|Monday 22nd of November 2021
Title: Mombasa Chronicle (MS 373394) Creator: Khamis bin Sa'id bin Shaikh al-Mambasi ( Author, Primary ) Publication Date: 1899 (1317 AH)
The Chronicle of Mombasa narrates the historical account of the Omani conquest of the Coast, from the Portuguese, in the 17th century.
The narration is typical of the chronicle that overlaps between real history and narrative.
The story begins by telling that Ngome, Fort Jesus, belonged to a Portuguese who built it in order to place there a mzungu, white man, and about the arrival to the coast of Mombasa of Imam Qayadi al-ardh by ship (mashua).
The Portuguese wants the ship and wants to give the Omani a smaller one. This caused a quarrel between the Omani, referred as 'the Muscati', and the Portuguese that led to a war.
This event was reported to the Imam in Oman who decided to send a Baluchi man, a military general, Jumadari Chota, to fight against the Portuguese.
However, the general suggests that rather than starting a war it would be better to first approach the Portuguese by means of trade and commerce to befriend them, and then to attack them.
Jumadari Chota manages to go and live in the Fort, and to get help from the people of Mombasa. Girls and slaves were sent to help him.
At a certain point, a girl was raped by the Portuguese, which led the people of Mombasa to think about attacking the Fort.
Therefore, Jumadari Chota sends a letter to the Imam in Muscat to ask for support for the people of Mombasa, who are Muslim and need his help to fight the Portuguese.
The Imam gathered a big army to send to Mombasa in 1086 AH (1675 AD) [This is the first date provided in the MS)
The battle starts and as said in the chronicle 'God helped the Muslims to defeat the Christians in 1094 AH (1683 AD)' (p.2).
The Imam places Jumadari Chota in charge of the Fort for three years. However, the Portuguese were not finally defeated at the battle described above, and they returned to Mombasa.
At this point, a Shirazi person is mentioned arriving with seven ships at Malindi. The connection to this event is not clear, and it could be related to the legend of the Seven Brothers of Shiraz who founded the islands towns of Lamu and Pate.
The people of Malindi however told the Shirazi that he could not settle there because of a war with the Galla.
The Shirazi, with the help of a guide (rubani) is therefore advised to go to Kilifi to settle, but even there the people do not allow him to stay, and suggest him to go to Mtwapa. (p.3).
From Mtwapa the Shiraz goes to Mvita (old name for Mombasa) where he met Shehe Mvita. Shehe Mvita tells the rubani that he can leave the Shiraz with him.
The Shiraz began to build houses along the Coast and asks the Wajunda people to settle there.
Then 'makafiri' hunters (pagans, non-Muslims from the interior) are asked by Shehe Mvita to see if the area is safe, and they found out that the Portuguese are still in the area and can be a threat.
So, Shehe Mvita and the Shiraz ally against the Portuguese. At the same time, the WaGalla attach Mombasa, but they are defeated and have to run off to Malindi.
There they defeat the people of Malindi who have to run away to Mombasa, Zanzibar, Kilwa and other places on the Coast.
The WaGalla continue on they wars, now against the people of Kilifi. Here, the chronicle discerns about the Kilifi clans that had to escape from the WaGalla.
It refers to the clan of Bwana Shoka Mdogo that escape to Mvita/Mombasa, to that of Bwana Shoka Mkubwa that escaped to Zanzibar, and of other clans' members that went to the Mrima region.
From here the towns of Mtwapa, Kilifi, Mvita and Malindi are referred as the 'Taifa arba', the 'four Tribes' by Shehe Mvita, the ruler of Mombasa.
The Portuguese were still a threat and Shehe Mvita decided to send a delegation that included the WaNyika (people of the interior), to Oman to ask support from Imam Qaydi al-Ardh. The Imam sent support to Mombasa.
The Omani began a war at sea with the Portuguese that lasted many months, until the summer when the monsoon season calls for the ships to return to the Arabia peninsula.
The following summer, with the new monsoon season, the Omani returned to the Coast with ships full of dates. The dates were thrown in the water to make a surface for 'mizinga', canons (p.6) to shoot at Fort Jesus (Ngome).
However, the Omani did not succeeded and had to return again to Oman. The Imam told his army to wait until the following 'kaskazi', monsoon season.
In the meantime, the Portuguese had sent a report of these events to the government in Lisbon to request additional military support.
With the third kaskazi the Imam sent his ships to the Coast and one ship, named Kabarazi, with captain Abdalla bin Nasir al-Mazrui, reached the port of Mombasa.
This time instead than attacking the Ngome directly they use the strategy of attacking from a side.
They fought for four months, until the Portuguese were without water and food and began to die. In order to escape, the Portuguese had to build an underground passage to the sea where they embark on their ships and went back to Portugal.
The place in Portugal where they go back is referred as 'Msumbiji', which is unclear where it is located.
From this moment, there is the advent of the Mazrui dynasty in Mombasa (p.7) Abdalla bin Nasir resided in the Fort for 25 years and was succeeded by his son Nasir bin Abdalla.
Nasir bin Abdalla lived in the Fort for 9 years only and because of a sickness he asks the Iman to be sent back to Oman.
Then, freed slaves, Wauhuru, were allowed to live in the Fort because of their status of soldiers.
Also, the Imam sent seven brothers, all called Seif, from the Ma'miri clan, to live in the Fort as representatives of the Imam authority.
The seven brothers stayed in the Fort for 40 years. Afterwards, the Mazrui dynasty came back to rule at the Fort in 1143AH (1731AD) with Muhammed bin Othman as leader.
Muhammed lived at the Fort for 9 years and was succeeded by his brother Ali bin Othman who ruled for 15 years.
After Ali, Mas'ud bin Nasir took control of the Fort for 25 years. Mas'ud was succeeded by Abdalla bin Muhammed who ruled for 2 years.
Abdalla was succeeded by his brother Hemed bin Muhammed who ruled for 35 years.
Then, Abdalla bin Hemed ruled for 9 years. At this point, the chronicle narrates the reason behind the dispute between the Mazrui and Sayyid Said bin Sultan.
Apparently, the Sultan of Pate, Fumutuli [Fumuluti] Nabahani went to Muscat, Oman, to give his support to Sayyid Said bin Sultan and to tell him that he [Sayyid Said] is the ruler of Pate.
So Sayyid Said bin Sultan wrote a letter to the Liwali, Abdalla bin Hemed, to let him know that he should not interfere in the affairs of the people of Pate who are his subjects.
Abdalla however disagrees and a military operation broke off in Pate between the forces of Sayyid Said bin Sultan and those of the Mazrui, under the leadership of Abdalla.
The leader of Sayyid Said bin Sultan 's army was Hammad bin Hemed al-Busaidi who managed to seize Pate and Pemba. Pemba was ruled by the Liwali Abdalla bin Hemed.
The Busaidi replaced Abdalla bin Hemed, who was the liwali of Pemba as well, with Nasir bin Suleiman al-Ismaili.
Sayyid Said bin Sultan went to Mvita [Mombasa] with his army and conquered the Fort and the town in only one hour on Friday 23 Jumadathani [the seventh month of the Arabic year] 1243AH (1828AD).
At the end, the chronicle gives information about the period of rule by the Mazrui in Mombasa (109 years, 2 months, and 8 days). Mombasa was fully seized by Sayyid Said bin Sultan in 1252AH (1836AD).
In 1283AH (1866AD) Said bin Sultan died in a ship on the way from Muscat to Zanzibar. He was succeeded by his son Sayyid Majid who ruled for 14 years.
Majid was succeeded by his brother Barghash. The chronicle ends with the list of the Busaidi rulers.
In the final line the author, Khamis bin Sa'id, says that this account is based on what he has heard and saw himself.
The chronicle is a source that shows how the original 'tribes' of Mombasa were formed and when and how they settled in Mombasa.
It also provides an historical account at the time of Portuguese colonisation and the advent of the Mazrui dynasty in Mombasa.
The central parts of most pages are damaged and unreadable, which makes the whole reading quite difficult.
The dialect used is KiMvita, with the influence of northern Swahili, with many Arabic expressions.
The writing does not contain much punctuation, which makes the reading sometime difficult.
Also, there are occurrences where the adaptation of the Arabic scripts to Swahili is complicated in the sense that a word could mean two opposites meanings.
For instance on page 8 (last line) the verb 'wakashinda' (they win) could also be 'wakashindwa' (they lose).
Also, the Swahili of Mombasa has 49 consonantal sounds but the manuscript uses only the 28 consonantal characters of the Arabic alphabet, which has caused problems in the transliteration of the text (Omar & Frankl, 1990).
Amor e um fogo que arde sem se ver Love is a fire that burns unseen
Amor é um fogo que arde sem se ver,
é ferida que doi, e não se sente;
é um contentamento descontente,
é dor que desatina sem doer.
É um não querer mais que bem querer;
é um andar solitário entre a gente;
é nunca contentar-se de contente;
é um cuidar que ganha em se perder.
É querer estar preso por vontade;
é servir a quem vence, o vencedor;
é ter com quem nos mata, lealdade.
Mas como causar pode seu favor
nos corações humanos amizade,
se tão contrário a si é o mesmo Amor?
Love is a fire that burns unseen,
a wound that aches yet isn’t felt,
an always discontent contentment,
a pain that rages without hurting,
a longing for nothing but to long,
a loneliness in the midst of people,
a never feeling pleased when pleased,
a passion that gains when lost in thought.
It’s being enslaved of your own free will;
it’s counting your defeat a victory;
it’s staying loyal to your killer.
But if it’s so self-contradictory,
how can Love, when Love chooses,
bring human hearts into sympathy?
The Mers coronavirus is 35 times more deadly than Sars-Cov-2, the virus that causes Covid-19. @thetimes H/T @R_H_Ebright
So why would any responsible scientist create a chimeric Mers virus with an unrelated bat coronavirus that could infect and potentially kill millions more people than Covid?
Yet that is precisely what researchers at the Wuhan Institute of Virology were doing three years before Covid erupted.
These inherently dangerous experiments, known as gain-of-function research (GOF), were conducted with the approval and financial support of the US National Institutes of Health.
The experiments aim to discover how pathogens work and what combination of mutations enable animal viruses to develop the ability to infect humans.
One objective is to predict future pandemic viruses, but there is zero evidence that this can be achieved.
GOF research did not help scientists to predict the Sars, Mers, ebola, zika or nipah virus epidemics, nor the 2009 flu pandemic. It clearly did not predict Covid-19.
As for the argument that GOF research will inform the development of outbreak vaccines, where is the evidence?
Developers of the safe and highly effective Covid vaccines only needed the virus’s sequence.
With its high standards and aspirations of becoming a scientific superpower, Britain is well qualified to lead a multinational effort to restrain this research, which benefits no one.
The most controversial GOF work accounts for less than 0.01 per cent of all virological research worldwide. This means that 99.99 per cent of virology would be unaffected by tighter regulation.
Significant lab accidents resulting in a leak or lab-acquired infection occur on average once a year, so decisive action cannot be delayed.
First, we need an immediate moratorium on the most dangerous GOF research with potential pandemic viruses.
Second, there should be an international treaty tightly regulating such research with certification, verification and inspection powers, like those of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
As Tom Tugendhat, chairman of the foreign affairs committee, argued, treating viruses like atomic bombs would help to prevent pandemics.
The US and China are clearly compromised. Acting in concert with like-minded countries, Britain has the opportunity and every incentive to take the lead in this endeavour.
@SecBlinken said that the U.S. would treat African countries as equals rather than subjects of geopolitics @WSJ
“Too many times, the countries of Africa have been treated as junior partners—or worse—rather than equal ones,” Mr. Blinken said.
“Too often, we ask our partners to help uphold and defend an international system that they don’t feel fully reflects their needs and aspirations. And we’re sensitive to centuries of colonialism, slavery, and exploitation have left painful legacies that endure today.”
“The United States doesn’t want to limit your partnerships with other countries. We want to make your partnerships with us even stronger,” Mr. Blinken said. “We don’t want to make you choose. We want to give you choices.”
28 OCT 19 :: From Russia with Love
But, he said, Russia was going to be a different kind of superpower, one that does not engage in “pressure, intimidation and blackmail” to “exploit” sovereign African governments.
“Our African agenda is positive and future-oriented. We do not ally with someone against someone else, and we strongly oppose any geopolitical games involving Africa.”
“Russia regards Africa as an important and active participant in the emerging polycentric archi- tecture of the world order and an ally in protecting international law against attempts to undermine it,” said Russian deputy foreign minister Mikhail Bogdanov back in November 2018.
The dirty secrets of the dictators favourite bank BGFIBank @mailandguardian @thecontinent_
BGFIBank is the biggest bank in central Africa. It has always enjoyed suspiciously close relationships with some of the region’s most notorious heads of state.
But no one knew quite how close – or quite how suspicious – until now.
A massive new investigation into some 3.5-million leaked documents shows how the bank played a central role in the alleged looting of hundreds of millions of dollars from the Congolese state – even as most of the population lives in extreme poverty.
It is a short walk from the stately Palais de la Nation, the official residence of the Democratic Republic of Congo’s head of state, to the gleaming, modern Kinshasa headquarters of BGFIBank.
We don’t know if Joseph Kabila, during his 18 years as president, ever visited the bank’s offices in person.
We do know that the bank was owned and run by several of his closest family members; and that the proximity between the bank and the presidency is far more than just geographic.
The Continent can reveal that the bank allegedly played a central role in a years-long scam that allowed Kabila’s family and close associates to launder at least $243-million in public and suspect funds, and make multimillion-dollar cash withdrawals.
On one occasion, $6-million was withdrawn – in cash – from an account linked to the Kabila family.
To put this in perspective: 60-million Congolese citizens live below the international poverty line of $1.90 per day.
These startling figures come from the biggest-ever leak of African bank records: some 3.5-million statements, emails and documents that give an unprecedented insight into the inner workings of BGFIBank, the largest bank in central Africa.
The leak was obtained by PPLAAF, the Platform to Protect Whistleblowers in Africa, and the French investigative unit Mediapart, and shared with the European Investigative Collaborations network.
The documents were trawled through by a consortium of investigators representing 19 different media houses across 18 countries, including The Continent, as well as five NGOs.
These startling figures come from the biggest-ever leak of African bank records: some 3.5-million statements, emails and documents
This investigation, known as Congo Hold-Up, offers the most convincing evidence yet of widespread corruption during Kabila’s tenure as president, which lasted from 2001 to 2019.
It also paints a damning picture of a bank which flouted rules and regulations – both its own and those imposed by national and international authorities – to enable looting on a grand scale.
“For me, BGFI is a mafia bank,” said Jules Alingete, the head of the Inspectorate General of Finance, who was appointed last year by Kabila’s successor, President Felix Tshisekedi. “It is unacceptable what happened.”
The consortium made repeated and sustained attempts over the past month to obtain comment from senior executives at BGFIBank, including from the holding company’s headquarters in Libreville, and its offices in Kinshasa and Paris. The bank did not respond in any way.
The oil company that wasn’t
It is another short walk, along Kinshasa’s wide, colonial-era avenues, from the BGFIBank offices to 43 Avenue Tombalbaye, where an office block has been built in the heart of Kinshasa’s upmarket commercial district.
The story of this land’s ownership is a case study in how money was siphoned from the Congolese public purse into the hands of Kabila’s inner circle – with the bank playing a central role in allowing it to happen.
Until 2013, the land was owned by Philippe de Moerloose, a wealthy Belgian businessman with ties to President Kabila.
Then he agreed to sell it to Sud Oil – a shell company with no ties to the oil business, and no evidence of having conducted any commercial activity at all. At the time, Sud Oil did not appear to have any assets or funds in its account at BGFIBank.
Sud Oil was, however, very well connected to the then-Congolese president. Gloria Mteyu, Kabila’s sister, owned 20% of the company; Aneth Lutale, Kabila’s sister-in-law, owned the rest.
Sud Oil agreed to pay $5-million upfront for the building, with another $7-million to be paid in instalments over the next year.
Before agreeing to the deal, De Moerloose demanded a bank guarantee for the outstanding amount. Despite the complete lack of security offered by Sud Oil, BGFIBank provided that guarantee.
In other words, if Sud Oil failed to pay, the bank itself would be liable for the debt. An unusual commitment, given that Sud Oil had no assets.
The man who agreed to these terms was Francis Selemani, who was then the chief executive of BGFIBank’s Congolese operations.
Selemani also happens to be President Kabila’s foster brother, and is married to Aneth Lutale – the majority owner of Sud Oil.
Kabila’s sister Gloria, who owned the rest of Sud Oil, at the time also owned 40% of BGFIBank in the DRC.
But Sud Oil still needed to find the $5-million for the initial payment. Just before it was due, the Banque Centrale du Congo – the DRC’s central bank, the keeper of the country’s treasury – transferred $5.5-million from state coffers into Sud Oil’s account at the BGFIBank.
This appears to be a brazen violation of Congolese banking laws, which prevent the central bank from funding private companies. Typically, central banks formulate a country’s monetary policy and provide financial services for the government and commercial banking system.
Some $5-million was then transferred from the Sud Oil account to De Moerloose’s bank in Switzerland.
In the time it took to complete these transfers, the Congolese state became poorer to the tune of $5.5-million, while the Kabila family gained ownership of a luxury multimillion dollar property – with all these transactions facilitated by BGFIBank.
Extensive attempts were made through various different channels by the consortium to contact the people named in this investigation, including Kabila, Selemani, Mteyu, Lutale, and De Moerloose.
Detailed questions were sent to the current and former governors of the Banque Centrale du Congo.
If Sud Oil failed to pay, the bank itself would be liable for the debt. An unusual commitment, given than Sud Oil had no assets
No one responded to these requests for comment, with the exception of De Moerloose, who said that he had corresponded with Selemani over the “payment guarantee” granted by BGFI, and that he “at the time demanded a copy of the register of shareholders” from Sud Oil and there was no reference to any member of the Kabila family.
In the absence of any other official comment, the documents must speak for themselves.
What they show is that this pattern of dubious transactions, riddled with conflicts of interest and apparent violations of both Congolese law and international banking regulations, was repeated again and again.
A close analysis of the leaked documents conducted by the Congo Hold-up consortium shows that $51.4-million was wired directly from the central bank into Sud Oil’s account at BGFIBank. A further $42.5-million came in from other state entities.
Tens of millions more came from payments linked to the Chinese owners of copper and cobalt mines in the country.
The documents also show that at least $80-million was withdrawn in cash from Sud Oil and related accounts between 2013 and 2018, including several multi- million dollar withdrawals. Congolese law limits dollar withdrawals to a maximum of $10,000 per day.
BGFIBank’s close links with the central African region’s ruling elite have attracted scandal before.
The bank began life as the Gabonese branch of the Banque de Paris et des Pays- Bas (better known today as BNP Paribas).
It was renamed in 1996 as Banque Gabonaise et Française Internationale – BGFIBank – due to its increasingly close links with the Gabonese state.
As of today, at least 10% of the bank’s holding company is owned by companies linked to the family of Gabon’s President Ali Bongo.
Pascaline Bongo, the president’s sister, is on the board of the holding company;
Ali oops: The family of Gabon’s President Ali Bongo is linked to companies that own more than 10% of BGFIBank. and, until last year, so was former finance minister Emile Doumba.
Sure enough, when the Bongo family purchased 12 luxury properties in France between 1996 and 2008, they
did so via an account at BGFIBank.
These deals are at the heart of a major corruption case in France, with French prosecutors saying that the late President Omar Bongo’s salary cannot account for the vast sums of money that were spent.
And in the neighbouring Republic of Congo, the local subsidiary of is run by Jean-Dominique Okemba, the country’s much-feared intelligence chief who also happens to be the nephew of President Denis Sassou Nguessou.
The president’s son, Denis Christel Sassou Nguessou, is currently under investigation by authorities in the United States for allegedly using funds embezzled from the state petroleum company to buy two luxury apartments in Florida, three Range Rovers, a Patek Philippe watch worth 110,000 euros, and jewellery to the value of $1.4-million, as well as a number of private plane trips for himself and his entourage.
These funds were channeled through shell companies with accounts at BGFIBank, according to a Global Witness investigation.
The world of international finance is supposed to be tightly controlled.
There are regulations in place to prevent the flow of suspicious money from one country to another, and banks play a central role in enforcing these regulations.
When high-profile politicians (known in the industry as “politically exposed persons”) are involved, the rules are even stricter.
Those rules were poorly enforced at BGFIBank, as even its own audit in 2017 concluded:
“The sum of the weaknesses described creates for the bank a very high exposure to operational, litigation, money laundering and reputation risks,” concluded auditors KPMG.
That internal audit was triggered by another, much smaller leak of documents, which again suggested widespread corruption by Kabila’s inner circle.
The whistleblower on that occasion was Jean- Jacques Lumumba, grand-nephew of Congo’s liberation hero Patrice Lumumba.
Lumumba joined BGFIBank in Kinshasa as the head of the credit department in February 2016.
It didn’t take him long to notice that something was badly wrong. When he confronted Selemani – the CEO and Kabila’s adopted brother – with evidence of suspicious transactions, he claims that Selemani threatened him with a gun (Selemani has not responded to this claim).
“The bank effectively exists to facilitate corruption, and there have been no consequences,” Lumumba told The Continent.
“You know, Patrice Lumumba was the first Congolese to really fight against corruption. He would have been devastated to see his country exposed to so much of it.”
Meanwhile, the DRC remains one of the poorest countries in the world, with 73% of its population living in extreme poverty.
With the help of a friendly bank, Kabila and his family became considerably richer during his 18 years in office. The people that the former president was supposed to be serving did not.
US pressure critical to thwarting Sudan’s military takeover @AfricanBizMag @__TomCollins
In the immediate aftermath of Sudan’s October coup, it seemed as if the general who led the military takeover may have made a strategic miscalculation.
Rather than showing signs of support, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, traditional allies with strong links to Sudan’s military, joined the US and UK in issuing a statement calling for the “immediate restoration of the civilian-led transitional government and institutions”.
This came as a surprise from two Gulf countries that in 2019, during the revolution that ousted longtime dictator Omar al-Bashir, wired $500m to support Sudan’s Transitional Military Council as it debated whether to ignore protestors who demanded that civilians must be represented in Sudan’s executive.
The apparent lack of Gulf support – and capital to prop up Sudan’s battered economy – has added to widespread condemnation by Western powers and the international community of the October coup.
As the World Bank halted $2bn in loans and the US suspended $700m in aid, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the general who has since appointed himself head of the new transitional council, seemed to have overplayed his hand.
Mohamed Osman, a Sudanese businessman and fellow at the African Leadership Institute, says that the success or failure of the military takeover depends in part on how far the international community will continue to lobby Sudan’s Gulf partners to reject the coup.
“In the medium to long term it really depends on the reaction of the West,” he tells African Business.
“Will the army, after taking charge, use diplomacy, Egypt and Gulf countries to convince the world that this is what is good for the region? It is a plausible scenario. We, the people, are hoping that by taking to the streets the demonstrations will not run out of steam and we can influence the West to continue lobbying regional players.”
Events on the street
Since the army seized control, weeks before it was scheduled to cede power to a civilian government, there have been sustained protests on the streets of Khartoum.
The civilian elements that led the revolution in 2019 have been at the forefront of several “million marches” and there has been an ongoing policy of “civil disobedience”.
A total of 38 protestors had been killed by 18th November in clashes with security forces, according to a pro-democracy doctors’ union.
The bloodiest day was in mid-November when security forces shot dead 14 anti-coup protestors and wounded dozens more, the union says.
The military has responded by erecting barricades across the capital city and shutting down the internet for weeks.
Osman says that the ability of the protestors to maintain pressure on the military will be key to convincing Sudan’s democratic partners to continue pushing for a return to civilian representation in government.
The US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, telephoned Sudan’s deposed prime minister, Abdalla Hamdok, in November after he was placed under house arrest by the military junta.
In a visit to Kenya later that month, he said: “If the [Sudanese] military puts this train back on its tracks and does what’s necessary, I think the support that has been very strong from the international community can resume”.
That includes extensive debt relief and the prospect of future financial support from multilateral institutions and nations which refused to deal with Sudan during the leadership of Omar al-Bashir.
In June, the IMF confirmed that Sudan would receive debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative which could see its debt reduced by $50bn.
The coup raises questions over that support, while in early November, the foreign ministry of France, Sudan’s second largest creditor, said that the coup had put in doubt its plans to cancel around $5bn in debt owed by Sudan.
Chris Coons, the leader of the US Senate panel that funds foreign aid, says that assistance to Sudan will be removed if the transitional government is not restored.
Without extensive debt relief and the permanent end of economic sanctions, the prospect of an economic revival in a country experiencing high inflation and shortages of fuel, food and medicine is remote.
The military’s supporters
Though the civilian protests show no signs of stopping there are several factors that are working to solidify the takeover.
The day before the army seized control in Sudan, Burhan discreetly flew to neighbouring Egypt where he was told that Hamdok “has to go”, according to the Wall Street Journal.
Just before the coup, the director of the Egyptian intelligence service, Abbas Kamel, travelled to Khartoum to meet General al-Burhan, but shunned Hamdok, it was reported.
“The feeling on the street is that the coup was orchestrated by Egypt,” says Osman.
Many have likened the current takeover to Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s military surge to power on the back of widespread popular protest against Egypt’s former Islamist regime.
The removal of a democratically elected government in Egypt was tolerated by the West and Sisi has since become a key partner in the region – a cautionary tale for stakeholders in Sudan’s democratic transition.
A potential reason behind Egyptian interference in Sudan is due to its stance on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which will dam the River Nile in Ethiopia before it runs through Sudan and Egypt.
Hamdok, who previously worked in Ethiopia at the UN, was seen to be close to the government in Addis Ababa.
With Sudan diplomatically and geographically in between Egypt and Ethiopia, Cairo wanted a head of state in Khartoum who will apply more pressure on Addis Ababa over the dam, it has been reported.
A current land dispute on the border of Sudan and Ethiopia at al-Fashaga would provide the perfect vehicle to raise tensions between the two countries, a Sudanese businessman tells African Business on condition of anonymity.
While Hamdok had tried to steer clear of the conflict, the military repeatedly issued strong statements confirming that the land belonged to Sudan.
Egypt was notably absent from the initial statement denouncing the coup by Gulf countries and Western partners, but the US has since stepped up its efforts to reluctantly bring the Arab nation into line.
However, the US must also face lobbying from Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Israel who argue behind closed doors that Washington should eventually accept the coup.
In 2021, Sudan and Israel normalised relations and signed the Abraham Accords, a US-brokered thawing of relations between Arab countries and Israel.
The rapprochement between Sudan and Israel was led by military leaders in Khartoum, not the civilian faction that made up part of the Sovereign Council.
“The military leadership in Sudan is asking Israel to use its relationship with the US to push to accept the coup,” says Osman.
Meanwhile, the US is pressuring Israel to convince the military leaders to return to a transitional civilian government.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE also have strong ties to Sudan’s military and they would be in full support of the takeover if it wasn’t for US pressure, experts say.
Sudan’s warlord and paramilitary leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, has for years been leasing troops from his Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to Saudi Arabia for the war in Yemen.
“There is no way Saudi Arabia will ditch those guys,” says the Sudanese businessman.
The UAE is also a key export route for the illegal export of gold from Sudan, a multi-billion-dollar business allegedly connected to Sudan’s military.
Russia is seen to be supporting the coup due to several strategic objectives including gold mining in Sudan and security operations from the Kremlin-linked paramilitary force, the Wagner Group.
Moscow is building its first military base in Africa since the fall of the Soviet Union in Port Sudan.
At the UN Security Council, Russia did not condemn the military takeover and has been making objections to statements that come down hard on the coup.
“To what extent is US support to counter the role of Russia? The million-dollar question is why the US is so engaged with Sudan and how much effort will it put into supporting Hamdok and the transition,” says Osman.
The Biden administration is keen to establish itself, in contrast to the former administration, as a supporter of democracy, but also fears the very real threat of widespread instability in the region.
With neighbouring Ethiopia on the verge of imploding and Libya already in a state of disarray, the US may ultimately prefer to deal with a stable Sudan that is governed by strong military leadership, like in Egypt.
Sudan’s military future?
However, Sudan’s military leaders have found it much harder than expected to form a new government – a sign that the balance of power may eventually swing against them.
The military had initially intended for Hamdok to continue as prime minister but he has refused to do so, leaving a question mark over who will lead the country.
The army has also found it hard to fill key ministerial positions while civilians are refusing to take up lucrative positions in the new government.
With far less domestic support for the coup than expected, the military will have trouble running the country, the Sudanese businessman says.
Unable to recruit individuals for the new setup, the military has been installing unqualified members of the old Islamist regime.
“Islamists are super excited by the move,” says the businessman. “They are already working with Burhan; he is using the Islamists to run the country”.
If Burhan continues to work with the Islamists without domestic support, it could return Sudan to its former status as a global pariah.
Besides isolating himself from the West, it would also complicate his relationship with Egypt, which has spent years trying to stamp out the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood.
Our revolution is bulletproof. @LaurenBinDC
#Sudan's protest movement puts out a new series of videos, in English here, about their ongoing response to the #SudanCoup:
JUN-2019 :: Hugh Masekela said ‘’I want to be there when the people start to turn it around.’’ Sudan is a Masekela pivot moment.
The "zeitgeist" of the Revolution in Khartoum was intoxicating
As I watched events unfold it felt like Sudan was a portal into a whole new normal.
And now we have two visions of the Future. One vision played out on our screens, the protestors could have been our wives, children.
The other vision is that of MBS, MBZ and Al-Sisi and its red in tooth and claw.
Islamic State Claims Deadly Bombings in Ugandan Capital @WSJ
The militant group’s leadership formally recognized the ADF as one of its affiliates in July 2019.
The ADF usually operates from the jungles of the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, but European security officials say it has recently become emboldened to launch high-profile attacks in Uganda and neighboring Rwanda after receiving sizable funding and technical assistance from Islamic State’s central leadership.
Uganda is a major contributor of troops to an African Union mission fighting an Islamist insurgency in Somalia, and Rwanda recently sent its soldiers to battle another ISIS affiliate in Mozambique.
“Our intelligence indicates that these are domestic terror attacks, linked to the ADF,” he said.
“We believe there are still very many suicide attackers out there. The threat is being directed at all Ugandans.”
The meme shows the series protagonist raising a glass with the subtitle, Welcome to a new dispensation. #EndSARS @mailandguardian @thecontinent_
In 2016, almost 40,000 Nigerians arrived in Italy, and about 18,000 made the trip in 2017, according to the BBC.
In a 2018 survey conducted by Pew Research, 45% of Nigerian adults said they planned to move to another country within the next five years.
And in 2019 more than 300,000 Nigerians migrated to Canada under its skilled workers programme.
This is not the first time Nigerians have left en masse.
Tunde Leye, of SBM Intelligence, a risk consultancy, says the exodus is hollowing out the country. “The people leaving Nigeria belong to the middle class, who can afford to leave; the immigration programmes are targeted at them.”
LAGOS A MEGACITY LIKE NO OTHER @washingtonpost
He’s driving one of nearly 100,000 decrepit “danfo” buses in Lagos — the main means of public transport — all of them decades-old hand-me-downs from wealthier countries.
: There is no plan. Lagos will balloon to 30 million, then 50 million, maybe even 100 million people, and meanwhile the government will keep unveiling new visions for the city that never come to fruition.
No matter how the values are tweaked, though, Lagos emerges as the world’s most populous city at some point between now and 2100, in study after study.
Most of Africa’s population will continue to grow rapidly this century. Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Tanzania are all forecast to join Nigeria among the 10 most populous countries by 2100.
More than half the city’s residents live in what Lagosians call “face-me-I-face-you” housing, where space is so tight that several people sleep in the same room, either back to back or facing one another.
“God no dey promise future,” he said. “If you dey come give am ticket to leave this here country, I will disappear o. I will not even stop home for pick my bag.”
“You can get started in Lagos with practically nothing if you are willing to live on the street,” Lawanson said.
“Come in on a truck. Buy a broken basket. Use it to transport goods. Use the money to buy a wheelbarrow — there’s a ready market for that kind of labor.”
Without new infrastructure to keep up with the growth, it now takes longer to cross Lagos from one edge to the other in a danfo than it does to fly to Lagos from Europe.
Lyrics written half a century ago by Fela Kuti, the legendary Lagosian king of Afrobeat, still ring true:
“Before-before Lagos traffic na special, eh / Number one special all over the world / You go get PhD for driving for Lagos, eh.”
KHARTOUM SHAPED BY CATASTROPHE @washingtonpost
From the surrounding desert, the sand-colored city of Khartoum rises like a mirage.
A caravan heading inward from its edge will pass scenes that repeat mile after mile like a plaintive folk song: square mud-brick compounds stretching to the horizon, the expanse broken every so often by slightly taller, mostly unfinished skeletons of iron and concrete, halfway between rubble and a dream fulfilled.
These cities — such as Goma, in war-torn eastern Congo, or Bangui, the capital of the deeply impoverished Central African Republic — tend to be as big as their countries’ problems are deep.
Greater Khartoum’s population has octupled while a succession of wars, famines, droughts and floods have ravaged Sudan’s countryside.
“Tell me: What does a person want?” said Aziza Idris Ahmed, one of Khartoum’s millions of newcomers in recent decades, as she sat with her family in their dusty compound.
“Peace and safety. The rest comes after.”
Around 40 percent of the world’s internally displaced people are in Africa, according to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center’s most recent report, and that number is growing. In 2020, nearly 9 million people became newly displaced on the continent.
Some camps were named in ways that nodded to displacement (the Arabic equivalents of “We were forced” or “They threw us,” for instance), while others were named for their most visible characteristics (“Rubbish” or “Shanty”).
Some say Bashir planted the seeds of his own downfall in driving displacement to Khartoum, concentrating rising discontent over his misrule in camps that flanked the city on all sides.
KINSHASA UNEQUAL GROWTH @washingtonpost
Six decades after independence, three-quarters of Congolese live on less than $2 a day. Life expectancy hovers around 60 years.
The city was built with race and class segregation in mind; only the rich received public services.
Fewer than 1 in 10 Congolese have electricity at home. In Kinshasa, the number is closer to half, but a drive around the city at night is one way to witness its inequality.
MOMBASA REMADE BY FOREIGN POWERS @washingtonpost
It was dusk in the plaza and histories were blending together in the dimming light.
Dozens of men had gathered under the chinaberry trees to talk politics and chew khat, a mild stimulant beloved in the communities that skirt the western Indian Ocean.
The call to prayer emanated from a nearby mosque built by Omani tradesmen more than 450 years ago.
A crumbling fort built by the Portuguese, who wrested this port city from the Omanis in the 1600s, loomed behind the trees, which also enshrouded a monument to a British regimental commander killed in World War II.
“We have deep water, we’re on the equator, we’re on the way from everywhere to everywhere else,” said Kalandar Khan, a historian of Kenya’s coast whose ancestors were brought from Baluchistan, in what is now Pakistan, to Mombasa four centuries ago by Omani sultans who employed them as mercenaries.
ABIDJAN AFRICAS INTERNAL MIGRATION ROUTES @washingtonpost
The majority of African migrants, both rich and poor, do not cross oceans, but rather land borders within Africa.
Ninety-four percent of African migration across oceans takes a regular, legal form.
At least 80 percent of Africans contemplating migration say they have no interest in leaving the continent.
He serves its signature fried tuna on a bed of chopped tomatoes, onions and chiles, with a side of attieke, the Ivorian cassava staple.
Cash takes on the kingpins @Africa_Conf
Raila Odinga's presidential bid relies on the grandees, while his rival William Ruto focuses on the money
With less than ten months before the presidential elections next year, the two leading contenders are almost certain to be veteran oppositionist Raila Odinga, now 'handshake' partner to President Uhuru Kenyatta, who will face Kenyatta's deputy William Ruto.
Each is building the complex alliances necessary to win in Kenya's electoral system and showing the differences in their tactics as they do so.
For decades, Odinga has built his credo as the outsider, the people's tribune taking on the establishment. This time, he's shed that pretence. Backing from the establishment, from President Kenyatta onwards, is driving Odinga's campaign.
His rival, Ruto, who launched his career as a uber-loyalist to President Daniel arap Moi and spearheaded the youth wing of the old ruling party, Kenya African Union (KANU), is styling himself as the rebel outsider, idealising the hard-working 'hustler'.
Odinga will rely on tribal blocs and endorsements from regional kingpins, chiefly via a formal merger with President Kenyatta's Jubilee party due to be formalised at a special conference this month.
Jubilee's plans to finalise a coalition with Odinga's Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) will finalise Kenyatta's slow and messy divorce of Ruto.
It was the 'handshake' deal of 2018 in which Kenyatta and Odinga recognised their mutual advantage in collaboration.
They were presidential rivals in the 2012 and 2017 elections.
Raila's campaign, although yet to be formally launched, is a governor-heavy entourage, including from Central province of Kikuyu and Meru voters: Nyandarua's Francis Kimemia, Meru's Kiraitu Murungi, Kiambu's James Nyoro, and governors Lee Kinyanjui and Ndiritu Muriithi from Nakuru and Laikipia.
His supporters believe that this will secure the Kikuyu vote which has thwarted Odinga's three previous presidential bids
What happens with Odinga's erstwhile allies in the National Super Alliance (Nasa) could be more problematic.
All of them have their presidential ambitions and reasons to distrust Odinga:
Ford Kenya's Moses Wetangula, Amani National Congress's Musalia Mudavadi, and the Wiper party's Kalonzo Musyoka joined by Kenya African National Union chairman Gideon Moi.
Recently, Odinga has secured a string of endorsements from Musyoka's turf in Kamba land.
Alfred Mutua (who had launched his own presidential bid in September), Charity Ngilu and Kivutha Kibwana from Machakos, Kitui and Makueni respectively, who have all called for regional kingpin Musyoka of the One Kenya Alliance to join Odinga.
Having formed OKA in protest at being marginalised by the 'handshake' politics of Odinga and Kenyatta, the four leaders in the minor league – Mudavadi, Musyoka, Gideon Moi and Wetangula – are keeping their powder dry.
With the exception of Moi, who harbours enmity against fellow Kalenjin Ruto, the leaders have substantial negotiating power in the coming months.
Failure by Odinga to secure their support would erode his share of the vote, particularly in the western and lower eastern regions.
Odinga knows that he must draw millions of votes in Central Kenya region.
That's why Peter Kenneth and Martha Karua, along with a host of county governors from around Mount Kenya, have been proposed as running mates.
Ruto is trying his 'hustler nation' message, emphasising his humble roots, combined with cash handouts at mass rallies, reminiscent of Donald Trump's populist tactics in the United States.
Dismissing the idea of alliances, Ruto wants to promote his United Democratic Alliance as a populist challenge to the established ethnic bloc politics.
Ruto reckons that Jubilee will be hollowed out if he can persuade enough senior politicians to defect to the UDA.
Ruto calculates that Odinga's support from central province governors is an elite project lacking traction at the grassroots.
Less interested in winning over county governors, Ruto has been campaigning with party MPs, focusing on young voters.
UDA's by-election success in Central Kenya's Kiambaa constituency and Mugaga ward in Kiambu boosted his confidence in these tactics.
After courting Central Kenya alongside President Kenyatta during the 2012 and 2017 elections, Ruto claims to be confident that Kenyatta's declaration of 'kumi yangu, kumi ya Ruto' loosely translated as 'my ten years followed by Ruto's ten', will be delivered.
Then there is the money. Ruto is handing out wads of banknotes on his tour, envelopes of cash to small business owners, street grocers, motorbike taxis and others, for 'the youth and mama mboga to boost their businesses'.
This isn't a new tactic for Kenyan politicians. But the sums that Ruto is giving out are stunning: in a couple of hours on a trip to Homa Bay last week, deep in Odinga's Luo heartland, he handed out 2 million Kenya shillings ($20,000).
That ability to generate cash ensures big campaign rallies; it also encouraged local county assembly politicians to hold rallies with the Ruto. The sources of these mountains of cash remain opaque.
A more formal handout is being offered by Odinga. He promises to create a social security system known as 'Azimio la umoja', a monthly stipend of Ksh6,000 ($60) for poor Kenyans if he becomes President.
It is part of what he described as Kenya's 'third stage of development', to establish a welfare state.
So far, neither candidate has established a clear lead on his rival. But Ruto is seen as the better organised and more determined of the two although Odinga may prove the wiliest, and the less disliked.
Ruto has been rattled by Meru Governor Murungi opting to back Odinga. Accusing those politicians fronting for the ODM leader of duping residents, Ruto said Jubilee could not govern for two terms on the strength of eight million votes and then get 'auctioned off' to the ODM leader.
Both candidates are likely to select running mates from Central Kenya; of the two, Odinga who faces the tougher choice as he builds his coalition.
Under pressure from Mount Kenya to select a Kikuyu running mate he also knows that doing so would risk pushing Musyoka, Mudavadi or Wetan'gula into Ruto's arms.
It is unclear whether a formal merger between Jubilee and ODM can hold at the grassroots. None of the bigger political parties are ideological. They are either ethnic or personal political vehicles.
Lower down the food chain, many politicians in both parties would be imperilled if ODM–Jubilee select joint candidates across the board.
There are already murmurs of discontent from candidates vying for the Nairobi governorship, who want open primaries to be held.
If the management of the cumbersome ODM–Jubilee merger falls apart at the first set of hustings, that would give Ruto a powerful lead in the numbers game.
Eaagads Ltd. reports HY 2021 Earnings here
N.S.E Equities - Agricultural
Par Value: 1/25
Closing Price: 13.90
Total Shares Issued: 32157000.00
Market Capitalization: 446,982,300
Interim results through 30.09.2021 versus 30.09.2020
HY Revenue 57.23m versus 67.013m
HY Fair Value on biological assets 4.564m versus 4.395m
HY Cost of Production [48.369m] versus [47.144m]
HY Gross Profit 13.425m versus 24.264m
HY PBT 1.490m versus 10.167m
HY PAT [0.375m] versus 0.225m
HY EPS [0.01] versus 0.29
In the 6 month period under review, the company produced 83 tons of clean coffee compared to 123 tons same period last year.
The decrease was mainly attributed to prolonged cold weather experienced in the half-year which led to intermittent flower formation of the 2021 early crop.
Sales revenues decreased from Kshs. 67 million to Kshs. 57 million in the current period.
The average price realized for the 6 month period however improved, with a kilogram of clean coffee fetching on average USD 6.62 compared to USD 5.07 per kilogram last year.
Due to the dip in coffee tonnages sold, profit before tax decreased from Kshs. 10 million to Kshs. 1.4 million.
Coffee upkeep costs, picking costs and wet processing costs increased by KShs 1.2 million.
Crop commission charges reduced by KShs 2.5 million. Farm management fees remained constant at USD 90 per hectare per year.
The company is on target towards achieving its late crop harvest, pegged at 200 Tons.
The future of the farm looks promising as evidenced by the good flowering currently exhibited by the trees for 2022/23 production season.
Although the weather forecast indicate the short rains to be poor, Eaagads farm management has put in place measures to ensure that the current crop on the tree is preserved and attained.
The prices are expected to remain stable owing an anticipated global coffee production shortfall to meet the current global demand. This will put the farm in a better position to improve its profitability.