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Satchu's Rich Wrap-Up
Monday 22nd of July 2019

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22-JUL-2019 :: The Showdown. @TheStarKenya
Law & Politics

President Trump is a unique Political Phenomenon otherwise he would
not have parlayed his way to the White House. Trump has already
established his credentials as a linguistic warfare specialist. Look
at the names he gave his opponents: Crooked Hillary, Lyin’ Ted, Little
Marco, ‘Low-energy’ Jeb — which were devastating and terminal. His
Linguistics actually derive from the World of Wrestling and Between
1988 and 2013, he ran wrestling events, appeared ringside (notably in
the Battle of the Billionaires), and was even inducted into the World
Wrestling Entertainment Hall of Fame. Despite being presented as a
competitive sport, professional wrestling is scripted. The
competitors, results, pre-match and post-match interviews — all of it
is make-believe. The broadcasters give their audience all the things
you’d expect in a work of fiction: backstory, suspense, symbolism and
so forth. [Financial Times' Stephen Grosz]

In wrestling, as in literature, names are never neutral. Naming a
character is an essential part of creating them. There’s always a
“face” (short for babyface, or hero) and a “heel” (villain). Hulk
Hogan and Dwayne “The Rock” Johnson are faces. Jake “The Snake”
Roberts and Rick Rude are heels. Wrestling pits good against bad, a
genuine he-man against a phoney rascal. To emasculate his opponents,
Trump uses this trope: “Low Energy Jeb”, “Mr Magoo” (Jeff Sessions)
“Lyin’ James” (Comey), “Rat” (Michael Cohen), “Highly Conflicted Bob
Mueller”. As part of his two-fisted swagger, Trump tweets in
wrestling-speak: “Lightweight Marco Rubio was working hard last night.
The problem is, he is a choker, and once a choker, always a choker!
Mr. Meltdown.

The President last week expanded his linguistic warfare repertoire
last week to embrace a [prima facie] racist trope, he said;

In America, if you hate our Country, you are free to leave. The simple
fact of the matter is, the four Congresswomen think that America is
wicked in its origins, they think that America is even more wicked
now, that we are all racist and evil.

He picked on 4 Ladies of colour  AOC, Tlaib, Omar & Pressley. His use
of the word ''wicked'' was a ''Blinder'' because who can forget the
Wizard of Oz and the Wicked Witch of the West. Paul Virilio said

''Images contaminate us like a virus.''

What is clear is that he has characterised the 4 Ladies as 4 Wicked
Witches of the West.

The Ladies turned apoplectic.

Set aside the Right and wrong because what is right and what is wrong
is no longer moving the political Needle. The Linguistic warfare
specialist has laid a Trap & Team @AOC and @IlhanMN et al are exactly
where he wants them Rabbits caught in the headlights and not
sufficiently situationally aware. He has made them the Face of the
Democratic Party. And they are so ''drunk'' they don't even understand
what he has done. He has relegated Speaker Pelosi to a mere Footnote
and he is going to fight his re-election against them.

"What the president has done is politically brilliant. Pelosi was
trying to marginalize these folks and the president has now identified
the entire party with them." @jaketapper

Sure its open racism but if he gets 2/3 of the white vote he gets
re-elected [RenCapman]

There is a reason Trump twits:it gives  him Pavlovian control over the
narrative. And now he is trying to release  A$AP Rocky

President Trump: "I personally don’t know A$AP Rocky but I can tell
you he has tremendous support from the African American community in
this country. When I say African American, I think I can really say
from everybody in this country n/c we’re all one."

The President is a political Genius and the 4 Wicked Witches see their
role as wearing their moral compass on their sleeve. Its Game Over.

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Currency Markets at a Glance WSJ
World Currencies

Euro 1.1218
Dollar Index 97.17
Japan Yen 107.91
Swiss Franc 0.9826
Pound 1.2485
Aussie 0.7037
India Rupee 69.0250
South Korea Won 1178.24
Brazil Real 3.7483
Egypt Pound 16.6170
South Africa Rand 13.9382

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Crude Oil 6 Month Chart INO

Emerging Markets

Frontier Markets

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What Happens in Sudan Doesn't Stay in Sudan @ForeignAffairs

Will Khartoum Become the Center of a New African Order or an Appendage
of the Gulf?

It’s the end of an era in the Horn of Africa. After three decades in
power, Sudanese strongman Omar al-Bashir fell in April. Mass
antigovernment protests erupted, and a military coup soon followed.
Now the remnants of Bashir’s security state are locked in a protracted
standoff with an indefatigable pro-democracy movement over control of
the country. The governing Transitional Military Council has cracked
down violently, killing more than 100 protesters in a wave of
repression that began on June 3. But it has also promised to
facilitate a transition to civilian rule as part of a tentative
power-sharing agreement with the Forces of Freedom and Change, an
umbrella organization representing the demonstrators.

The upheaval in Sudan comes at the same time as Ethiopia’s
reform-minded prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, is dramatically expanding
political space in his country, while battling an attendant surge in
ethnic violence. Together with subtler stirrings in Eritrea and
elsewhere, the historic transitions in Sudan and Ethiopia could change
the trajectory of a volatile corner of Africa for decades to come. The
question that now hangs over the region is what the next era will
bring: Will it usher in a new, more democratic order built on a shared
foundation of national sovereignty and collective security? Or will it
bring a closed, authoritarian order that is beholden to extraregional
powers? Sudan, in particular, is a microcosm of this broader struggle
to reshape the regional order, as well as a likely harbinger of its
outcome. On one side of that struggle is a coalition of African
states, bound together by the African Union and an important East
African regional bloc. On the other are the oil-rich monarchies of the
Persian Gulf.

The Horn of Africa has remained steadfastly authoritarian since the
dying days of the Cold War, during which the United States and the
Soviet Union vied for dominance by arming the region’s despots. Much
of Africa transitioned to competitive political systems in the 1990s,
but not the Horn: there a new generation of autocrats consolidated
power. In 1989, Bashir led a military-Islamist cabal that overthrew
the elected government of Sudan. Shortly thereafter, guerrilla leaders
took control of Ethiopia and neighboring Eritrea. By the end of the
1990s, Djibouti’s ruling People’s Rally for Progress party had
engineered a transition from one strongman to another.

At first the United States did little to halt the rise of this new
generation of autocrats. Then, after the 9/11 terror attacks, it began
to aid and abet them in the interest of fighting terrorism. The
bloated national-security states that came to dominate the region
promoted an ideology of authoritarian stability, but they provided
only authoritarianism. Inherently insecure and militaristic, they
feuded and repressed their way from one regional crisis to the next.

Over the last three years, the edifice of that old order has begun to
crack. A prime minister with reformist zeal rode a wave of popular
protest to power in Ethiopia, where he has released thousands of
political prisoners, improved media freedoms, and ended the
two-decades-long feud with neighboring Eritrea. A similar uprising in
Sudan sank the region’s longest-serving dictator, although what sort
of regime will replace him remains to be seen. The political
transitions in both countries—the region’s two largest, most powerful,
and economically important—will have ramifications for Eritrea,
Djibouti, and South Sudan, where looming succession crises, among
other pressures, are placing autocracies under stress.

Shifting external forces have accompanied—and to some extent
caused—the changes in the Horn. Under Presidents Barack Obama and
Donald Trump, U.S. influence has waned across Africa, but especially
in the Horn and the adjoining waterways of the Red Sea and Gulf of
Aden. Washington’s competitors and newly assertive allies have stepped
into the breach, each of them keen to carve out a foothold in a
critical maritime region. China, Russia, Turkey, and even the European
Union have made gambits. But the most formidable bids for regional
dominance have come from the middle powers of the Middle East: Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Crown Princes Mohammed Bin Zayed and Mohammed Bin Salman have sought
to radically transform their countries’ relationships with their
neighbors across the Red Sea.

Faced with expanding Iranian influence, the destabilizing precedent of
the Arab Spring, and a shrinking American security umbrella, Crown
Princes Mohammed Bin Zayed and Mohammed Bin Salman have sought to
radically transform their countries’ relationships with their
neighbors across the Red Sea. In 2015, the UAE established a military
base in Eritrea, from which the Saudi-Emirati alliance has waged war
in Yemen—often relying on Sudanese troops and paramilitaries for
ground operations. The UAE is now building a second military base in
Somaliland’s port of Berbera while the Saudis are planning their own
military facility in neighboring Djibouti. Both countries have also
expanded their commercial ties to the Horn, and provided large cash
infusions to Sudan and Ethiopia. A major goal of these efforts is to
align the Horn states with the Saudi-Emirati axis against Iran, Qatar,
and Turkey. To that end, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi find it useful to
protect the region’s autocratic regimes, because the Gulf states’
interests don’t always align with popular opinion in the Horn. In
Sudan, for example, the government has supported the Saudi-Emirati
intervention in Yemen despite vocal criticism from across the Sudanese
political spectrum.

The Horn’s two most important African-led bodies have quietly but
persistently set themselves against the region’s emerging Gulf-led
order. The African Union and an East African regional bloc known as
the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, or IGAD, seek to craft
a regional order that rests on the sovereignty and collective security
of African states. The commitment to democracy within these
institutions remains weak, as evidenced by the many authoritarian
leaders in their ranks, but the organizations do embrace norms of
constitutional governance and civilian supremacy in politics far more
than the leaders of the Gulf states.

The Gulf states, on the one hand, and the African-led organizations,
on the other, have sought to formalize their competing visions in
recent years. Just last December, the Saudis inaugurated a Red Sea
forum, which includes all of the Horn’s coastal states as well as
Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt, and Jordan. The forum will organize
working groups at the ministerial level, in order to coordinate policy
across the region in areas like defense, intelligence gathering,
economic cooperation, and environmental policy. For more than two
years now, the African Union and IGAD have also sought to foster
dialogue and cooperation on Horn and Red Sea issues—including Gulf
interventionism. The African Union expanded the mandate of its special
panel on Sudan and South Sudan to address broader regional issues, and
IGAD recently extended the mandate of its Special Envoy for Somalia to
include the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. IGAD’s Council of Ministers also
strongly endorsed a common approach to the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden,
and in April it established a task force to begin formulating one.

The battle lines in Sudan have been drawn. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have
lined up behind the ruling TMC, offering the post-coup government
their political and military support. (Egypt and Eritrea, two
important African allies of the Saudi-Emirati axis that share long
borders with Sudan, have adopted a similar stance.) The TMC’s
leaders—Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as
Hemedti—commanded Sudanese troops in Yemen and so have long-standing
ties to Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In fact, the two Gulf monarchies
encouraged the generals to overthrow Bashir, whom they viewed as
unreliable because of his warm relations with Qatar and Turkey, and
his Islamist leanings. They backstopped the TMC with $3 billion in aid
immediately following Bashir’s ouster, and the UAE appears to have
supplied Hemedti’s Rapid Support Forces with Emirati armor. And
although they have tempered their public support for the TMC after
Hemedti’s troops massacred civilian protesters in early June, Abu
Dhabi and Riyadh have continued to provide political cover to Sudan’s
generals as they battle for control of the transition.

IGAD and the African Union have taken the side of Sudan’s democracy
movement and pushed the TMC to relinquish power to a transitional
civilian administration. The efforts of these African-led
organizations have at times been haphazard and uncoordinated, but the
groups’ position is clear. The African Union’s powerful Peace and
Security Council initially demanded in mid-April that Sudan’s military
cede power to a civilian government within 15 days of toppling Bashir.
Roughly a week later, it extended the grace period to three months.
But after the slaughter of the protesters, the council suspended the
TMC’s AU membership and threatened to impose further sanctions if an
agreement on a civilian-led transition was not reached by the end of
that month. The Ethiopian prime minister then attempted to broker a
deal for a civilian-led transition, using the AU and IGAD position as
a starting point. The two sides eventually agreed to share power for
three years until elections can be organized, alternating leadership
of a council made up of an equal number of military and civilian
representatives. The agreement remains fragile, but the Peace and
Security Council appears ready to monitor its implementation before
readmitting Sudan to the African Union.

What happens in Sudan will likely determine the future of the Horn for
the next decade or more. If the TMC clings to power, Riyadh and Abu
Dhabi will not only have secured an important political and military
ally; they will have positioned themselves as regional kingmakers,
capable of imposing their foreign policy priorities on the countries
of the Horn and forestalling democratic transitions. But if the
African Union and IGAD can shepherd a transition to civilian
government in Sudan, they will have laid the groundwork for a very
different regional order, one that can deliver peace, development, and
accountable government.

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10-JUN-2019 :: And now we have two visions of the Future

And now we have two visions of the Future. One vision played out on
our screens, the protestors could have been our wives, children. The
other vision is that of MBS, MBZ and Al-Sisi and its red in tooth and
claw. Vladimir and Xi backed the Gulf and America is below the radar

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by Aly Khan Satchu (www.rich.co.ke)
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July 2019

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