home | rich profile | rich freebies | rich tools | rich data | online shop | my account | register |
  rich wrap-ups | **richLIVE** | richPodcasts | richRadio | richTV  | richInterviews  | richCNBC  | 
Satchu's Rich Wrap-Up
Monday 30th of August 2021

Register and its all Free.

read more

Macro Thoughts
World Of Finance

The Markets
In one of his books Nassim Nicholas Taleb @nntaleb described his Trading Strategy as one which lost money 364 days of the year but made more on one day than was lost in those preceding 364 days. 

He makes the point that Few People or Trading Desks have the mental stamina to last those 364 days for that extreme one day pay out.

Paul Tudor-Jones "I love trading macro. If trading is like chess, then macro is like 3D chess. You never have a complete information set or information edge the way analysts can have when trading individual securities." Paul Tudor Jones @NeckarValue

read more

In another instance, in a demonstration of her equal status, Solomon sent his powerful ring to her. @aaolomi

He directed a bird-like jinn to carry it to her, but the confused creature got lost and accidently dropped the ring into the sea where it became Cumoro Island.

read more

Moroni -capital of comoros @rhaplord

settled during the 14 cent. after the abandonment of mzwani
old mosque was built in 1427AD (minaret added in 1921 and 2nd storey after)
the bangwe (public square) was built in the 19th cent.

read more

67,000 years of coastal engagement at Panga ya Saidi, eastern Africa

The antiquity and nature of coastal resource procurement is central to understanding human evolution and adaptations to complex environments. 

It has become increasingly apparent in global archaeological studies that the timing, characteristics, and trajectories of coastal resource use are highly variable. 

Within Africa, discussions of these issues have largely been based on the archaeological record from the south and northeast of the continent, with little evidence from eastern coastal areas leaving significant spatial and temporal gaps in our knowledge. 

Here, we present data from Panga ya Saidi, a limestone cave complex located 15 km from the modern Kenyan coast, which represents the first long-term sequence of coastal engagement from eastern Africa

Rather than attempting to distinguish between coastal resource use and coastal adaptations, we focus on coastal engagement as a means of characterising human relationships with marine environments and resources from this inland location. 

We use aquatic mollusc data spanning the past 67,000 years to document shifts in the acquisition, transportation, and discard of these materials, to better understand long-term trends in coastal engagement. 

Our results show pulses of coastal engagement beginning with low-intensity symbolism, and culminating in the consistent low-level transport of marine and freshwater food resources, emphasising a diverse relationship through time. 

Panga ya Saidi has the oldest stratified evidence of marine engagement in eastern Africa, and is the only site in Africa which documents coastal resources from the Late Pleistocene through the Holocene, highlighting the potential archaeological importance of peri-coastal sites to debates about marine resource relationships.
In archaeological research, the terms coastal resource use and coastal adaptation carry specific connotations [1, 9], though there is no widespread agreement on when the transition between the two occurs. 

Coastal resource use can be defined as the systematic and recurrent exploitation of marine resources, but where lifeways are not necessarily transformed. 

On the other hand, coastal adaptation occurs with the effective, repeated, and dominant exploitation of marine environments and the intertidal zone (e.g., [1, 2, 10]). 

This intense relationship shapes all aspects of a culture including diet, technology, mobility systems, and socio-economic organization.

In this study, we report a 67,000 year long marine mollusc sequence at Panga ya Saidi (PYS), a near-coastal cave site in Kenya. 

PYS contains the oldest stratified evidence of coastal resources in eastern Africa, and provides the first glimpse into the timing, nature and trajectory of marine resource engagement in this region. 

PYS is also the first stratified site in Africa with an archaeological record from MIS 5–1, possibly due to the peri-coastal setting, and we use these data to provide the continent’s first long-term socio-economic sequence of coastal engagement. 

PYS is situated in the Kilifi District, at c.150 m above sea level (asl) on the east facing escarpment of the Dzitsoni Uplands of southern Kenya. 

These uplands separate the coastal plains from the arid Nyika Plateau interior, which is dominated by a dry Acacia Thorn-Bushland. 

Positioned within the Zanzibar-Inhambane coastal forest mosaic (lowland moist and dry forest remnants), PYS lies c.8-9 km inland from the Kilifi Creek Lagoon (as the shortest straight-line distance to the current landward edge), and ≤15 km from the present coastline

read more

Luminous and Fairy Tale

Its as if my hearing is sharpened. I hear the Breeze, birdsong, Nature in its many forms

read more

.@nfergus Niall Ferguson on why the end of America’s empire won’t be peaceful @TheEconomist

“THE MULTITUDES remained plunged in ignorance… and their leaders, seeking their votes, did not dare to undeceive them.” So wrote Winston Churchill of the victors of the first world war in “The Gathering Storm.” 

He bitterly recalled a “refusal to face unpleasant facts, desire for popularity and electoral success irrespective of the vital interests of the state.” 

American readers watching their government’s ignominious departure from Afghanistan, and listening to President Joe Biden’s strained effort to justify the unholy mess he has made, may find at least some of Churchill’s critique of interwar Britain uncomfortably familiar.

Britain’s state of mind was the product of a combination of national exhaustion and “imperial overstretch”, to borrow a phrase from Paul Kennedy, a historian at Yale. 

Since 1914, the nation had endured war, financial crisis and in 1918-19 a terrible pandemic, the Spanish influenza. The economic landscape was overshadowed by a mountain of debt. 

Though the country remained the issuer of the dominant global currency, it was no longer unrivalled in that role. 

A highly unequal society inspired politicians on the left to demand redistribution if not outright socialism. 

A significant proportion of the intelligentsia went further, embracing communism or fascism.

Meanwhile the established political class preferred to ignore a deteriorating international situation. Britain’s global dominance was menaced in Europe, in Asia and in the Middle East. 

The system of collective security—based on the League of Nations, which had been established in 1920 as part of the post-war peace settlement—was crumbling, leaving only the possibility of alliances to supplement thinly spread imperial resources. 

The result was a disastrous failure to acknowledge the scale of the totalitarian threat and to amass the means to deter the dictators.

Does Britain’s experience help us understand the future of American power? Americans prefer to draw lessons from the United States’ history, but it may be more illuminating to compare the country to its predecessor as an Anglophone global hegemon, for America today in many ways resembles Britain in the interwar period.

Like all such historical analogies, this one is not perfect. The vast amalgam of colonies and other dependencies that Britain ruled over in the 1930s has no real American counterpart today. 

This allows Americans to reassure themselves that they do not have an empire, even when withdrawing their soldiers and civilians from Afghanistan after a 20-year presence.

Despite its high covid-19 mortality, America is not recovering from the kind of trauma that Britain experienced in the first world war, when huge numbers of young men were slaughtered (nearly 900,000 died, some 6% of males aged 15 to 49 died, to say nothing of 1.7m wounded). 

Nor is America facing as clear and present a threat as Nazi Germany posed to Britain. 

Still, the resemblances are striking, and go beyond the failure of both countries to impose order on Afghanistan. 

(“It is clear,” noted The Economist in February 1930, after “premature” modernising reforms had triggered a revolt, “that Afghanistan will have none of the West”.) And the implications for the future of American power are unnerving.

So many books and articles predicting American decline have been written in recent decades that “declinism” has become a cliché. 

But Britain’s experience between the 1930s and the 1950s is a reminder that there are worse fates than gentle, gradual decline.

Follow the money
Start with the mountains of debt. Britain’s public debt after the first world war rose from 109% of GDP in 1918 to just under 200% in 1934.

 America’s federal debt is different in important ways, but it is comparable in magnitude. 

It will reach nearly 110% of GDP this year, even higher than its previous peak in the immediate aftermath of the second world war. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that it could exceed 200% by 2051.

An important difference between the United States today and the United Kingdom roughly a century ago is that the average maturity of American federal debt is quite short (65 months), whereas more than 40% of the British public debt took the form of perpetual bonds or annuities. 

This means that the American debt today is a great deal more sensitive to moves in interest rates than Britain’s was.

Another key difference is the great shift there has been in fiscal and monetary theories, thanks in large measure to John Maynard Keynes’s critique of Britain’s interwar policies.

Britain’s decision in 1925 to return sterling to the gold standard at the overvalued pre-war price condemned Britain to eight years of deflation. 

The increased power of trade unions meant that wage cuts lagged behind price cuts during the depression. This contributed to job losses. 

At the nadir in 1932, the unemployment rate was 15%. Yet Britain’s depression was mild, not least because abandoning the gold standard in 1931 allowed the easing of monetary policy. 

Falling real interest rates meant a decline in the burden of debt service, creating new fiscal room for manoeuvre.

Such a reduction in debt-servicing costs seems unlikely for America in the coming years. Economists led by the former treasury secretary, Lawrence Summers, have predicted inflationary dangers from the current fiscal and monetary policies. 

Where British real interest rates generally declined in the 1930s, in America they are projected to turn positive from 2027 and rise steadily to hit 2.5% by mid-century. 

True, forecasts of rising rates have been wrong before, and the Federal Reserve is in no hurry to tighten monetary policy. 

But if rates do rise, America’s debt will cost more to service, squeezing other parts of the federal budget, especially discretionary expenditures such as defence.

That brings us to the crux of the matter. Churchill’s great preoccupation in the 1930s was that the government was procrastinating—the underlying rationale of its policy of appeasement—rather than energetically rearming in response to the increasingly aggressive behaviour of Hitler, Mussolini and the militarist government of imperial Japan. 

A key argument of the appeasers was that fiscal and economic constraints—not least the high cost of running an empire that extended from Fiji to Gambia to Guiana to Vancouver—made more rapid rearmament impossible.

It may seem fanciful to suggest that America faces comparable threats today—not only from China, but also from Russia, Iran and North Korea. Yet the mere fact that it seems fanciful illustrates the point. 

The majority of Americans, like the majority of Britons between the wars, simply do not want to contemplate the possibility of a major war against one or more authoritarian regimes, coming on top of the country’s already extensive military commitments

That is why the projected decline of American defence spending as a share of GDP, from 3.4% in 2020 to 2.5% in 2031, will cause consternation only to Churchillian types. And they can expect the same hostile reception—the same accusations of war-mongering—that Churchill had to endure.

Power is relative
A relative decline compared with other countries is another point of resemblance. 

According to estimates by the economic historian Angus Maddison, the British economy by the 1930s had been overtaken in terms of output by not only America’s (as early as 1872), but also Germany’s (in 1898 and again, after the disastrous years of war, hyperinflation and slump, in 1935) and the Soviet Union (in 1930)

True, the British Empire as a whole had a bigger economy than the United Kingdom, especially if the Dominions are included—perhaps twice as large. 

But the American economy was even larger and remained more than double the size of Britain’s, despite the more severe impact of the Great Depression in the United States.

America today has a similar problem of relative decline in economic output. On the basis of purchasing-power parity, which allows for the lower prices of many Chinese domestic goods, the GDP of China caught up with that of America in 2014. 

On a current-dollar basis, the American economy is still bigger, but the gap is projected to narrow. This year China’s current-dollar GDP will be around 75% of America’s. By 2026 it will be 89%.

It is no secret that China poses a bigger economic challenge than the Soviet Union once did, since the latter’s economy was never more than 44% the size of America’s during the cold war. 

Nor is it classified information that China is seeking to catch up with America in many technological domains with national-security applications, from artificial intelligence to quantum computing. 

And the ambitions of China’s leader, Xi Jinping, are also well known—along with his renewal of the Chinese Communist Party’s ideological hostility to individual freedom, the rule of law and democracy.

American sentiment towards the Chinese government has markedly soured in the past five years. But that does not seem to be translating into public interest in actively countering the Chinese military threat. 

If Beijing invades Taiwan, most Americans will probably echo the British prime minister, Neville Chamberlain, who notoriously described the German bid to carve up Czechoslovakia in 1938 as “a quarrel in a far away country, between people of whom we know nothing”.

A crucial source of British weakness between the wars was the revolt of the intelligentsia against the Empire and more generally against traditional British values. 

Churchill recalled with disgust the Oxford Union debate in 1933 that had carried the motion, “This House refuses to fight for King and country.” 

As he noted: “It was easy to laugh off such an episode in England, but in Germany, in Russia, in Italy, in Japan, the idea of a decadent, degenerate Britain took deep root and swayed many calculations.” 

This of course is precisely how China’s new breed of “wolf-warrior” diplomats and nationalist intellectuals regard America today.

Nazis, fascists and communists alike had good reason to think the British were succumbing to self-hatred. 

“I did not even know that the British Empire is dying,” George Orwell wrote of his time as a colonial policeman in his essay “Shooting an Elephant.” 

Not many intellectuals attained Orwell’s insight that Britain’s was nevertheless “a great deal better than the younger empires that [were] going to supplant it.” 

Many—unlike Orwell—embraced Soviet communism, with disastrous results for Western intelligence. Meanwhile, a shocking number of members of the aristocratic social elite were attracted to Hitler. 

Even readers of the Daily Express were more inclined to make fun of the Empire than to celebrate it. 

“Big White Carstairs” in the Beachcomber column was an even more absurd caricature of the colonial type than David Low’s Colonel Blimp.

The end of empires
America’s empire may not manifest itself as dominions, colonies and protectorates, but the perception of international dominance, and the costs associated with overstretch, are similar. 

Both left and right in America now routinely ridicule or revile the idea of an imperial project. 

“The American Empire is falling apart,” gloats Tom Engelhardt, a journalist in The Nation

On the right, the economist Tyler Cowen sardonically imagines “what the fall of the American empire could look like.” 

At the same time as Cornel West, the progressive African-American philosopher, sees “Black Lives Matter and the fight against US empire [as] one and the same”, 

two pro-Trump Republicans, Ryan James Girdusky and Harlan Hill, call the pandemic “the latest example of how the American empire has no clothes.

The right still defends the traditional account of the republic’s founding—as a rejection of British colonial rule—against the "woke” left’s attempts to recast American history as primarily a tale of slavery and then segregation. 

But few on either side of the political spectrum pine for the era of global hegemony that began in the 1940s.

In short, like Britons in the 1930s, Americans in the 2020s have fallen out of love with empire—a fact that Chinese observers have noticed and relish. Yet the empire remains. 

Granted, America has few true colonies: Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands in the Caribbean, Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands in the north Pacific, and American Samoa in the south Pacific. 

By British standards, it is a paltry list of possessions. Nevertheless, the American military presence is almost as ubiquitous as Britain’s once was. 

American armed-forces personnel are to be found in more than 150 countries. The total number deployed beyond the borders of the 50 states is around 200,000.

The acquisition of such extensive global responsibilities was not easy. But it is a delusion to believe that shedding them will be easier. 

This is the lesson of British history to which Americans need to pay more heed. 

President Joe Biden’s ill-advised decision for a “final withdrawal” from Afghanistan was just the latest signal by an American president that the country wants to reduce its overseas commitments. 

Barack Obama began the process by exiting Iraq too hastily and announcing in 2013 that “America is not the world's policeman.” 

Donald Trump’s “America First” doctrine was just a populist version of the same impulse: he too itched to get out of Afghanistan and to substitute tariffs for counterinsurgency.

The problem, as this month’s debacle in Afghanistan perfectly illustrates, is that the retreat from global dominance is rarely a peaceful process

However you phrase it, announcing you are giving up on your longest war is an admission of defeat, and not only in the eyes of the Taliban. 

China, which shares a short stretch of its vast land border with Afghanistan, is also closely watching. 

So is Russia, with zloradstvo—Russian for Schadenfreude. 

It was no mere coincidence that Russia intervened militarily in both Ukraine and Syria just months after Obama’s renunciation of global policing.

Mr Biden’s belief (expressed to Richard Holbrooke in 2010) that one could exit Afghanistan as Richard Nixon exited Vietnam and “get away with it” is bad history: America’s humiliation in Indochina did have consequences. 

It emboldened the Soviet Union and its allies to make trouble elsewhere—in southern and eastern Africa, in Central America and in Afghanistan, which it invaded in 1979. Reenacting the fall of Saigon in Kabul will have comparable adverse effects.

The end of American empire was not difficult to foresee, even at the height of neoconservative hubris following the invasion of Iraq in 2003. 

There were at least four fundamental weaknesses of America’s global position at that time, as I first argued in “Colossus: The Rise and Fall of America’s Empire” (Penguin, 2004). 

They are a manpower deficit (few Americans have any desire to spend long periods of time in places like Afghanistan and Iraq); 

a fiscal deficit (see above); 

an attention deficit (the electorate’s tendency to lose interest in any large-scale intervention after roughly four years)

and a history deficit (the reluctance of policymakers to learn lessons from their predecessors, much less from other countries).

These were never deficits of British imperialism. One other difference—in many ways more profound than the fiscal deficit—is the negative net international investment position (NIIP) of the United States, which is just under -70% of GDP. 

A negative NIIP essentially means that foreign ownership of American assets exceeds American ownership of foreign assets. 

By contrast, Britain still had a hugely positive NIIP between the wars, despite the amounts of overseas assets that had been liquidated to finance the first world war. 

From 1922 until 1936 it was consistently above 100% of GDP. By 1947 it was down to 3%.

Selling off the remaining imperial silver (to be precise, obliging British investors to sell overseas assets and hand over the dollars) was one of the ways Britain paid for the second world war. 

America, the great debtor empire, does not have an equivalent nest-egg. It can afford to pay the cost of maintaining its dominant position in the world only by selling yet more of its public debt to foreigners. That is a precarious basis for superpower status.

Facing new storms
Churchill’s argument in “The Gathering Storm” was not that the rise of Germany, Italy and Japan was an unstoppable process, condemning Britain to decline. 

On the contrary, he insisted that war could have been avoided if the Western democracies had taken more decisive action earlier in the 1930s. 

When President Franklin Roosevelt asked him what the war should be called, Churchill “at once” replied: “The Unnecessary War.”

In the same way, there is nothing inexorable about China’s rise, much less Russia’s, while all the lesser countries aligned with them are economic basket cases, from North Korea to Venezuela. 

China’s population is ageing even faster than anticipated; its workforce is shrinking. 

Sky-high private-sector debt is weighing on growth. Its mishandling of the initial outbreak of covid-19 has greatly harmed its international standing. 

It also risks becoming the villain of the climate crisis, as it cannot easily kick the habit of burning coal to power its industry.

And yet it is all too easy to see a sequence of events unfolding that could lead to another unnecessary war, most probably over Taiwan, which Mr Xi covets and which America is (ambiguously) committed to defend against invasion—a commitment that increasingly lacks credibility as the balance of military power shifts in East Asia. 

(The growing vulnerability of American aircraft carriers to Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles such as the DF-21D is just one problem to which the Pentagon lacks a good solution.)

If American deterrence fails and China gambles on a coup de main, the United States will face the grim choice between fighting a long, hard war—as Britain did in 1914 and 1939—or folding, as happened over Suez in 1956.

Churchill said that he wrote “The Gathering Storm” to show:

how the malice of the wicked was reinforced by the weakness of the virtuous; how the structure and habits of democratic States, unless they are welded into larger organisms, lack those elements of persistence and conviction which can alone give security to humble masses; how, even in matters of self-preservation … the counsels of prudence and restraint may become the prime agents of mortal danger … [how] the middle course adopted from desires for safety and a quiet life may be found to lead direct to the bull’s-eye of disaster.

He concluded the volume with one of his many pithy maxims: “Facts are better than dreams.”

 American leaders in recent years have become over-fond of dreams, from the “full spectrum dominance” fantasy of the neoconservatives under George W. Bush to the dark nightmare of American “carnage” conjured up by Donald Trump.

As another global storm gathers, it may be time to face the fact that Churchill understood only too well: the end of empire is seldom, if ever, a painless process.

read more

Thus, we concentrate too much on the strengths of the three great powers. But all of them could weaken in their own way, creating a more anarchic world. Robert D. Kaplan @TheEconomist
Law & Politics

The World in the c21st exhibits viral, wildfire and exponential characteristics and feedback loops which only become obvious in hindsight.

23-AUG-2021 ::  ZigZag The Optics spoke its own narrative 

As the World watched events unfold in Afghanistan, it certainly felt like the curtain was falling on the once ‘’unipolar’’ Power. 

Of course, Afghanistan remains a ‘’Ball of fire’’ and chucking the Ball to others to catch is not a Bad Call all things considered.

read more

Iran Redux @Halsrethink
Law & Politics

It was in 1991 [3 decades ago now] that Krauthammer spoke of the “Unipolar Moment” and highlighted that the US had emerged as the center of world power and unchallenged superpower.

The World in the c21st exhibits viral, wildfire and exponential characteristics and feedback loops which only become obvious in hindsight.
It was in 1991 [3 decades ago now] that Krauthammer spoke of the “Unipolar Moment” and highlighted that the US had emerged as the center of world power and unchallenged superpower.
Thirty years later, The US is exiting Afghanistan and we can speak of a Tripolar World with the US, China and Russia now ruling the c21st Roost. 

The ''Salami Slicer'' has snaffled up Hong Kong and the World waits on tenterhooks for the inevitable move on Taiwan.

read more

Brazilian President @jairbolsonaro Tells Supporters "Buy A Gun, Damn It" Amid Impending Chaos @zerohedge
Law & Politics

"Everybody has to buy a rifle, damn it! The armed people will never be enslaved. I know it costs a lot. An idiot says: 'Ah, what you have to buy is beans,' if you don't want to, don't buy the rifle, but do not come to disturb whoever wants to buy it," Bolsonaro told reporters.

read more

.@jairbolsonaro said today he sees only 3 options for his future: 1) Prison 2) “being killed” 3) “victory” @BrazilBrian
Law & Politics

He may realy believe these are the stakes. Explains why he is digging in so hard, as polls suggest he would lose in 2022

read more

Johnson: Are you the guys inundated with all the emails from everywhere in the world saying, please help my son, mother in Afghanistan? I've had a few of those @ukiswitheu
Law & Politics

Raab: It was extraordinary that they all stayed after the #KabulAiport attack

Johnson: Amazing, amazing

The democratization of authority spurred by the digital revolution has flattened cognitive hierarchies along with other hierarchies, and political decision-making is now driven by often weaponized babble. @FukuyamaFrancis

The Pandemic and Political Order @ForeignAffairs @FukuyamaFrancis
Another reason for pessimism is that the positive scenarios assume some sort of rational public discourse and social learning.
Yet the link between technocratic expertise and public policy is weaker today than in the past, when elites held more power.
The democratization of authority spurred by the digital revolution has flattened cognitive hierarchies along with other hierarchies, and political decision-making  is now driven by often weaponized babble.
That is hardly an ideal environment for constructive, collective self-examination, and some polities may remain irrational longer than they can remain solvent

read more

Latest @WHO #COVID19 Epi Update Key take aways: 4.5 million new cases & >68,000 deaths reported last week. @mvankerkhove

Daily Infections have risen for 9 consecutive weeks. 

19-JUL-2021 :: COVID-19

The Virus remains unresolved.

23-AUG-2021 ::  #COVID19 cases exponentially growing 0.32% per day  @jmlukens

23-AUG-2021 ::  Lets turn briefly to COVID-19 because I sense an Inflexion Point

As to the goal of reaching herd immunity—vaccinating so many people that the virus simply has nowhere to go

“With the emergence of Delta, I realized that it’s just impossible to reach that,” says Müge Çevik, an infectious disease specialist at the University of St. Andrews. Via @ScienceMagazine @kakape
But Holmes was startled. “This virus has gone up three notches in effectively a year and that, I think, was the biggest surprise to me”
The 1918–19 influenza pandemic also appears to have caused more serious illness as time went on, says Lone Simonsen, an epidemiologist at Roskilde University who studies past pandemics.

 “Our data from Denmark suggests it was six times deadlier in the second wave.”

“Many still see Alpha and Delta as being as bad as things are ever going to get,” he says. 

“It would be wise to consider them as steps on a possible trajectory that may challenge our public health response further.”
Some dangerous variants may only be possible if the virus hits on a very rare, winning combination of mutations, Eugene Koonin told me. 

“But with all these millions of infected people, it may very well find that combination.” @kakape 

We have now crossed peak Vaccine Euphoria

23-AUG-2021 ::  I think the Spread improvement [Cases versus Deaths] has run its course.

the most tumultuous period in SARS-CoV-2’s evolution may still be ahead of us, says @ArisKatzourakis @ScienceMagazine @kakape

"The greatest shortcoming of the human race is our inability to understand the exponential function." - Professor Allen Bartlett

''viruses exhibit non-linear and exponential characteristics''

―They fancied themselves free, wrote Camus, ―and no one will ever be free so long as there are pestilences

―In this respect, our townsfolk were like everybody else, wrapped up in themselves; in other words, they were humanists: they disbelieved in pestilences.
A pestilence isn't a thing made to man's measure; therefore we tell ourselves that pestilence is a mere bogy of the mind, a bad dream that will pass away.
But it doesn't always pass away and, from one bad dream to another, it is men who pass away, and the humanists first of all, because they have taken no precautions

23-AUG-2021 ::  We have now crossed peak Vaccine Euphoria

read more

When four common mutations were introduced into the receptor binding domain (RBD) of the Delta variant (Delta 4+), some BNT162b2-immune sera lost neutralizing activity and enhanced the infectivity

Given the fact that a Delta variant with three similar RBD mutations has already emerged according to the GISAID database, it is necessary to develop vaccines that protect against such complete breakthrough variants.

The continued message that breakthroughs are rare ultimately shoots us in the foot. They aren’t rare & public is seeing this @michaelmina_lab


We need to be VERY clear about expectations of vaccines (protect from bad disease) and stop saying they stop infxn/spread
False expectations erode trust

read more

And the virus has tricks up its sleeve. Coronaviruses are good at recombining, for instance, which could allow new variants to emerge suddenly by combining the genomes—and the properties—of two different variants.@ScienceMagazine @kakape

The mutation rate of SARSCoV2 is at least 50% higher than previously thought. The virus mutates about once a week—significantly higher than the rate estimated previously. @DelthiaRicks

UK findings suggest new variants could emerge sooner than earlier estimated

28-MAR-2021  we are seeing a sustained acceleration in mutant viruses.

read more

Allowing for the virus’s complex mutational and compositional biases, estimate that the mutation rate is at least 49-67% higher than would be estimated based on the rate of appearance of variants in sampled genomes

Indeed, from analysis of closely related lineages, in SARS-CoV-2 the Ka/Ks ratio was previously estimated as 1.008, suggesting no within-host selection. 

By contrast, we find a higher number of observed SNPs at 4-fold degenerate sites than elsewhere and, allowing for the virus’s complex mutational and compositional biases, estimate that the mutation rate is at least 49-67% higher than would be estimated based on the rate of appearance of variants in sampled genomes.

read more

The 1918–19 influenza pandemic also appears to have caused more serious illness as time went on, says Lone Simonsen, Roskilde University “Our data from Denmark suggests it was six times deadlier in the second wave.”

Each successive variant has proven to be slightly more vaccine-evading than the last. @yaneerbaryam

“The variants are like a thoroughbred and our vaccines are like a workhorse,” noted evolutionary biologist Sally Otto.

read more

Currency Markets at a Glance WSJ
World Currencies

Euro 1.1800
Dollar Index 92.64
Japan Yen 109.76
Swiss Franc 0.9114
Pound 1.3764
Aussie 0.7299
India Rupee 73.4645
South Korea Won 1164.75
Brazil Real 5.2045
Egypt Pound 15.6901
South Africa Rand 14.7285

read more

Africa is currently reporting a million new infections about every 28 days @ReutersGraphics

Third Wave of Africa Covid-19 Cases Has Stabilized, @WHO  Says @business 

The World Health Organization said the third wave of Covid-19 infections in Africa appears to have stabilized, though cases remain high with almost 248,000 reported in the past week.
“There have now been almost 7.6 million Covid-19 cases and 191,000 Africans have sadly died,” Matshidiso Moeti, the organization’s regional director for the continent
Some 24 countries are experiencing a resurgence and deaths are rising in eight of them, including in Botswana and Ethiopia, she said. 

19-JUL-2021 :: So, my Point is this, our Attention span is short and Many Folks seem to feel we are in the final Act of the COVID-19 Play. I would be limit short that particular narrative.

''The third wave appears to have stabilized but cases are still very high, with almost 248,000 reported in the past week." - Dr @MoetiTshidi @WHOAFRO

"24 countries are in resurgence & deaths are rising in eight countries, including in #Botswana & #Ethiopia" - Dr @MoetiTshidi @WHOAFRO

"24 countries are in resurgence & deaths are rising in eight countries, including in #Botswana & #Ethiopia. This is a preventable tragedy, if African countries can get fair access to the vaccines." - Dr @MoetiTshidi

Drinking the Kool-Aid 

read more

Here we report the identification of a potential variant of interest assigned to the PANGO lineage C.1.2.

This lineage was first identified in May 2021 and evolved from C.1, one of the lineages that dominated the first wave of SARS-CoV-2 infections in South Africa and was last detected in January 2021. 

C.1.2 has since been detected across the majority of the provinces in South Africa and in seven other countries spanning Africa, Europe, Asia and Oceania. 

The emergence of C.1.2 was associated with an increased substitution rate, as was previously observed with the emergence of the Alpha, Beta and Gamma variants of concern (VOCs)

C.1.2 contains multiple substitutions (R190S, D215G, N484K, N501Y, H655Y and T859N) and deletions (Y144del, L242-A243del) within the spike protein, which have been observed in other VOCs and are associated with increased transmissibility and reduced neutralization sensitivity. 

Of greater concern is the accumulation of additional mutations (C136F, Y449H and N679K) which are also likely to impact neutralization sensitivity or furin cleavage and therefore replicative fitness.

read more

The C.1.2 has 14 mutations in Spike, including three mutations at the Receptor Binding Motif, the Y449H, E484K, and N501Y @Tuliodna

The C.1.2 has 14 mutations in Spike, including three mutations at the Receptor Binding Motif, the Y449H, E484K, and N501Y - two of the mutations have been found in three of the four variants of concern (Alpha, Beta, and Gamma).
In relationship to decrease neutralization, in addition to the E484K, there are also deletions at position 144 and positions 242-243, the 144 deletions are also seen in the Alpha and the 242-243 in the Beta, which associates with a decrease neutralization of antibodies

There is also the N679K, which is a mutation just upstream of the S1/S2 furin cleavage including Q675H/R, Q677H/P, N679K, and P681H/R have occurred independently in many SARS-CoV-2 global lineages.

1918–19 influenza pandemic  “Our data from Denmark suggests it was six times deadlier in the second wave.” Lone Simonsen, an epidemiologist at Roskilde University @ScienceMagazine @kakape

read more

In addition, there is also a mutation at 655 positions, the H655Y mutation, which in the 3-D structure of Spike it cluster very close to the S1/S2 furin. @Tuliodna

Around 8% (i.e. 7/95) of the sequences have also added the P681H found in the Alpha VOC.

The constellations of mutations worry us as they seem The C.1.2 end up adding multiple mutations that are similar to the Beta with extra mutations at S1/S2 and NTD. 

read more

From prison to president: @HHichilema remarkable comeback @mailandguardian @thecontinent_ @simonallison

I have interviewed Zambia’s new president twice, both times at the lowest ebbs of his political career.

The first time was by telephone, in the early hours of 11 April 2017. Hichilema was at his Lusaka home, but he was in trouble. 

The house was surrounded by heavily-armed riot police, who wanted to arrest him. 

He had retreated with his wife and child into a panic room that had been installed for exactly this kind of situation. 

As we spoke, the police were trying to smoke them out, and Hichilema, increasingly panicked, described how tendrils of tear gas were creeping under the door frame.
“My wife is asthmatic and my child is asthmatic, they are fainting,” he said. “Our eyes are swollen from the toxic gas they have been pushing in here. We are injured, my family is injured. My workers around the homestead were tortured the whole night.”

He was not sure if he would make it out alive. “This guy is trying to kill me. This guy is a dictator, a full-blown dictator.”
The “dictator” in question was, of course, the president at the time: Edgar Lungu.
After his lawyers raced to the scene to negotiate safe passage, Hichilema emerged from the panic room and was duly arrested on a trumped-up charge of treason, for allegedly obstructing the president’s motorcade at a cultural festival.
He was denied bail, and spent 127 days in prison before the case was dismissed. 

Shortly after he was released, I interviewed him a second time, this time in person at a hotel in Johannesburg, where he described the filthy, inhumane conditions in which he and other prisoners were kept.
“Our detention centres are death traps,” he said. 

“In a room like this, you have 200 inmates spending nights. So you really don’t go to sleep. You take a nap by sitting, and someone has their body inside your legs. There is very poor ventilation – something very simple to fix but it’s not there. Food, there’s no food. 

And when it’s there, it’s rotten beans, rotten kapenta [sardines]. Medical services are very poor. People go into prison and come out with diseases. During my stay we saw bodies being taken away, dead.”
Hichilema seemed unusually reserved for a politician, then, and tired.

 “There are times I feel like nobody is listening,” he said. The trauma of his time behind bars was still fresh, and he had already run for president – unsuccessfully – on five occasions. Did he have it in him to keep going?
Meanwhile, Lungu was taking full advantage of incumbency to consolidate his power. 

And one of Hichilema’s major financial backers confided, off the record, that they were considering switching their support to a younger, more vibrant candidate.
But Hichilema insisted he would run for president again – and that next time he would win.
He was right.
On Tuesday, at the age of 59, Hakainde Hichilema was sworn in as the seventh elected president of the Republic of Zambia. His political persistence paid off, and now he’s won the ultimate prize.

Not that it gets any easier from here.
At the Heroes Stadium in Lusaka, he delivered a careful speech, urging citizens “to put aside our election-related and other differences and pull in one direction as a country”; and thanked Zambians for putting their “trust in a simple village boy” (although this simple village boy also happens to be the second-largest owner of cattle in the country).
His ascent to the top job is a chance for Zambia to arrest the worrying slide towards authoritarianism that occurred under Lungu.
Pilato, a prominent rapper and activist who was forced into exile under Lungu’s government, said that he cried when Hichilema became president. “It felt like it was independence day,” he told The Continent. 

“It took so long, seven years of living in fear, of not knowing who to trust, where it was safe for us to go. And then that thing is no longer there.
Hichilema beat Lungu by more than a million votes – a margin so decisive that Lungu had no choice but to accept defeat. 

“These guys were bad at everything, even rigging,” laughed Laura Miti, the executive director for the Alliance for Community Action, a civil society organisation that played a major role in both mobilising and protecting the vote.

Miti first met Hichilema in the mid- 2000s, when she went to his house to tell him she would not vote for him. 

“I told him to convince me. And he did. He understood his challenges, he understood the difficulties of the opposition, he could explain his steps.”
But Lungu, who came to power in 2015 following the death in office of president Michael Sata, presented the opposition with a new set of challenges. 

Under his administration, opposition leaders and activists were locked up, independent media silenced, and the judiciary was hollowed out.
Lungu empowered thuggish ruling party cadres who became infamous for beating up and extorting ordinary citizens, and he tried to rewrite the Constitution to concentrate power in the presidency.
Ironically, Lungu’s brazen attempts to retain power may have been why he lost it. 

All the violence and threats were very un-Zambian, said Miti, which is partly why voters turned out en masse to reject his Patriotic Front (PF) in favour of Hichilema’s United Party for National Development (UPND). 

Turnout was reportedly in excess of 70%.
Now it is up to Hichilema to fix Lungu’s mess – and deliver on all those election promises. “I am hopeful about him, but not half as hopeful about the party he leads,” explained Miti. 

“I think the UPND is the mirror image of PF. It’s formative years were very much under the influence of PF, so it learned some very bad habits. It has its own set of cadres, and its own set of people who imagine that power is a means of gaining personal wealth. So he’s going to have his work cut out for him, managing expectations within his own party and at the same time fixing a broken society.”

read more

Former Chadian dictator Hissène Habré died in a Senegalese prison this week at the age of 79. Doctors had been treating him for Covid-19. @mailandguardian @thecontinent_

Hissen Habré, was a convicted war criminal who served as the 5th president of Chad from 1982 until he was deposed in 1990

Habré seized power in Chad and ruled from 1982 until he was deposed in 1990 by Idriss Déby.

Libya invaded Chad in July 1980, occupying and annexing the Aozou Strip. 

The United States and France responded by aiding Chad in an attempt to contain Libya's regional ambitions under Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi.

Despite this victory, Habré's government was weak, and strongly opposed by members of the Zaghawa ethnic group. 

A rebel offensive in November 1990, which was led by Idriss Déby, a Zaghawa former army commander who had participated in a plot against Habré in 1989 and subsequently fled to Sudan, defeated Habré's forces. 

The French chose not to assist Habré on this occasion, allowing him to be ousted; it is possible that they actively aided Déby. 

In the summer of 1983, when Libya invaded northern Chad and threatened to topple Habré, France sent paratroops with air support, while the Reagan administration provided two AWACS electronic surveillance planes to coordinate air cover. 

By 1987 Gaddafi's forces had retreated.
"Habré was a remarkably able man with a brilliant sense of how to play the outside world," a former senior U.S. official said. 

"He was also a bloodthirsty tyrant and torturer. It is fair to say we knew who and what he was and chose to turn a blind eye."

read more

Not above the law Kenya’s judges do their duty. A pity about its politicians @TheEconomist
Law & Politics

Breaking constitutions is often easier than making them. 

Kenya’s first two presidents, Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel arap Moi, took a hatchet to the one negotiated at independence from Britain in 1963. 

By the time the butchery ended, Kenya was a one-party state run by untouchable kleptocrats. Fixing the damage took decades. 

Under international and domestic pressure, Moi repealed the provision banning all parties but his own in 1991. 

But it took 19 more years of bitter struggle before Kenya again had a constitution worthy of the name.

In recent years the hatchets have been out again. Kenya’s politicians finally accepted a new dispensation after post-election bloodshed claimed more than 1,000 lives in 2007-08. 

But the chastening effect of the violence did not last long. 

After another election controversy, in 2017, Uhuru Kenyatta, Kenya’s president (and Jomo’s son) joined forces with Raila Odinga, his rival-turned-sidekick, to push for yet another constitutional overhaul under the sweetly named Building Bridges Initiative (bbi). 

On August 20th Kenya’s Court of Appeal thwarted the initiative and granted the constitution from 2010 a reprieve.

On the surface the bbi seemed a worthy enterprise. It was purported to be the glue that held the reconciliation between Messrs Kenyatta and Odinga (pictured, right and left) together. 

In 2017 the president secured re-election in a brace of contentious polls. Kenya teetered dangerously for months as Mr Odinga rejected the president’s initial victory, boycotted a court-ordered re-run and finally had himself sworn in as “the people’s president” before a baying mob of supporters. 

Nearly 100 people died in the accompanying political violence. The stand-off was defused only after the two rivals shook hands in March 2018 following secret talks. They have been inseparable ever since.

Yet it was little more than political expediency that underpinned the reconciliation. For the president it defused a nasty crisis, shored up his iffy legitimacy and neutralised an opponent. 

Better still, it offered a handy opportunity to ditch his deputy president, William Ruto, whose uses had waned after he helped secure his boss a second term. 

Although Mr Ruto remains in office, he is clearly an outcast, his place in the sun now taken by the more malleable Mr Odinga. 

(The deputy president is all too familiar with the carousel of betrayal in Kenyan politics, having previously abandoned Mr Odinga for Mr Kenyatta.)

Mr Odinga also benefited. After four failed bids for the presidency, he appears to have concluded that a share of power was better than none at all

More important, the president would now presumably back him rather than Mr Ruto as his successor in the election next August, when Mr Kenyatta is required to stand down.

A deal built on rank expediency needed a cloak of respectability, however. Mr Odinga had to justify to his supporters his reconciliation with the man he accused of thrice cheating him. The bbi helped cover the stink. 

Kenya’s ethnic and political divisions could be presented not as man-made but the result of surmountable constitutional flaws. 

A popular initiative to fix these would usher in a new era of peace and prosperity and allow its architects to cast themselves as saviours.

Kenyan civil society was appalled. However the politicians dressed it up, there was no popular clamour to alter the constitution. 

Nor was the initiative suggesting the odd tweak here and there. 

It would do real damage to the essence of the charter. The bbi would have altered 14 of its 18 chapters, reckons Jerotich Seii, an activist who campaigned to stop it.

Buried in the verbiage was what the activists considered the real purpose of the initiative: an expansion of executive power by creating the post of prime minister and two deputies. 

This would ease efforts by Messrs Odinga and Kenyatta to build an electable coalition by allowing them to dangle plum positions before the kingpins of smaller tribes.

Kenya’s judges were quick to sense a stitch-up. In May the High Court sided with Ms Seii and her fellow plaintiffs, who argued that the bbi was a meretricious attempt to hoodwink the Kenyan people

The judges ruled that the constitution permitted amendments resulting from a popular initiative, but the bbi had clearly been driven by the president, not the people. 

On August 20th the Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s judgment and put a halt to a referendum to enshrine the bbi’s proposals into the constitution. 

Although there may yet be another appeal, Mr Odinga said he would accept the judgment and focus instead on next year’s election.

Some good has come out of a tawdry process. Kenya’s judiciary, which ordered a re-run of the presidential election in 2017 over irregularities, has again shown its mettle. 

The constitution itself has proved resilient, while the judgment has made it harder for politicians to meddle with it.

Bridges to nowhere

If the bbi enhanced the reputation of Kenya’s judges, its politicians emerged with less credit. 

Mr Kenyatta had hoped to secure his legacy with a grandiose national-development strategy meant to reach full speed by the end of his term. 

It has largely stalled, partly because he chose instead to waste his efforts on a failed piece of opportunistic scheming. 

His ally seems equally damaged. During the president’s first term, Mr Odinga offered robust and often principled opposition. Given how readily it was sacrificed for the sake of ambition, such principle looks increasingly coincidental.

If there is a political winner, it is Mr Ruto, who has noisily been thanking God for delivering Kenya from the disaster of the bbi. 

In reality the opposition he offered was tepid. Had the matter gone to a referendum, it is doubtful he would have led a “no” campaign. “It’s not worth expending political capital on,” a senior ally confided earlier this year.

That won’t stop Mr Ruto from making mileage out of the bbi’s failure. The deputy president believes his ticket to the top job lies in casting himself as an alternative to the corrupt political dynasties embodied by Messrs Kenyatta and Odinga (whose families have dominated Kenyan politics since independence). 

Never mind that Mr Ruto is rich and has been linked to numerous scandals (he denies any wrongdoing). 

Reinvention is a staple of Kenyan politics, and he has been able to recast himself as a principled outsider. 

Standing apart from the bbi fray has strengthened his narrative. With less than a year to go before Kenyans vote for a new president, Mr Ruto will be content with his position. ■

read more

Next Africa: William Ruto’s Star Is Rising in Kenya By Helen Nyambura and Antony Sguazzin @business

William Ruto’s push for the Kenyan presidency got a boost, and he has the Court of Appeal to thank.

The judges  threw out President Uhuru Kenyatta’s proposed constitutional amendments, including reintroducing executive positions such as a prime minister and deputies that many saw as a way to reward future alliance partners. 

They are also seen as a veneer to keep Ruto from ascending to the top job after next year’s elections.
The reforms were backed by opposition leader Raila Odinga, with whom Kenyatta has recently allied with. 

That partnership sidelined Ruto, the deputy president who had expected that 2022 would be his year in exchange for supporting the president in the last two votes. 

The relationship between the two leaders has since  soured.

Kenyatta and Odinga argue that the proposals, if implemented, would end the ethnic violence that’s plagued Kenyan politics for decades, by sharing ruling positions more equitably. 

While Kenyatta can’t run again, he could have had more influence over the choice of his successor — most likely Odinga.
Ruto lauded the ruling as a win for the ordinary Kenyan against the elite. Kenyatta is the son of the former British colony’s first president and Odinga is the offspring of the first vice president.
While that may strike a chord in a nation where the top positions have been closely guarded by a small ruling class, Ruto himself is one of the country’s richest people.
Still, with Kenyatta and Odinga losing their  trump card — the offer of executive positions to smaller political groups — Ruto can build his own political formation.
The race is far from decided, but Ruto is once again on track.

read more

@LibertyLifeKe reports HY 2021 EPS 0.47 -29.85% Earnings
N.S.E Equities - Finance & Investment

Par Value:                  
Closing Price:           8.56
Total Shares Issued:          535707499.00
Market Capitalization:        4,585,656,191
EPS:             1.23
PE:                 6.959

Liberty Kenya reports H1 2021 Earnings versus H1 2020

H1 2021 Total Assets 41.927497b versus 39.007664b

H1 Financial Investments 23.295183b versus 22.265339b

H1 2021 Net Insurance Premiums 3.230097b versus 3.425219b

HY 2021 Revenue from contracts with Customers 638.802m versus 643.889m

HY Investment Income 65.320m versus 58.564m

HY Investment income on Financial Assets using effective interest rate method 288.768m versus 231.125m

HY Fair Value adjustments to assets held at fair value through Profit and Loss 1.346969b versus 161.455m

HY Total Income 5.569956b versus 4.520252b

HY Claims and PolicyHolder benefits under insurance contracts [4.060900b] versus [3.727567b]

HY Insurance claims recovered from reinsurers 1.282078b versus 0.959757b

HY Change in long term policyholder assets and Liabilities 355.295m versus 947.598m

HY Fair value adjustment to long term policyholder liabilities under investment contracts [536.694m] versus [25.746m]

HY Acquisition Costs [768.107m] versus [744.144m]

HY General Marketing and Admin Expenses [1.411504b] versus [1.566740b]

HY PBT 423.708m versus 366.838m

HY PAT 265.105m versus 383.858m

HY EPS 0.47 versus 0.67

Total comprehensive Income 255.993m versus 414.592m


The global economic environment continued to recover in the first half of 2021. 

This has positively impacted global and Kenyan financial market conditions and contributed positively to corporate earnings.

read more

Liberty Kenya Holdings H1 2021 results: @MwangoCapital
N.S.E Equities - Finance & Investment

-Total assets Ksh 41.9B
-Net insurance premiums down 5.7%
-Claims & policy benefits up 8.9%
-EPS Ksh 0.47 [2020: Ksh 0.67]
-PAT down 30.9% to Ksh 265M


Actually PBT expanded +15.5% but a previous Tax Credit in H1 2020 blurred the EPS number

Its well managed and actuarially sound

read more

.@NSE_PLC Nairobi Securities Exchange reports H1 2021 EPS -32.55% Earnings here
N.S.E General

Par Value:                  
Closing Price:           9.92
Total Shares Issued:          259503194.00
Market Capitalization:        2,574,271,684
EPS:             0.65
PE:                 15.262

NSE reports H1 2021 Earnings versus H1 2020 Earnings here 

H1 2021 Revenue 276.513m versus 292.383m -5.00% 

HY Interest Income 46.865m versus 36.715m

HY Other Income 42.790m versus 35.968m

HY Total Income 366.168m versus 365.066m

HY Administrative Expenses [258.800m] versus [236.122m]

HY Profit before Taxation 107.969m versus 142.763m

HY Profit after Taxation 77.393m versus 110.657m -30% 

HY EPS 0.29 versus 0.43 -32.55% 

HY Total Assets 2.442194b versus 2.310568b

HY Cash & Cash Equivalents 487.158m versus 500.328m


The impact of COVID-19 continues to be experienced in the market with equity turnover decreasing by 16.2% in H1 2021 compared to H1 2020, from Kshs. 63.7 Billion to Kshs. 83.2 Billion.

Bonds turnover increased by 60% in H1 2021 when compared to similar position in H1 2020, with total turnover increasing from Kshs. 293 Billion in June 2020 to Kshs. 471 Billion in June 2021

During the period, the Government of Kenya issued a total of Ksh 260 Billion in new bond issuances.

Market capitalization rose by 15.6% to Kshs. 2.702 Trillion in 2021 from Kshs. 2.336 Trillion in 2020.

Revenue decreased by 5% from Kshs. 292.4 Million in the six months ended 2020 to Kshs. 276.5 Million in the similar period in 2021. 

This was mainly driven by a 16% drop in equity turnover which declined from Kshs. 83 Billion for the six months ended 30 June 2020 to Kshs. 70 Billion for the similar period in 2021. 

This in turn led to a reduction in equity trading levies by 16% from Kshs. 199.8 Million for the six months ended 30 June 2020 to Kshs. 167.3 Million for same period in 2021.


Correlated to Equity trading volumes which declined as Investors continued a switch to Bonds. 

Its in many ways quite high beta so a pick up in equity volumes will boost earnings sharply. 

read more

Housing Finance Company Ltd. reports H1 2021 EPS [1.80]
N.S.E Equities - Finance & Investment

Par Value:                  5/-
Closing Price:           3.79
Total Shares Issued:          352416667.00
Market Capitalization:        1,335,659,168
EPS:             -4.44
PE:                 -0.854

HF Group reports H1 2021 Earnings versus H1 2020

HY Total Assets 52.964927b versus 56.480785b

HY Loans and Advances [Net] to Customers 35.290699b versus 38.172648b 

HY Customer Deposits 37.822307b versus 39.174242b

HY Net Interest Income 919.852m versus 987.304m

HY Total Non-Interest Income 325.123m versus 285.618m

HY Total Operating Income 1.244975b versus 1.272922b

HY Total Other Operating expenses [1.562927b] versus [1.566089b]

HY PBT after exceptional Items [318.070m] versus [293.804m]

HY PAT [346.098m] versus [295.512m]

HY EPS [1.80] versus [1.54] 

read more

@HFGroupKE H1 2021 results [vs H1 2020]: @MwangoCapital
N.S.E Equities - Finance & Investment

-Total assets down 6.2% to Ksh 52.9B
-Customer deposits down 3.5%
-Loan book down 7.5%
-Net interest income down 6.8%
-Loan loss provisions down 78.2%
-Loss Ksh 346M [2020: Loss Ksh 295M]

-Interest income [loans] down 20.5%
-Interest income [govt securities] up 28.1%
-Gross NPLs down 21.3%
-Non-interest income up 13.8%
-EPS Ksh -1.80 [2020: Ksh -1.54]

read more

by Aly Khan Satchu (www.rich.co.ke)
Login / Register

Forgot your password? Register Now
August 2021

In order to post a comment we require you to be logged in after registering with us and create an online profile.