South China Sea and anchored at Manila Bay on
Wednesday, in a show of reassurance for the US-Philippine alliance in
the region.
When asked if his contingent had encountered the Chinese navy in the
region, Captain Eric Anduze, commander of the USS Blue Ridge, said
“all of our interactions were safe and professional”, vowing the US
military would “sail, fly and operate wherever the law allows us to”.
Sun Zhe, co-chair of the China programme at Columbia University, said
the intention of the US in using B-52s was to restrain China in the
South China Sea.
“By dispatching strategic bomber *which is capable of carrying nuclear
weapons* - instead of reconnaissance aircraft such as EP-3 - the US’s
intention is very clear: to restrain China through flaring up the
issue of South China Sea,” Sun said, “Beijing should remain vigilant.”
Sun said the US military had increased the frequency of its close
surveillance – in the air and at sea – on contested islands in recent
years.
Diao Daming, a US studies expert at Renmin University in Beijing, said
the US military had been enhancing its presence in the South China Sea
under the Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy.
But he dismissed suggestions that the US was pressing China on trade
talks by sending the B-52s.
“These are two different issues,” Diao said. “Beijing absolutely will
not concede to any pressure from other issues.”
Bonnie Glaser, an Asia security specialist at the Centre for Strategic
and International Studies said the US military was now more willing to
publicise its freedom of navigation operations.
“The US is exercising it’s international right to freedom of
navigation in the air and at sea,” Glaser said. “In the past, such
operations were not always publicised.”
Wednesday’s operation followed one on March 4, in which two B-52Hs
conducted training flights from Guam, one to the East China Sea and
one to the South China Sea.

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09-JUL-2018 :: Tariff wars, who blinks first?
Law & Politics


Trump: “I think President Xi saw that I’m somebody that believes in
walking when the deal is not done, and you know there’s always a
chance it could happen, and he probably wouldn’t want that”  马奇山
@jc_mittelstadt

https://twitter.com/jc_mittelstadt/status/1106126400229203968

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Currency Markets at a Glance WSJ
World Currencies


Euro 1.1318
Dollar Index 96.67
Japan Yen 111.66
Swiss Franc 1.0026
Pound 1.3171
Aussie 0.7083
India Rupee 69.3055
South Korea Won 1137.00
Brazil Real 3.8417
Egypt Pound 17.4015
South Africa Rand 14.5031

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Has The World Been Ignoring An Almost Decade-Long "African Spring"? via @eurasia_future @AKorybko
Africa


The announcement that Algerian President Bouteflika won’t run for
re-election but will instead postpone the upcoming vote until the
conclusion of his recently decreed comprehensive constitutional reform
process represented the eighth non-electoral regime change in Africa
in as many years, making one wonder whether the world has been
ignoring an almost decade-long “African Spring” or if something else
entirely is going on across the continent.

The country had been experiencing an unprecedented wave of peaceful
protests in reaction to his originally declared candidacy fed by the
majority-youthful population’s indignation at high unemployment and a
stagnant economy, to say nothing of how insulted they felt that an
elderly leader who is speculated to be physically and perhaps even
mentally incapacitated after suffering a 2013 stroke would be put
forth once more as the face of the nation by what are thought to be
his powerful military-intelligence “deep state” handlers.

A lot has already been written about what might come next in Algeria,
but most observers are either analyzing events in a vacuum or are
making predictable comparisons to the 2011 “Arab Spring” theater-wide
Color Revolutions, neither of which are entirely accurate because they
both miss the fact that Algeria represents the eighth non-electoral
regime change in Africa in as many years and is therefore just the
latest manifestation of a larger trend that has hitherto not yet been
brought to the public’s attention. It’s true that there are shades of
the “Arab Spring” in what’s presently taking place in Algeria, but
simply stopping there doesn’t do the country justice because it
misleadingly implies that foreign powers had a predominant hand in
guiding the course of events there.

* 2014 Burkina Faso:


The sudden onset of progressively violent protests in response to
long-serving President Blaise Compaoré’s attempts to change the
constitution to run for yet another term quickly resulted in a regime
change that was briefly challenged a year later by loyalist special
forces in a failed coup. Some observers predicted that the “Burkinabe
Revolution” would trigger an “African Spring” against other rulers who
had been in office for decades and also were speculated to soon
announce their intent to follow in Compaoré’s footsteps and change
their own constitutions as well, though this forecast didn’t unfold as
expected.

Still, the 2014 Burkina Faso regime change could in hindsight be seen
as evidence that genuine (as in, not externally provoked, guided,
and/or hijacked) protests are capable of unseating entrenched
governments and the permanent military, intelligence, and diplomatic
bureaucratic structures (“deep state”) behind them. It should also be
noted that the international community recognized Compaoré’s
resignation and subsequent decision to go into self-imposed exile

The Gambian case study somewhat mirrors the controversial French-led
UN intervention that took place in the Ivory Coast in 2011 following a
similarly disputed election a few months prior, though the Ivorian
leader wasn’t as lucky as his Gambian counterpart in that he was
captured by French-backed forces and extradited to The Hague, where he
was charged with war crimes but eventually acquitted earlier this
year. The lesson to be had from both the Ivory Coast and The Gambia is
that international coalitions can be assembled to remove recalcitrant
leaders from office who refuse to accept electoral results

* 2017 Angola:


This rising power in Southern Africa experienced a democratic transfer
of power that summer from revolutionary leader Jose Eduardo dos Santos
to fellow MPLA member and designated successor João Lourenço in what
was initially thought by many to be a carefully coordinated “shuffling
of the cards” by the Angolan “deep state” but which eventually proved
to be a “deep state” coup after Lourenço quickly went to work
eradicating the power structure that his predecessor implemented and
even going after the former “royal family” (in particular, his
daughter [who’s also Africa’s richest woman and its first female
billionaire] and son on corruption charges). Suffice to say, this was
a shock for many, though generally a pleasant one for most.

The abovementioned events prove that sometimes the “deep state” is the
most influential force driving regime change in certain countries,
namely those with post-war revolutionary parties that still remain in
power. It’ll turn out that Angola might have been an inspiration for
what later took place in Ethiopia and just occurred in Algeria, albeit
with both unfolding under slightly different circumstances and in
varying ways, but the point is that the so-called “powers that be”
might either be engaged in serious infighting among themselves and/or
decide that the most responsible course of action in the name of
national stability is either “shuffle the cards” or carry out a
genuine regime change behind the scenes to preemptively or reactively
quell (potentially) destabilizing (anti-corruption-driven or
election-related) unrest.

* 2017 Zimbabwe:


The tail end of 2017 saw the Zimbabwean military carry out a de-facto
coup against nonagenarian revolutionary leader Robert Mugabe during a
period of rising civil society unrest in this economically destitute
country. Barely anyone disputes that this was indeed a military coup,
and one that was possibly partially inspired by Mugabe’s controversial
grooming of his wife as his successor at the expense of the ZANU-PF
political and military elite, but it wasn’t legally recognized as such
abroad because otherwise the African Union and other actors would have
been compelled to impose varying degrees of sanctions against the
country in response.

* 2018 South Africa:


Jacob Zuma was pressured to resign in early 2018 due to what many have
interpreted as being a “deep state” coup against him carried out by a
rival faction of the ruling ANC led by his eventual successor
Ramaphosa

* 2018 Ethiopia:

Ethiopia captivated the world’s imagination after its post-war ruling
party decided upon the relatively young 41-year-old former military
intelligence officer Abiy Ahmed to be its new leader following the
outbreak of violent unrest in 2016 that threatened to return Africa’s
second most populous country to civil war. To make a long story short,
Abiy is of the Oromo ethnicity that represents the country’s largest
plurality but which has traditionally been underrepresented in its
ruling class, especially following the rise to power of the Tigray-led
EPRDF, but he swiftly got to work dismantling the party’s “old guard”
in what can only be described as a “deep state” coup with overwhelming
public support. Importantly, he also made peace with neighboring
Eritrea and put the two fraternal people’s lingering tensions behind
them as they jointly embarked on crafting a new regional future for
the Horn of Africa.

* 2018 Comoros:


It’s difficult to categorize what exactly took place last year in the
island nation, but it can most objectively be summed up as a
semi-popular and possibly externally influenced attempt to actively
challenge the country’s regional center by a peripheral unit that felt
disenfranchised by democratically instituted constitutional reforms
that removed the coup-prone state’s rotating presidency clause.

* 2018-2019 Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC):


There was global trepidation for the past year after former President
Kabila delayed his country’s first-ever democratic transfer of power
for logistical reasons that he would try to change the constitution to
remain in power indefinitely, something that his traditional Western
backers pressured him not to do while his new Chinese patron remained
silent about on the basis that its political process is an internal
affair (though its strategic cobalt interests there might have played
a role in its position to stay on the good side of the government).
The country gradually slid into an undeclared state of low-level civil
war that could more accurately be described as a hybrid one and which
could have exploded on command into a much larger conflict had he not
unexpectedly reached a speculated deal with one of the opposition
leaders to supposedly allow Tshisekedi to replace Kabila while the
former strongman would remain the “grey cardinal” after his party came
out on top in the parliamentary elections.

International media and local activists decried this stunt as a
blatant undermining of what should have been a democratic transfer of
power that some observers said would have rightly resulted in Fayulu
winning had the vote truly been free and fair, but that candidate
posed the greatest threat to the Congolese “deep state” that owes its
lucrative existence to Kabila and was – as the narrative goes –
sidelined in favor of Tshsekedi, the son of a well-known opposition
leader. This can be seen as a hybrid form of both an “internationally
recognized” election and a “deep state” coup, the former of which was
universally recognized probably because of the multilateral interests
involved in retaining stability in the mineral-rich country (at least
for the time being) while the latter was suppressed in order not to
sully the optics of the DRC’s “first-ever democratic transfer of
power” (and consequently the soft power of those who endorsed Kabila’s
cunning plan).

* 2019 Gabon:


As was touched upon earlier, there was a failed attempt to stage a
military coup in the economically stratified and politically polarized
country of Gabon where an ageing and ailing leader continues to rule
as part of a political dynasty that’s been in power for over half a
century. The regime change operation was quickly put down by the rest
of the military forces that didn’t join in the coup, though the event
succeeded in shedding global light on the underlying tensions
prevalent in this OPEC member country. It also temporarily raised
concerns about whether the French would use their in-country military
forces to aid the embattled government and “restore democracy” if the
rebels succeeded in seizing power from their proxy.

Targets:

The typical target seems to be a long-serving elderly leader with
speculative health concerns who represents a power structure (whether
his own or inherited) that increasingly large segments of the
population and/or a faction of his “deep state” has come to believe
(whether on their own or with foreign infowar and NGO “nudging”)
doesn’t support their interests. They’re also usually plagued by
accusations of corruption (whether real, exaggerated, or false) that
serve to incite unrest during periods of nationwide economic hardship
caused by either systemic mismanagement, Hybrid War, and/or a drop in
the price of primary exports (oil, commodities, etc.).

Triggers:


It’s usually the case that something directly or indirectly related to
an impending “changing of the guard” or political transition triggers
the non-electoral regime change movement, be it efforts by the
incumbent to change the constitution in order to run for another term,
declaring their candidacy for the x-consecutive time after already
serving for many years, fears by a “deep state” faction that the
incumbent will lose the next election and therefore lead to their
successor possibly dismantling the power structure they inherit
(usually on “anti-corruption” grounds for populist appeal), a disputed
election, or in the case of the “Arab Spring”, the perception of
so-called “regional momentum”.

Determinants:

Most non-electoral regime changes succeed because of factors beyond
the public’s view, namely the state of affairs within the “deep state”
and in particular the loyalty of the military forces that enjoy a
legal monopoly on violence by virtue of their being. It’s important,
however, that there’s some “plausible” public pretext for the regime
change, be it protests, a corruption scandal, or a disputed election,
and the unity of the “deep state” is also another important
determinant because rival factions might abuse the aforesaid for their
own purposes. Sometimes the threat of sanctions against the incumbent
and their clique for using force to quell unrest could widen “deep
state” divisions and facilitate regime change.

* Cameroon:

President Biya won his sixth term in office late last year following a
serious breakdown of law and order in the separatist Anglophone region
abutting the Nigerian border, which came on the heels of Cameroon
finally seeming to surmount the challenge posed by Boko Haram in the
northern part of the country. The primary geostrategic consequence of
his ouster under the possible scenario of a nascent Color Revolution
in the cities merging with the Unconventional War in the rural
periphery might be the destabilization of what the author described as
China’s plans to create a “West-Central African CPEC”, though if
managed properly by the “deep state”, it might contrarily stabilize
this megaproject’s viability if the choreography succeeds in placating
the population.

* Republic of the Congo:


The other less-discussed Congo located between the DRC and Gabon, this
one is presided over by one of Africa’s longest-serving leaders who
recently joined OPEC and also put an end to a simmering insurgency in
the Pool region surrounding the capital. Unlike Cameroon, it’s less
clear what the geostrategic consequences of a non-electoral regime
change here could be, but it might potentially be a factor in whether
the country continues to remain within the joint orbit of France and
China or decisively pivots to one or the other. In this sense, it
could change the “balance of power” in Central Africa and contribute
to the gradual retreat of Françafrique in the face of overall Chinese
gains in France’s historic “sphere of influence” and Russia’s recent
ones in the Central African Republic.

* Chad:


Occupying the pivot space between Saharan and Equatorial Africa,
President Idriss Deby came to power on the back of a coup in 1990 and
has remained in office ever since, mostly relying on the fact that his
country’s military is regarded as one of the strongest in all of the
continent and has an operational reach as far west as Mali. He’s not
without his domestic detractors, however, some of whom have led large
rebel formations towards the capital in several unsuccessful coup
attempts that were at times thwarted through the intervention of his
French ally, such as last month when Paris bombed an anti-government
convoy that crossed into northern Chad from Libya. For all of its
faults, Chad seems to be “too big to fail” for France and it’s
unlikely that the former colonizer will ever let this prized piece of
real estate slip from its grasp.

* Equatorial Guinea:


President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo has reigned for nearly four
decades and survived numerous coup attempts, some of which were
planned by mercenaries in this tiny but oil-rich island-coastal nation
in the strategic Gulf of Guinea.  Being located where it is and with
the resource wealth that it has, it’s an important piece of the
African chessboard that France might want to pry away from its
American ally in order to reinforce its policy of Françafrique that’s
facing its greatest threat ever from China and Russia in Central
Africa. Apart from the “friendly competition” between those two Great
Powers, there isn’t really much else that can be said at this time
about the possible outcome of any non-electoral regime change in
Equatorial Guinea.

* Mozambique:


The incumbent leader has only been in power for a few years, but he
represents the corrupt and increasingly reviled FRELIMO party that’s
been ruling Mozambique since independence, though to their credit, the
authorities have been progressively implementing what appears to be a
“phased leadership transition” to incorporate the former RENAMO rebel
opposition into the country’s “deep state” as part of a peace deal.
That said, this responsible arrangement could always collapse at any
time, and the country is nowadays threatened by mysterious jihadists
who’ve been wreaking havoc along the northern borderland with
Tanzania, so “black swan” developments that might trigger a
non-electoral regime change are more likely here than in most of the
other predicted targets, which could have an impact on global LNG
geopolitics given its sizeable offshore reserves (coincidentally
located in close proximity to where the new terrorist threat emerged)
and regional security.

* Sudan:


Sudan is undoubtedly in the throes of a multifaceted Hybrid War that
the author elaborated upon at length in a previous piece late last
year and which should be skimmed for reference if one’s interested in
the strategic nuances involved, but the latest update is that its
“deep state” might be preparing for a “phased leadership transition”
in a manner which seemed to have influenced the Algerian one that
suddenly followed soon thereafter. Simply put, Sudan is indispensable
to China’s Silk Road vision for Africa and is also Russia’s gateway to
the continent, so its destabilization and possible “Balkanization”
like President al-Bashir warned about a year and a half ago would
inflict very serious damage to multipolar integration processes all
across the continent.

* Uganda:


Finally, the country that most closely fits the criteria of the
author’s non-electoral regime change model is Uganda, the military
heavyweight in the transregional East and Central African space that’s
been ruled by President Museveni for the last one-third of a century.
During the last few years, however, his mostly-youthful population
(which is also one of the fastest growing in Africa, notwithstanding
the large amounts of migration [sometimes illegal] that it receives)
has become restive and most recently (and one can argue, quite
naively) placed their hopes in the singer-turned-politician Bobi Wine
because they see in him a comparatively younger face of anti-systemic
change. However a non-electoral regime change might unfold in Uganda,
its consequences would change the entire “balance of power” in this
strategic part of the world at the height of the New Great Game and
modern-day “Scramble for Africa” in the New Cold War.

Concluding Thoughts


Using the latest events in Algeria as the lead-in to discussing the
other non-electoral regime changes and attempts thereof that took
place in Africa since the “Arab Spring”, it’s clear to see that three
separate – but sometimes interconnected scenarios – have unfolded, be
they Color Revolutions like in the aforementioned 2011 events, genuine
non-externally-influenced people’s movements like 2014 Burkina Faso,
or “deep state” coups such as what took place in 2017 Angola and which
later structurally inspired the subsequent ones in Ethiopia and
Algeria (both of which were driven in part by the first two
scenarios). All countries have power structures (“deep states”), but
some are more flexible than others when confronting bottom-up pressure
(which may or may not be externally influenced – and in the future,
possibly weaponized against China’s geostrategic interests), which
usually makes or breaks the regime change operation and will determine
whether the forecasted targets will survive if they end up on the
chopping block too.

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10 NOV 14 ::Ouagadougou's Signal to Sub-Sahara Africa
Africa


What’s clear is that a very young, very informed and very connected
African youth demographic [many characterise this as a ‘demographic
dividend’] – which for Beautiful Blaise turned into a demographic
terminator – is set to alter the existing equilibrium between the
rulers and the subjects, and a re-balancing has begun. We need to ask
ourselves; how many people can incumbent shoot stone cold dead in such
a situation – 100, 1,000, 10,000? This is anotherpoint: there is a
threshold beyond which the incumbent can’t go. Where that threshold
lies will be discovered in the throes of the event. Therefore, the
preeminent point to note is that protests in Burkina Faso achieved
escape velocity. Overthrowing incumbents is all about acceleration,
momentum and speed best characterised by the German word ‘Blitzkrieg’.

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04-MAR-2019 :: the worst performing currency in the world in 2019 is the Ghana Cedi which has retreated about -12.6% year to date.
Africa


“The performance of the cedi doesn’t correlate with the fundamentals,”
Opata said in a phone interview from the nation’s capital, Accra.

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Global FDI flows fell by 19% in 2018 via @UNCTAD. But 2018 FDI flows to Africa increased 6% from $38bn to $40bn. @gregorylbsmith
Africa


Huge gains for #SouthAfrica (446%!), #Egypt up 7%, #Nigeria down 36%
(to $2.2.bn in 2018 and was overtaken by Ghana who received $3.3bn).

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@Heineken opens first brewery in Mozambique, a US$100M investment @FurtherAfrica
Africa


The new brewery, incorporating the latest technologies, represents a
US$100 million (EUR85 million) investment. Located in the province of
Maputo, between the Marracuene and Manhica districts, the brewery will
have a production capacity of 0.8 million hectolitres.
It recently started to brew Txilar, a brand-new beer specially made by
Mozambicans for Mozambican consumers. HEINEKEN Mozambique will also
continue to offer international brands including Heineken(R), Amstel,
Sagres and Strongbow.
With a GDP growth of 3.5% in 2018, Mozambique’s socio-economic
fundamentals are encouraging. Beer consumption is currently at 10.5
litre per capita.
HEINEKEN wants to be a partner for growth in Mozambique. Through this
important investment, HEINEKEN Mozambique already employs 200 people –
96% of which are Mozambican.
HEINEKEN Mozambique will also support indirect jobs through its entire
value chain.
HEINEKEN Mozambique is using local maize grown in Catandica district
in the central province of Manica in its new locally produced beer
Txilar.

read more








15-MAR-2019 :: Welcome to Nairobi President @EmmanuelMacron
Kenyan Economy


The Visit by the French President Emmanuel Macron to Kenya is an
important Signal not only for its being the first visit by a French
Head of State to Kenya, but also it speaks to a number of other
narratve threads. I wrote a hagiographic Piece in December 2017
headlined Emmanuel Macron gives France back its mojo.

You might recall the famous Harold Macmillan response

Harold Macmillan when asked what a prime minister most feared:
'Events, dear boy, events'

President Macron was overtaken by Events in particular the Mouvement
des gilets jaunes [Yellow Vests] and this tapered some of the
enthusiasm. However, The French have always been prone to go to the
Streets. In the 1990s, when I used to trade the French Short End, I
can recall Prime Minister Alain Juppe who similarly tried to reform
and reshape the system but met his match on the Street.

After all, it was the iconic French philosopher Paul Virilio who said
this about the Street

“The revolutionary contingent attains its ideal form not in the place
of production, but in the street, where for a moment it stops being a
cog in the technical machine and itself becomes a motor (machine of
attack), in other words a producer of speed.’’

Therefore, it is easy to get excited about the French Street but The
Street is an occupational hazard for any Leader in the Lycée Palace
and just like how Macron arm-wrestled Trump to a stand still, Macron
had to arm-wrestle the Street in order to establish himself. Its a
rite of Passage for a French President like the unheated Pool at Mount
Kenya Safari Club was my rite of passage.

President Macron has appealed directly to the African Citizen;  “I am
from a generation for whom Nelson Mandela’s victory is one of the best
political memories.” He has cast himself and is in fact as much a part
of the Post-Colonial Africa as are the overwhelming majority of
Africans. The reformatting of France-Afrique is a subject for another
day. This First Visit of a French President to Kenya speaks to a
desire to engage with ''Anglo-Afrique'' The French Government has an
incredible level of coherence and the same President who pronounced

"I want France to be a start~Up Nation. A Nation that thinks and moves
like a Start~Up"

has walked and chewed gum at the same time and launched Choose Africa.
Emmanuel Macron has pledged to invest 2.5 billion euros in Africa by
financing and supporting startups and small- to medium-sized
enterprises by 2022. Dubbed Choose Africa, the government would
support about 10,000 enterprises across the continent by providing
credit, technical support and equity financing, the French Development
Agency said in an emailed statement.
The funds will be mobilized via the AFD and its private-sector
financing arm, Proparco. Macron, who is on a three-day trip to Africa
to boost trade with Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya, said 1 billion euros
was earmarked for equity investment in startups and SMEs.

Wit respect to Kenya in particular, France is the 6th largest investor
in Kenya representing about 10% of direct and indirect commercial
interests. Think Lafarge, Danone's investment in Brookside, Total both
up and down stream, big loans into the Renewable Energy side via AFD
and into KenGen and plenty more. Just in the last 24 hours, the
President unveiled the locally assembled Peugeot and had President
Kenyatta take him for a spin in it. The Peugeot 504 was surely the
most iconic car brand of all time in Africa.

The President told reporters at a Press Conference

“We are launching a project for the refurbishment of the rail-line,
from the central station to the airport” Macron added that France
plans to invest 3.1 billion euros worth of projects in Kenya once the
two countries sign new trade deals on Thursday.

Of course, France is present in Djibouti and therefore has a foothold
in the Western Indian Ocean and this is further buttressed by its
presence in various Indian Ocean Islands [which because of their
Economic Exclusions Zones have become highly prized Partners]. It is
clear that France appreciates that the centre of Geo-economic Gravity
has shifted and towards the Indian Ocean. The centre of Gravity was
once somewhere in the Pacific Ocean. President Macron and ''Allez
France'' [once the Arc de Triomphe for Daniel Wildenstein an eternity
ago] is seeking to extend its Africa positioning in order to better
project power into this new strategically central geo-economic zone.

Welcome to Nairobi Mr. President.

read more


In Kenya push, France seals business deals worth over 2 billion euros @ReutersAfrica
Africa


Macron’s visit to Nairobi is the first by a French president since
Kenya won independence from Britain in 1963 and follows stopovers in
Ethiopia and Djibouti - all countries where China has moved in
aggressively and presents stiff competition.
At a ceremony with Kenyan leader Uhuru Kenyatta, a consortium led by
Vinci secured a 30-year concession worth 1.6 billion euros to operate
a highway linking the Kenyan capital and Mau Summit in western Kenya.
Renewables firm Voltalia sealed a 70 million euro contract for a solar
power plant while an Airbus-led consortium won a 200 million euro deal
for coastal and maritime surveillance. Total is finalising terms on a
second solar plant.
“In Kenya there is an economic opportunity and it’s within the
president’s strategy in France to look at not just Francophone Africa,
but Anglophone Africa too,” said a French presidential source.
During a four-day trip to East Africa, Macron has vaunted France’s
soft power in culture and education and its military know-how to woo
deeper partnerships.
Kenya is east Africa’s most advanced economy with a liberal business
environment and entrepreneurial culture. French businesses however
account for just a 1.4 percent market share.

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Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres @JY_LeDrian presente #ChooseAfrica, l'initiative 🇫🇷 mise en oeuvre par @AFD_France et @Proparco pour soutenir les start-up, TPE et #PME en #Afrique
Kenyan Economy


Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères @JY_LeDrian présente
#ChooseAfrica, l'initiative 🇫🇷 mise en oeuvre par @AFD_France et
@Proparco pour soutenir les start-up, TPE et #PME en #Afrique. 2.5 Mds
d'euros pour accompagner 10 000 entreprises africaines d'ici 2022.

read more




@CICInsurance reports FY 2018 EPS +33.333% Earnings here
Kenyan Economy


Par Value:
Closing Price:           4.00
Total Shares Issued:          2615538528.00
Market Capitalization:        10,462,154,112
EPS:             0.24
PE:             16.66

CIC is the leading provider of micro insurance and other financial services

CIC Insurance Group Limited FY 2018 Results through 31st December 2018
vs. 31st December 2017
FY Total Assets 32.975733b vs. 30.505376b +8.098%
FY Gross written premiums 16.627384b vs. 14.886887b +11.691%
FY Reinsurance ceded [2.683815b] vs. [2.241195b] +19.749%
FY Net earned premiums 14.261486b vs. 12.094997b +17.912%
FY Investment income 1.517464b vs. 1.543581b -1.692%
FY Other gains 354.096m vs. 704.373m -49.729%
FY Total income 17.078711b vs. 15.600262b +9.477%
FY Claims and policyholders’ benefits expense [9.250055b] vs.
[7.856468b] +17.738%
FY Commissions expense [2.384012b] vs. [2.122470b] +12.323%
FY Operating and other expenses [4.601816b] vs. [4.914736b] -6.367%
FY Total expenses [16.235883b] vs. [15.081152b] +7.657%
FY PBT 851.621m vs. 519.156m +64.040%
FY Profit for the year 625.363m vs. 478.473m +30.700%
EPS 0.24 vs. 0.18 +33.333%
Dividend per share 0.13 vs. 0.12 +8.333%
Cash and cash equivalents as at 31st Dec 2018 4.305082b vs. 2.877373b +49.618%

FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS
• Gross written premiums increased by 11% from KShs.14.89 b in 2017 to
KShs.16.63 b in 2018
• Total assets increased by 8% to KShs.33 b
• Profit before tax grew by 64% to Kshs.852 m
The company registered strong topline growth with improved quality of
business in most of the lines of business. However, because of the
prevailing market conditions, the valuation of our shares portfolio at
the Nairobi Securities Exchange has significantly dropped. The group
focused on cost control measures resulting in lower operating expenses
in 2018 which benefited the bottom line. Property valuations remained
fairly flat in Kenya. As pace setters in insurance financial
reporting, we have adopted IFRS 9 and the impact of this is included
in the financial statements.

DIVIDENDS
The directors recommend the payment of a first and final dividend of
Ksh.0.13 per share totalling to Ksh 340 m (2017 – Ksh 313 m). The
dividend is subject to shareholders’ approval and payment will be
subject to withholding tax. The payment will be made on or about 31st
May 2019 to the shareholders registered at the close of business on
30th April 2019.

Conclusions

Curiously they only made 3cents in H2
However, this bias has been seen before.
Looks attractive on reverses.

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Kenya Shilling versus The Dollar Live ForexPros
Kenyan Economy


Nairobi All Share Bloomberg +10.69% 2019 +1.23% 2019

http://www.BLOOMBERG.COM/quote/NSEASI:IND

Nairobi ^NSE20 Bloomberg +1.23% 2019

http://j.mp/ajuMHJ

Every Listed Share can be interrogated here

http://www.rich.co.ke/rcdata/nsestocks.php

read more



 
 
by Aly Khan Satchu (www.rich.co.ke)
 
 
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March 2019
 
 
 
 
 
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