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Wednesday 28th of November 2018 |
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05-FEB-2018 :: [The End of] Halcyon Days @TheStarKenya Africa |
Wikipedia has an article on: halcyon days and it reads thus,
From Latin Alcyone, daughter of Aeolus and wife of Ceyx. When her husband died in a shipwreck, Alcyone threw herself into the sea whereupon the gods transformed them both into halcyon birds (kingfishers). When Alcyone made her nest on the beach, waves threatened to destroy it. Aeolus restrained his winds and kept them calm during seven days in each year, so she could lay her eggs. These became known as the “halcyon days,” when storms do not occur. Today, the term is used to denote a past period that is being remembered for being happy and/or successfuL
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The Khashoggi killing had roots in a cutthroat Saudi family feud @washingtonpost @IgnatiusPost Law & Politics |
Behind the brutal murder of Jamal Khashoggi lies a power struggle within the Saudi royal family that helped feed the paranoia and recklessness of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Eventually, this rage in the royal court led to the death and dismemberment of a Washington Post journalist. The opening scenes of this family feud took place in January 2015 in a VIP hospital suite in Riyadh, as King Abdullah lay on his deathbed. According to a Saudi who was at the hospital at the time, Abdullah’s sons and courtiers briefly delayed informing his successor, King Salman, that the monarch had passed — perhaps hoping to control the court’s stash of money and sustain powerful positions for Abdullah’s wing of the family. The cutthroat scheming within the House of Saud over the following years matches anything in the fantasy series “Game of Thrones.” The fallout extended to the United States, China, Switzerland and other countries, as the two most powerful clans of the royal family jockeyed for power. As the tension increased, the royal court around Mohammed bin Salman, the new king’s favorite son, even dared to try to kidnap a member of the Abdullah faction in Beijing in a brazen operation in August 2016 that reads like a chapter in a spy thriller. MBS, as Salman’s son is known, became increasingly anxious and aggressive toward those he considered enemies. Starting in the spring of 2017, a team of Saudi intelligence operatives, under the control of the royal court, began organizing kidnappings of dissidents abroad and at home, according to U.S. and Saudi experts. Detainees were held at covert sites. The Saudis used harsh enhanced interrogation techniques, a euphemism for torture, to make the captives talk. They were forced to sign oaths that if they disclosed any of what happened, they would pay a severe price. This real-life drama was described to me in a series of interviews by prominent Saudis and U.S. and European experts, in the United States and abroad, in the weeks since Khashoggi’s death. These sources had firsthand knowledge of events but asked not to be identified because they involve sensitive international matters. The information was checked with knowledgeable U.S. sources to confirm its accuracy. It helps explain the vortex of rage and lawlessness that ultimately sucked in Khashoggi, a Post Global Opinions columnist, when he entered the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul on Oct. 2. Here’s the bottom line, for U.S. and Saudi experts who have reviewed the intelligence findings: Khashoggi was murdered by a team sent from the royal court in Riyadh, which was part of the rapid-action capability that had been organized 18 months before. Khashoggi’s provocative journalism and his ties to Qatar and Turkey had offended the increasingly autocratic crown prince, who issued a “bring him back” order in July 2018, one that wasn’t understood by U.S. intelligence until three months later, after Khashoggi’s disappearance in Istanbul. The United States has closely observed this internecine war. Jared Kushner, President Trump’s son-in-law and adviser, became a close counselor to MBS. Kushner visited MBS in late October 2017 on a private trip; neither has disclosed details about the conversations, but it is possible they discussed the royal family’s machinations. A week after Kushner’s visit, that Nov. 4, MBS staged what amounted to an internal coup, arresting more than 200 Saudi princes and business leaders and holding them at the Ritz-Carlton hotel in Riyadh. Plans for these arrests were made carefully by MBS’s closest confidants in the royal court. Topping MBS’s enemies list in the Ritz-Carlton putsch was Prince Turki bin Abdullah, an ambitious son of the late king, who had earlier conveyed to American and Chinese contacts his worries about MBS’s erratic decisions. Turki remains in captivity, and his top military aide, Maj. Gen. Ali al-Qahtani, died in custody after being held at the Ritz-Carlton last year. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Washington in March. (Cliff Owen/AP) Succession struggle The palace intrigue began swirling in early January 2015, when King Abdullah, who according to news reports had been diagnosed the previous year with lung cancer, faced a worsening medical situation. He was rushed by helicopter from his desert retreat at Rawdat Khuraim to the VIP wing of the Saudi National Guard hospital in Riyadh, surrounded by his sons and palace aides. As the king slipped into a coma, the royal court tried to keep his mortal illness quiet as they speculated about succession possibilities, including the chance that Abdullah’s son Mutaib, head of the National Guard, could become king. When Salman, then crown prince, came to the hospital on Jan. 23 and demanded, “Where is my brother?” he was informed by Khaled al-Tuwaijri, the chief of the royal court and guardian of family funds, that Abdullah was “resting.” In fact, according to a Saudi who was present at the hospital at the time but requested anonymity, Abdullah was already dead. When Salman learned the truth, he was furious. Echoing down the hospital corridor came the sound of loud blows, as the new king slapped the now-deposed chief of the royal court. Tuwaijri was arrested and taken to the Ritz-Carlton in November 2017; he’s now under what’s described as house arrest, after repaying the bulk of the money he had improperly pocketed during Abdullah’s reign, Saudi sources said. “Khaled al-Tuwaijri was very damaging to the sons of King Abdullah,” says Tarek Obaid, a Saudi business executive who advised the Abdullah clan. Members of the royal family had already been spying on one another, as the succession struggle loomed. One of Abdullah’s sons described bugging the phones of many senior princes. The Abdullah camp also purchased a Chinese-made device that could secretly detect the identification numbers of phones within a 100-yard radius without accessing the phones directly. Surveillance devices hidden in ashtrays and other items were scattered around palaces in Riyadh to pick up political plots and gossip. An avid courtier who helped King Salman and his son MBS consolidate power in those early months was Saud al-Qahtani, a lawyer and former Air Force member with a penchant for hacking and social media. The Salman camp had initially been suspicious of Qahtani because he had worked as one of Tuwaijri’s assistants in the royal court since the early 2000s. Qahtani was interrogated and beaten in the first days after Salman’s accession, says one palace insider. But he soon proved his loyalty to MBS, with a vengeance. As director of the court’s Center for Studies and Media Affairs, Qahtani fed MBS’s suspicion about potential rivals and coup plotters. Qahtani also began assembling cyberweapons to use on behalf of MBS. In June 2015, he contacted a shadowy Italian group known as “Hacking Team” about acquiring covert cyber tools. On June 29, 2015, Qahtani messaged the head of Hacking Team: “The Saudi Royal Court (THE King Office) would like to be in productive cooperation with you and develop a long and strategic partnership.” Saudi and U.S. investigators have concluded that Qahtani, as MBS’s commander of information-related operations, helped organize Khashoggi’s murder. Saudi Arabia's King Salman attends the inauguration of the Haramain Railway connecting Mecca and Medina with the Red Sea coastal city of Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, in September. (Bandar Algaloud/Courtesy of Saudi Royal Court/Reuters) Family politics King Salman’s team began playing hard-nosed family politics from its very first week in power. In late January 2015, a royal decree removed two of Abdullah’s sons, Turki and Mishaal, as governors of Riyadh and Mecca, respectively. Their ouster left scars that never healed. MBS, just 29 then, was installed as minister of defense; Mohammed bin Nayef, the pliable son of the powerful former interior minister and a favorite of the CIA, was named deputy crown prince below Crown Prince Muqrin, an unassuming former head of intelligence. Salman and MBS tightened their control further in April 2015. Muqrin was dumped as crown prince and replaced by Mohammed bin Nayef. (A year later, as a farewell gift, the king gave Muqrin the 280-foot luxury yacht Solandge in addition to other perks, according to a Saudi who was familiar with the transactions.) MBS became deputy crown prince, formally joining the line of succession. Though not yet 30, MBS was already a Machiavellian prince, encouraged by Mohammed bin Zayed, the deputy crown prince of the United Arab Emirates, and Sheikh Tahnoon, a senior UAE intelligence official who visited MBS’s yacht frequently on weekends during that first year. MBS already had a reputation in Riyadh as a hothead, who in his younger days had intimidated a land registry official who was blocking a property transfer the young prince wanted by sending him a bullet as a warning. MBS proclaimed his desire to modernize the kingdom. But he was also paranoid about rivals, such as Abdullah’s sons, as well as Mohammed bin Nayef, and, later, about the threat from the uncontrollable journalist Khashoggi. Two warning signs in September 2015 should have alerted observers that MBS was “a Saudi prince who could jump-start the kingdom — or drive it off a cliff,” as a headline on a 2016 piece of mine put it. Ambassador Joseph Westphal, the American envoy in Riyadh, traveled that month to Jiddah planning to see Mohammed bin Nayef; but he was rerouted at the airport and sent to see MBS instead — an unsubtle suggestion of who was really boss. That same month, a longtime Saudi intelligence official named Saad al-Jabri visited then-CIA Director John Brennan in Washington, during a private visit. Jabri, a close adviser to Mohammed bin Nayef, hadn’t told Salman about the trip; when Jabri returned home, he was fired. He now lives in exile. Members of the Abdullah clan were watching as MBS grasped the levers of power that had once been theirs. Knowing that Brennan and other members of the Obama administration were uneasy about MBS, several of Abdullah’s sons hired a leading strategic advisory firm in Washington, to gather information about the new dynamic in U.S.-Saudi relations. The meetings were hardly a secret plot, as MBS may have imagined. Over several days in May 2016, Prince Turki bin Abdullah and his closest adviser, Saudi businessman Obaid, met with a series of former CIA and State Department officials in a suite at the Four Seasons Hotel in Georgetown. They were accompanied by Maj. Gen. Ali al-Qahtani, the military adviser and protector of Turki and other sons of the late King Abdullah — and the man who would end up dead the next year after being held at the Riyadh Ritz-Carlton. I met the group at the hotel, too, to gather information for the profile I was writing about MBS. I remember that Turki was careful in his comments; he expressed concern about the need for more balance in Saudi policy, but he didn’t propose any changes in governance. Obaid, in an interview, described Turki’s May 2016 Washington contacts this way: “The round of meetings was to get a strategic assessment on U.S. perspectives on the kingdom and its standing, through knowledgeable U.S. defense and national-security officials.” MBS came to Washington the next month, in June 2016, to meet with President Barack Obama and other officials. Up until then, the administration had been studiously neutral amid the mounting tension in the royal family, even with the crown prince and deputy seemingly on collision course. But Obama was impressed by the vision and energy that MBS brought to his reform agenda, and after that June visit, the United States tilted toward the young hothead-reformer. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, left, meets with Abu Dhabi's crown prince and deputy supreme commander of the UAE armed forces, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed. (Bandar Al-Jaloud/AFP/Getty Images) Prince Mohammed bin Salman meets with Barack Obama in Washington. (Bandar Algaloud/AFP/Getty Images) ‘Stuck in a power play’ The Abdullah clan retained some important foreign connections, especially in Asia. In 2016, those became increasingly tangled with MBS’s agenda. Obaid traveled to Shanghai in July 2016, to prepare for Turki bin Abdullah’s participation in a meeting of the International Finance Forum, which would be held there that September, a few days before the Group of 20 meeting that would take place in Hangzhou. Since MBS would be attending the G-20, Turki’s plan to attend the IFF meeting carried a hint of intra-Saudi rivalry. Obaid checked in to a suite at the Peninsula hotel on the Bund; in the adjoining room was Maj. Gen. Ali al-Qahtani. Then things began to get weird. This chain of events was described by several Saudi, Swiss and American sources. Obaid was Turki’s emissary on an important business venture. Turki had agreed to invest at least $10 million in a development fund called the Silk Road Finance Corp., or SRFC, headed by an MIT-educated chief executive named Shan Li, according to the organization’s website. The Chinese eminence behind the Silk Road initiative was Chen Yuan, a very senior leader who had headed the China Development Bank from 1998 to 2013 and whose father was reportedly one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party. When Obaid traveled to Beijing in early August 2016 to negotiate the terms of Turki’s investment, he had a perhaps significant encounter at the sumptuous Park Hyatt hotel. He had been invited by John Thornton, the chairman of Silk Road Finance, to meet for dinner with him and Li. Thornton also invited Michael Klein, a New York investment banker who at the time was rumored to be a key adviser to MBS on his plan to raise as much as $100 billion through an initial public offering of some shares of Saudi Aramco — providing a welcome cash boost for a country facing a budget squeeze because of low oil prices. (Klein didn’t end up representing the kingdom on this deal; the job went to other bankers.) Klein met with Obaid only briefly and then left, according to his spokeswoman and Thornton. During the Park Hyatt meeting with the Silk Road group, Obaid warned that the Saudi Aramco IPO, by imposing Western disclosure standards, could have a drastic effect on Saudi national security by weakening the royal family’s grip on power, since Aramco had long been one of the main pillars for ruling the kingdom. Instead, said Obaid, the Chinese should raise cash by working with the Saudis on a barter deal to trade some of China’s vast stockpile of U.S. Treasury bonds in exchange for Saudi oil. By criticizing MBS’s privatization plan in front of the Chinese investment group, Obaid was, in effect, urging the Chinese to support the traditional Saudi system that under Abdullah and previous kings had maintained stability and security. Klein said through a spokeswoman that during his brief conversation with Obaid, he never discussed either an oil barter deal or the privatization of Saudi Aramco. Thornton remembers Obaid making the oil barter proposal but doesn’t recall who was present: “I didn’t give it a second thought as a serious idea,” he said in a phone interview. According to a Silk Road executive who requested anonymity, Turki and Obaid never became actual investors in the venture. Word of the criticism of MBS’s privatization plan by the Abdullah clan’s chief financial adviser may have gotten back to Riyadh. A week or so later, Obaid began receiving a barrage of calls from Saudi numbers he didn’t recognize and didn’t answer. Eventually, according to a knowledgeable source, he received a call from Khalid Humaidan, head of the General Intelligence Presidency, as the Saudi intelligence service is known. Humaidan said the royal court wanted Obaid to return to Saudi Arabia immediately, the knowledgeable source said. Obaid responded that he needed to check first with his boss, Prince Turki. Who is Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman? The assassination of Washington Post contributor Jamal Khashoggi has put Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in the spotlight. Here’s what we know about him. (The Washington Post) According to the knowledgeable source, Turki called Humaidan and asked whether King Salman had personally ordered Obaid’s return. “If it’s the king who has requested this, I will personally fly Tarek back home now,” Turki is said to have told the intelligence chief. The request was instead described as from the “court,” and Turki is said to have advised Obaid to remain in China. On Aug. 21, Li invited Obaid to come to Beijing to look at an office for the Silk Road Finance Corp. that would be located in Yintai Center in the heart of downtown, a source said. It was a fashionable spot, with the new Park Hyatt hotel in the building. Li said that Obaid could meet Chen, the godfather of the Silk Road venture, on the trip. On the afternoon of Aug 25, Obaid flew from Shanghai to Beijing on a private jet. When the plane landed, it taxied to a remote area of the airport. Parked nearby was a plane with the tail marking “HZ-ATR.” The “HZ” prefix designated it as a Saudi plane. What happened next was described by knowledgeable Saudi and Swiss sources who were briefed on the case. As Obaid left his plane, he was stopped by more than 40 plainclothes Chinese security men. The leader of the group, speaking in Arabic, is said to have told Obaid: “We are the Ministry of State Security. Are you going to cooperate?” Obaid surrendered; his head and body were covered in a bag so tight that he couldn’t see or move unassisted; he was taken to an interrogation facility somewhere in Beijing and handcuffed to a chair. A Chinese intelligence officer asserted that Obaid was a terrorist financier who was organizing a plot by Pakistani militants to disrupt the G-20 summit scheduled for the next month, a source briefed on the case said. “Where are you hiding the terrorists? Where are you hiding the Pakistani militiamen?” demanded the interrogator. Obaid protested that he had no idea what they were talking about; they had the wrong man. He was subjected to a lengthy and painful interrogation ordeal. Fortunately, Ministry of State Security technicians were examining Obaid’s iPad and cellphone and checking the information against their own sources. Quickly, the Chinese concluded that an error had indeed been made: Saudi officials had given them false information about Obaid to arrest him as a terrorist and extradite him back to the kingdom. According to a knowledgeable source, a senior Ministry of State Security officer told Obaid: “Look, there’s been a mistake. Someone in your country called us five minutes before you landed in Beijing and said you were a terrorist financing a hit on the G-20 summit.” The Chinese official explained: “You are stuck in a power play in your country between two powerful princes.” Chinese intelligence officers, angry that they had been deceived, arranged for Obaid to quickly travel back to Shanghai and protected him for the rest of his stay in China. Meanwhile, the Saudis, who had hoped to snatch Obaid in Beijing, were furious that he had slipped their grasp. They sent agents to search hotels in Beijing, looking for the Abdullah clan’s operative. In Shanghai, Obaid received a call from Gen. Yousuf bin Ali al-Idrissi, deputy head of Saudi intelligence, telling him to fly back to Beijing and get on the Saudi plane that had been sent to pick him up, according to a source briefed on the case. Obaid turned again for advice to his patron, Prince Turki, who called Idrissi. According to a knowledgeable source, Turki said: “If the king wants it, it will be done. On whose behalf are you speaking?” Idrissi gave an ambiguous answer about who had ordered Obaid’s forced departure from China. Obaid stayed in Shanghai under close guard of the Ministry of State Security for another week. Because Obaid had a Swiss passport, he also received protection from the Swiss Consulate in Shanghai. A Jan. 11, 2017, letter to Obaid’s lawyer from Swiss Consul General Françoise Killias Zillweger confirms: “Referring to the assumption of responsibility for Mr. Tarek Obaid, I inform you that this Consulate Generale has provided benefits under the consular protection.” Turki arrived in China on Aug. 30 and spoke at the IFF meeting on Sept. 1; he was also photographed with President Xi Jinping. MBS arrived for the G-20 summit that took place in Hangzhou Sept. 4 and 5. By then, Obaid was on Turki’s private Airbus flying to Switzerland. The Chinese checked to make sure that Obaid had arrived safely in Geneva. Once there, Obaid was immediately treated at a specialized clinic for injuries he had suffered in China, according to a Swiss source. Then-Saudi Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman attends the Group of 20 opening ceremony at the Hangzhou International Expo Center on Sept. 4, 2016, in Hangzhou, China. (Pool/Getty Images) An embarrassing failure MBS spoke at the G-20 gathering about his Vision 2030 modernization plan. But privately, he was said to be upset when he learned about Idrissi’s embarrassing failure in the rendition effort. When he returned home, MBS conducted an “investigation” of the incident. Idrissi was fired as deputy chief of intelligence; he was replaced later by Gen. Ahmed al-Assiri — a man the Saudis would later dismiss on suspicion that he helped plot Khashoggi’s killing in Istanbul. The Saudis sent a special delegation to China to apologize for the misuse of intelligence channels in the Obaid case. A Saudi official close to MBS explained the kingdom’s chagrin, in a private statement to a fellow Saudi: “They were embarrassed by al-Idrissi’s mistake. I mean, Saudi Arabia was even embarrassed by this behavior. . . . He [Idrissi] made a mistake. He shouldn’t have done this.” Says Obaid of the false accusation that he was a terrorist: “There was clear abuse of power by incompetent thugs, but I don’t believe that the crown prince’s instructions were for these events to play out as they did.” But MBS’s royal court evidently didn’t learn the lesson. The suspicion of perceived enemies and desire for absolute control only deepened. Starting in the spring of 2017, the Saudis began a secret program for kidnapping dissidents and holding them at secret sites, according to knowledgeable U.S. and Saudi experts. The program involved a special “tiger team” operating in tandem with the Center for Studies and Media Affairs at the royal court, headed by Qahtani. Turki al-Sheikh, another close MBS adviser, helped oversee the interrogation sites, according to the U.S. and Saudi experts. MBS’s internal putsch gathered momentum last year, as the crown prince began to fear that his life was threatened. In June 2017, Mohammed bin Nayef was humiliatingly deposed as crown prince and replaced by MBS. In November, a week after Kushner’s visit, MBS rounded up his royal enemies, starting with Turki bin Abdullah, and warehoused them at the Ritz-Carlton. The detainees included some of the most senior princes and wealthiest commoners in the kingdom. After the Ritz-Carlton resumed its hotel business, new detainees were taken to secret sites. Several Saudi women’s rights activists were detained in May 2018, just a month before MBS removed the ban on women driving. MBS critics say that the crown prince didn’t want the female activists to get credit for his reform. One of the activists was so traumatized by her harsh treatment that she tried to commit suicide, according to a human rights activist, reportedly by slitting her wrists with a razor blade. Obaid remains in Switzerland. He’s under investigation there and in the United States on suspicion of improper payments from the Malaysian sovereign wealth fund, known as 1MDB, to a company called PetroSaudi International, which was founded by Turki bin Abdullah and Obaid. He has not been accused of any wrongdoing. A demonstrator holds a poster with a picture of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi outside the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul. (Osman Orsal/Reuters) A woman holds a poster during the funeral prayers in absentia for Khashoggi. (Emrah Gurel/AP) Brutal paranoia What’s haunting about this tale of family rivalry is that it helped breed the paranoia that led to Khashoggi’s death. Why didn’t anyone stop this deadly chain of error? The failed rendition of Obaid from China is eerily similar to the Khashoggi killing in Istanbul. In each case, the Saudis wanted to silence a meddlesome critic. When initial contacts failed, they attempted an illegal covert operation, each time under the direction of the deputy chief of intelligence, who had close links with the royal court. The deputy intelligence chief, each time, proved to be the fall guy; no hard evidence has emerged in either case documenting MBS’s role. Both operations appear to have been organized by a special cell within the royal court, where Qahtani was a key supervisor, not by the Saudi intelligence services. That’s reassuring to U.S. officials, who see as potential stabilizing forces Humaidan and his colleague Abdulaziz al-Howairini, the head of the internal security agency, known as the Mabahith. Perhaps the biggest difference between the two cases is that Obaid is alive in a suburb of Geneva, while Khashoggi is dead and dismembered, the whereabouts of his body unknown. The Saudi public prosecutor has arrested 18 Saudis in the case, including Maher Mutreb, a former intelligence officer and sometime bodyguard for MBS, who Saudi officials have charged was the leader of the team that murdered Khashoggi. Qahtani and Assiri have both been fired from their jobs, and Qahtani is among 17 Saudis sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury for their alleged roles in the Post journalist’s death. The Treasury statement said that Qahtani “was part of the planning and execution of the operation”and that Mutreb “coordinated and executed” it. Every Saudi watcher I spoke with believes that MBS is likely to survive in power, despite the global outrage over Khashoggi’s killing. The closest thing to a “smoking gun” in the Khashoggi case is that Qahtani is said to have exchanged multiple messages with MBS in the two days surrounding the journalist’s murder. But unless those messages are disclosed, it might be impossible to prove a connection. The brutal paranoia of MBS’s royal court in Riyadh recalls Baghdad in the days of Saddam Hussein. The spotlight cast by Khashoggi’s killing gives Saudi Arabia, and the United States, a last chance to check a slide toward Hussein-like despotism from overwhelming the region. The House of Saud rules with a sometimes bloody hand. The United States, as the kingdom’s key ally, has an obligation to calm this family feud before it does any more damage to Saudi Arabia and the world. Read more from David Ignatius’s archive, follow him on Twitter or subscribe to his updates on Facebook. Read more: David Ignatius: Why was MBS so afraid of Jamal Khashoggi? David Ignatius: The Saudi royal family circles its wagons in the Khashoggi crisis David Ignatius: The Saudi crown prince just made a very risky power play
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Donald Trump and Xi Jinping will meet over dinner at the G-20 meeting in Buenos Aires, marking a pivotal moment in the trade war Law & Politics |
President Donald Trump and China’s Xi Jinping will meet over dinner Saturday evening in Buenos Aires marking a pivotal moment in the escalating trade war between the world’s two largest economies. Trump is hopeful for a breakthrough with Xi but is ready to impose more tariffs if the upcoming talks don’t yield progress, Larry Kudlow, Trump’s top economic adviser, told reporters Tuesday during a briefing ahead of the Group of 20 meeting in Argentina. The president believes “there is a good possibility that we can make a deal” and he “is open to it,” Kudlow said later Tuesday. “As you can imagine this is a big deal, this meeting -- the stakes are very high,” Kudlow said. “It’s an opportunity to turn a new page, break through. President Xi can step up and come up with some new ideas for us.” The dinner with Xi is scheduled as one of the last events on Trump’s itinerary there before he returns to Washington, Kudlow said. He declined to say what other U.S. officials will join Trump in the session. Trump said on Monday that he will likely push forward with plans to increase tariffs on $200 billion of Chinese goods. In September, the Trump administration announced a 10 percent tariff on $200 billion of Chinese goods, and said the rate will rise to 25 percent on Jan. 1. If the two sides fail to reach a deal, Trump said he will also impose tariffs of either 10 percent or 25 percent on the remaining $267 billion in annual U.S. trade with China. Trump surprised his aides earlier this month with a call to Xi to restart the stalled negotiations. Since then, communications have picked up between the two sides, said Kudlow. “I don’t want to go overboard, but he’s indicated some optimism. We have an opportunity to extend that optimism, break some new ground,” Kudlow said. “So we’ll see.”
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26-NOV-2018 :: Armageddon Cryptogeddon and BITCOIN. World Currencies |
It was an in an article on Dec 30th 2016 that I wrote that my conviction Trade for 2017 was 1. Long BITCOIN. BITCOIN was trading at levels around $1,000.00 going into 2017. My Thesis was that BITCOIN and the entire crypto-currency World which had been very esoteric and something of a closed World of ''bug-eyed'' Gamers and the Off-Grid Folks who wanted throw the Yoke of Government off their backs, would ''mainstream'' And it ''mainstreamed'' beyond my wildest dreams through 2017. By November 2017 BITCOIN was knocking on the door of $10,0000.00 and on the 27th November 2017, I wrote an article captioned Bitcoin "Wow! What a Ride!" and advised booking the profits on the Trade. A more than 9.7x Price Inflation was getting uncomfortably close to outpacing the Tulip Mania [see Graph] BITCOIN's parabolic price rally had spawned thousands of other crypto currencies which were sold on the same grounds as the greatest South Sea Bubble prospectus: “For carrying on an undertaking of great advantage, but nobody to know what it is.”
The Price inflated further reaching a high of $19,763.00 on 18 dec 2017. By the first of January this year we had retreated to $13,428.00. On the 02-JAN-2018 I reiterated my Point to get out and said '' I am no longer bullish bitcoin, in fact, I am bearish'' At this point in time, I met Folks on these Streets who would pull out their Computer and show me how they were making money every second [Look at that they would say and indeed There was a number and it was ticking higher] mining BITCOIN. The recent cryptocurrency market decline has resulted in a similar drop in mining profitability and forced Chinese operators to sell their mining devices at a loss. Some mining machines are being sold on the second-hand market for merely 5 percent of their original value. Others would tell me, I've bought Nvidia. Crypto at this point was at Peak Phenomenon.
As I write this BITCOIN is trading at $3,650.00. I think its going right back to levels below $1,000.00.
We have yet to hit peak melt-down. The reason being so many Folks espouse the HODL philosophy.
GameKyuubi posted "I AM HODLING," a drunk, semi-coherent, typo-laden rant about his poor trading skills and determination to simply hold his bitcoin from that point on. "I type d that tyitle twice because I knew it was wrong the first time. Still wrong. w/e," he wrote in reference to the now-famous misspelling of "holding." "WHY AM I HOLDING? I'LL TELL YOU WHY," he continued. "It's because I'm a bad trader and I KNOW I'M A BAD TRADER. Yeah you good traders can spot the highs and the lows pit pat piffy wing wong wang just like that and make a millino bucks sure no problem bro."
He concluded that the best course was to hold, since "You only sell in a bear market if you are a good day trader or an illusioned noob. The people inbetween hold. In a zero-sum game such as this, traders can only take your money if you sell." He then confessed he'd had some whiskey and briefly mused about the spelling of whisk(e)y. [HODL Definition | Investopedia]
Selling at todays levels frankly is still a great Trade.
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"WHY AM I HOLDING? I'LL TELL YOU WHY," he continued. "Yeah you good traders can spot the highs and the lows pit pat piffy wing wong wang just like that and make a millino bucks sure no problem bro." World Currencies |
BREAKING DOWN 'HODL' The term HODL (or hodl) originated in 2013 with a post to the bitcointalk forum. The price of bitcoin had surged from under $15 in January 2013 to a high of over $1,100 at the beginning of December 2013. In the 24 hours to 10:00 a.m. UTC, Dec. 18 – possibly in response to reports of a Chinese crackdown – the price of bitcoin fell 39%, from $716 to $438, according to CoinDesk's bitcoin price index.
I AM HODLING At 10:03 a.m. UTC on Dec. 18, GameKyuubi posted "I AM HODLING," a drunk, semi-coherent, typo-laden rant about his poor trading skills and determination to simply hold his bitcoin from that point on. "I type d that tyitle twice because I knew it was wrong the first time. Still wrong. w/e," he wrote in reference to the now-famous misspelling of "holding." "WHY AM I HOLDING? I'LL TELL YOU WHY," he continued. "It's because I'm a bad trader and I KNOW I'M A BAD TRADER. Yeah you good traders can spot the highs and the lows pit pat piffy wing wong wang just like that and make a millino bucks sure no problem bro."
He concluded that the best course was to hold, since "You only sell in a bear market if you are a good day trader or an illusioned noob. The people inbetween hold. In a zero-sum game such as this, traders can only take your money if you sell." He then confessed he'd had some whiskey and briefly mused about the spelling of whisk(e)y.
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The Good News From Africa @bopinion @tylercowen Africa |
There’s a general feeling of optimism about Africa these days. And the good news, which runs deeper than rapidly improving health and quality-of-life indicators, deserves a closer look. Perhaps most significant, a relatively high proportion of sub-Saharan Africa is at peace today. It is more stable and less prone to conflict, relative to previous decades. Violence in the Congo region and Rwanda, for instance, killed millions in the 1990s. There is nothing comparable going on today. This general move toward greater peace has been detailed in a recent report from the Institute for Security Studies. This peace will also pay a demographic dividend, as the aging of Africa’s population, and the marrying off of many of its young males, will decrease the potential for conflict. Older, more settled populations are less likely to go to war. The costs of war are far more numerous than death. War can cause malnutrition, long-term damage to infrastructure, polarization and ruined politics, and the traumatization of entire populations. So the likely ongoing diminution of war in sub-Saharan Africa should bring many collateral benefits, boosting an overall positive dynamic. Not only have Ethiopia and Eritrea stopped fighting, for example, but they have also resumed open trade and travel, to the benefit of both countries. As long as peace holds, African nations should be able to continue to import new technologies from the rest of the world, and of course develop some of their own. That will lead to a virtuous circle of greater education, higher productivity, and more contentment with living standards, reinforcing the basic dynamic toward peace. A second dynamic is harder to measure or prove, but is also likely positive: greater national unity. It is a longstanding concern that the colonial powers drew African national borders that did not sufficiently correspond to the underlying ethnic and linguistic groups. That in turn boosted the probability of conflict and instability by making many nation-states prone to bickering over the nature of the regime. Furthermore, the colonial powers made this problem worse by instituting “divide and conquer” strategies in their territories. The Belgian rulers drew people’s attention to the underlying ethnic divisions — such as Tutsis and Hutus — in what is now Rwanda, for example, and the British did something comparable in Nigeria. One source of gain is simply that the colonial era is receding ever further into the past. In the meantime, a wide array of media outlets have helped to further African notions of national unity and cultural coherence. Soccer and other athletic teams compete on the world stage, and African players competing in Europe are portrayed as representatives of their nations, not particular ethnic groups. Commercial brands and celebrities help define national identities. Exposure to international media, most of all through smart phones and the internet, cements the notion that these regions are indeed perceived as nations by the outside world and that such designations are likely to stick. Mobile phones have knit together different African regions, and ethnic groups, in closer economic ties. The notion of a nation as an “imagined community,” to use a term from political scientist Benedict Anderson, is under accelerating construction in many parts of Africa. Cultures and cultural expectations are adapting to current borders, even given earlier injustices, thereby contributing to falling rates of violence and conflict. Unfortunately, Africa is exposed to a lot of “fake news,” perhaps more than Americans are. The good news, if you would call it that, is that Africans seem to be relatively skeptical of social media as a news source, and they put a relatively high degree of trust in international media. Better yet is that most Africans say that the internet has improved their politics and economics. For instance, 64 percent of Nigerians reported in 2017 that the increasing reach of the internet was good for Nigerian politics. That number compares to just 43 percent in 2014, and positive impressions of a similar nature are common throughout Africa. For all the talk about social media creating divisions (such as in Myanmar), the net effect of modern technology seems to be greater unity, including with respect to national borders. Many serious problems remain with respect to national identity — in places such as the Central African Republic, South Sudan and Cameroon — so a celebration would be premature. But, to pose a simple question, if you were asked to trade the Africa of the 1970s or ’90s for the Africa of today, the right answer would be pretty obvious. There has been so much net progress on the ground. The simple truth is that today’s Africa is still underrated.
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Mired in Western Aid Disputes, Tanzania's Leader Praises China @business Africa |
Tanzanian President John Magufuli criticized Western donors for tying conditions to aid, contrasting them with the Chinese who he said don’t meddle in African nations’ affairs when they lend money. Magufuli’s remarks follow recent spats with some donor countries, who’ve threatened to cut much-needed funding to the East African nation over what they describe as deteriorating human-rights conditions. “China are true friends who offer help without any conditions,” Magufuli said while opening a 90 billion shilling ($39 million) University of Dar es Salaam library built using a Chinese grant. “Free things are really expensive especially when they are provided by some countries. The only free things that won’t cost you anything are those provided by China.” Denmark is withholding 65 million krone ($9.8 million) in aid after Dar es Salaam’s regional commissioner made “unacceptable homophobic comments,” and the European Union is also reviewing its financial support. The World Bank suspended disbursement of a $300 million education loan and will only release the funds once the state meets certain conditions. The lender blocked the financing after Tanzania said it wouldn’t readmit schoolgirls that became pregnant. Human-rights groups warn governance in the $52 billion economy is taking a turn for the worse, with authorities detaining opposition leaders and free press advocates, and suspending medical services and HIV/AIDS treatment for members of the LGBTI community.
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South Africa Business Confidence at Lowest Since Junk Rating @economics Africa |
South African business confidence fell to the lowest level since the country lost its investment-grade credit rating, as political and policy uncertainty continue to weigh on sentiment. The gauge dropped to 31 in the fourth quarter from a revised 34 in the previous three months, FirstRand Ltd.’s Rand Merchant Bank division and the University of Stellenbosch’s Bureau for Economic Research said in an emailed statement Tuesday. Confidence is now at the lowest level since the second quarter of 2017, when former President Jacob Zuma’s move to fire Pravin Gordhan as finance minister saw the country’s debt cut to junk by S&P Global Ratings and Fitch Ratings Ltd. While Cyril Ramaphosa’s ascent to the presidency boosted business confidence earlier this year, sentiment has since cooled and the rand reversed all the gains that came on the back of the change in leadership. The ruling African National Congress’s decision to change the constitution to make it easier to expropriate land without compensation added to policy uncertainty, even as Ramaphosa’s moves to change some key ministers and the management of state companies such as Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd. were seen as positive steps. The mid-term budget last month painted a bleak picture of the nation’s finances, with government debt peaking at higher levels, and two years later, than previously forecast. The index level shows that seven of every 10 respondents are unhappy with prevailing business conditions, RMB said. “The reality is a multitude of political and policy issues, chief among them being the uncertainty around the government’s land-reform plans, continue to weigh down on confidence,” Ettienne le Roux, chief economist at RMB, said in the statement. “Unless these are resolved in a more speedily and concrete fashion, private-sector fixed investment, and by implication, economic growth will remain disappointingly low.”
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Zimbabwe Needs $171 Million to Deal With Rural Food Shortages Africa |
More than two million Zimbabweans may need support to buy food between January and March 2019, according to a report released Tuesday by the government and the World Food Programme. Fall armyworm, a pest that eats mainly corn, erratic rainfall and a decline in cash remittances sent to rural families by relatives contributed to food insecurity,” according to the the report, produced annually and known as the Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee. The worst affected areas are Matabeleland North, Masvingo and Matabeleland South, it said. “The country requires $140 million to buy cereals and $31 million for other food commodities to provide a full food basket for the vulnerable households,” the report said.
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.@MoodysInvSvc's says Kenya assets risk seizure by Chinese @BD_Africa Kenyan Economy |
Kenya is among countries at the highest risk of losing strategic assets to China over the pile of debt it owes Beijing, global ratings firm Moody’s Investor Service has said in a newly-released report that has raised eyebrows in public finance circles. Moody’s says in the report that China’s response to sub-Saharan Africa countries facing liquidity pressure has not been uniform or transparent - meaning predictability of credit implications are less clear. “Countries rich in natural resources, like Angola, Zambia, and Republic of the Congo, or with strategically important infrastructure, like ports or railways such as Kenya, are most vulnerable to the risk of losing control over important assets in negotiations with Chinese creditors,” Moody’s warns. Such countries are also at risk of being offered liquidity relief at higher resource concessions that only reduce the value of future export earnings. “Even if debt restructuring alleviates immediate liquidity pressure, the loss of natural resources revenue or other assets is credit negative,” Moody’s adds. Outside sub-Saharan Africa, China got land in exchange for some debt relief in Tajikistan and took control of the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka. Recent data from the National Treasury show that Chinese debt stood at Sh554.88 billion or 73.4 percent of total bilateral debt of Sh756.28 billion at the end of September. A large segment of the debt is linked to construction of the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR). “In general, concentrated exposure to a single creditor, with little transparency about decisions to restructure the terms of the debt, increases rollover risks, weakening the fiscal profile,” Moody’s said. The ratings agency says that for countries with narrow export bases, such as Kenya or Uganda, an increase in external debt associated with China's lending may not be met with sufficient and stable foreign-currency earnings in the future. Besides, Moody’s says, Chinese loans also come with relaxed conditions such as no call for structural reforms to enhance governance and competitiveness thus jeopardising the longer-term growth benefits from such loans. This is unlike World Bank and European Union development assistance that is often linked to compliance with objectives related to governance, socio-economic development, and democratic principles. Chinese lending to African countries increased to more than $10 billion (Sh1 trillion) annually between 2012 and 2017, from less than $1 billion ((Sh100 billion) in 2002. Angola (30 per cent), Ethiopia (10 per cent) and Kenya (seven percent) received almost half of all Chinese investment on the continent between 2000 and 2017, according to Moody’s.
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@KETRACO1 seeks approval for electric SGR line @BD_Africa Kenyan Economy |
The Kenya Electricity Transmission Company (KETRACO) has sought approval from the environmental watchdog to electrify the standard gauge railway (SGR) line between Mombasa and Nairobi. Nema through the latest Kenya Gazette notice says KETRACO had filed the Environmental Impact Assessment and is seeking to construct 12 transmission lines and 14 substations along the SGR line. The design of the SGR rail line — which is currently run by diesel-powered locomotives — allows for the addition of a single electric line. An electric track was mooted for fast movement of bigger containers and passengers in the quest to boost East Africa’s competitiveness as an investment destination. “Kenya Electricity Transmission Company IS proposing to construct twelve (12) transmission lines and fourteen (14) substations for supply of high voltage power to the Nairobi-Mombasa Standard Gauge Railway Line (SGR) and the economic belt along the railway line,” said NEMA in a public call for views on the project, which is expected to take 28 months. “The proposed project will traverse five (5) counties: Kilifi, Kwale, Taita Taveta, Makueni, and Machakos counties.” The electricity will also spur growth of factories, businesses and urban centres along the railway line, Ketraco added. Ketraco in January signed a $240 million (Sh24.4 billion) loan deal with China Electric Power Equipment and Technology Company Limited (CET) for the electrification. China Road and Bridge Corporation, which was appointed to build the Mombasa-Nairobi line, will be offered 15 per cent over the current construction costs of Sh327 billion or Sh49.05 billion more to upgrade the line. Kenya Railways earlier said electrifying the line would enhance the speed of the railway, but could not take Kenya to speeds of up to 250km per hour seen in developed nations such as China, Germany and UK. The move to electrify the rail comes at a time when Kenya Railways is need of more revenues to support the mega project that was built on debt. Cargo charges on the standard gauge railway (SGR) from Mombasa to Nairobi will rise by up to 79 per cent from January 1 in bid to raise more revenue to pay the Chinese operator.
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@KenGenKenya share price data Kenyan Economy |
Par Value: 2.50/- Closing Price: 7.00 Total Shares Issued: 6243873667.00 Market Capitalization: $426.409m EPS: 1.2 PE: 5.833
Energy Sales +6.00% to 7,989 Gwh What was interesting here is that with regional Interconnections and with a possible switch from a diesel powered SGR to an electric one The energy curve might will steepen and accelerate.
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.@Centum_Inv to launch Sh50bn private equity fund @BD_Africa Kenyan Economy |
“What we will be doing differently (under PE business) is that we will be raising third-party funds to invest alongside our own money,” he said. “We are not looking to invest in loss-making, turn-around situations, but entities that are already profitable and have some market leadership in one form or another.” The plan is to cut long-term debt, which stood at Sh11.38 billion at the end of September 2018, by paying them off on maturity without rolling over or renewing the facilities. Mr Mworia said the firm was looking at using proceeds from a “robust exit pipeline of mature assets” to pay off the debts which fall due, freeing up an average of Sh1.7 billion in annual debt service bill to enhance shareholder dividend payments. Centum has recently divested from firms such as regional micro-financier Platinum Credit and asset manager GenAfrica.
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Centum Investment Company Ltd reports H1 2018 EPS +64.25% Kenyan Economy |
Par Value: 0.50/- Closing Price: 26.50 Total Shares Issued: 665441775.00 Market Capitalization: 17,634,207,038 EPS: 3.96 PE: 6.692
6 months through 30th September 2018 versus through 30th September 2017 Sales 4.818287b versus 4.772045b Direct and Operating Costs [4.428471b] versus [4.233126b] Trading Profit 389.816m versus 548.919m Operating Loss from Financial Services [91.833m] versus [111.481m] Investment and Other Income 4.093440b versus 2.203492b Operating and Admin Costs [683.689m] versus [524.585m] Finance Costs [1.230388b] versus [557.253m] HY PBT 2.392198b versus 1.765589b HY PAT 2.079909b versus 1.631461b HY EPS 3.40 versus 2.07 HY Comprehensive Income 1.524082b versus 1.928075b
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